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REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK FORCE
ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS*
I. PREFACE
The New York Task Force on Women in the Courts has concluded
that gender bias against women litigants, attorneys and court em-
ployees is a pervasive problem with grave consequences. Women are
often denied equal justice, equal treatment and equal opportunity.
With leadership there will be change. Ultimately, reform depends
on the willingness of bench and bar to engage in intense self-
examination and on the public's resolve to demand a justice system
more fully committed to fairness and equality.
II. INTRODUCTION
Submission of the Report of the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts to the Honorable Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge of the
State of New York' culminates a twenty-two month investigation
undertaken on behalf of and under the auspices of the Unified Court
System of the State of New York. This Report reviews the status
and treatment of women who: (a) appear before the courts as
litigants; (b) practice in the courts as attorneys; and (c) are employed
by the courts as nonjudicial personnel. It sets forth the Task Force's
assessment of: (1) conditions in the courts that have an adverse
impact on the welfare of women; and (2) the consequences of gender
bias in the .courts; together with (3) the Task Force's recommen-
dations.
* The Report of the New York State Task Force on Women in the Courts
is an official report of the Unified Court System of the State of New York. The
Urban Law Journal has therefore published the complete Report corrected but essen-
tially unedited. The Journal has corrected substantive and typographical errors and
has added over 100 footnotes to identify the sources of quotations in the Report.
In addition, the Journal has changed footnotes more completely to conform to the
uniform citation rules for legal periodicals. Although the Journal has checked the
accuracy of all quotations in the Attorneys' Survey and identified the respondents
by a survey respondent number, demographic information concerning each respon-
dent was confidential and therefore could not be confirmed.
The Journal wishes to express its appreciation to Edward M. Roth, Member
of and Reporter to the Task Force, who assisted in the editorial process.
1. The Honorable Sol Wachtler was appointed Chief Judge of the State of
New York on January 2, 1985. Soon after his appointment, he communicated to
the Task Force his sense of the importance of its undertaking and requested that
the Task Force continue its work under his administration.
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On May 31, 1984, the Honorable Lawrence H. Cooke, Chief
Judge of the State of New York (1979-1984), announced the creation
of the Task Force. He stated that "in recent chapters of history
tremendous strides have been made by women in the legal structure
and operation of our State and Nation. The issue remains whether,
at this juncture, their allotment of the jurisprudential scheme in the
Empire State is fair under all the circumstances." 2
The Task Force was established to "examine the courts and identify
gender bias and, if found, make recommendations for its allevia-
tion." 3 "Gender bias" was defined by Chief Judge Cooke as em-
bracing "decisions ... made or actions taken because of weight
given to preconceived notions of sexual roles rather than upon a
fair and unswayed appraisal of merit as to each person or situation." 4
The scope of the Task Force's mandate was sweeping; it was re-
quested to review "all aspects of the [court] system, both substantive
and procedural" 5 and ascertain whether "there are statutes, rules,
practices, or conduct that work unfairness or undue hardship on
women in our courts."96
When examining these issues the Task Force could not overlook
the history of women's experiences in the courts. New York's con-
temporary legal culture arose out of an environment in which women
were denied or had limited access to the courts. At common law,
women were incapable of ordering their legal affairs:
The husband and the wife were treated as one person and marriage
operated as a suspension, in most respects, of the legal existence
of the latter. From this supposed unity of husband and wife
sprang all the disabilities of married women. She could not make
a binding contract or commence an action, because either would
imply that she had a separate existence. 7
Women, permitted to practice law in New York since 1886,8 have
entered the profession in significant numbers only within the past
fifteen years. Women could not serve as petit or grand jurors until
2. Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, Remarks at Press Conference Announcing For-
mation of New York Task Force on Women in the Courts (May 31, 1984) (for full
text, see infra Appendix A) [hereinafter Remarks of Cooke].
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 591-92, 23 N.E. 17, 19 (1889); see P.
BINGHAM, THE LAW OF INFANCY AND COVERTURE 182 (1849).
8. See 1886 N.Y. Laws 425.
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19409 and were granted an automatic exemption from jury duty until
1975.10
Just as the historical perspective could not be ignored, neither
could the considerable progress women have made towards achieving
equality. New York was a leader among the states in eliminating
by statute these absolute disabilities." Women are now presumed to
enjoy nearly the same rights and responsibilities as do men. Barriers
to women's professional and civic participation in New York's courts
have been removed. Our lawmakers have become more sensitive to
prejudicial, gender-based stereotypes.12
But the laws of New York, no matter how enlightened, are not
self-executing. Judges, -attorneys and court administrators must breathe
life into legal reforms.
The Task Force has concluded that gender bias against women
litigants, attorneys and court employees is a pervasive problem with
grave consequences. Women are often denied equal justice, equal
treatment, and equal opportunity. Cultural stereotypes of women's
role in marriage and in society daily distort courts' application of
substantive law. Women uniquely, disproportionately and with un-
9. See 1940 N.Y. Laws 202; see id. § 596 (qualification that juror be "[a]
male citizen of the United States" changed to "a citizen of the United States");
see also In re Grilli, 110 Misc. 45, 179 N.Y.S. 795 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1920),
aff'd sub nom. In re Matthiessen, 191 A.D. 951, 181 N.Y.S. 945 (1st Dep't 1920).
10. See 1975 N.Y. Laws 4. This exemption was replaced with a gender-neutral
exemption for anyone taking care of a child under the age of 16. See id. ch. 382,
§ 1.
11. See 1848 N.Y. Laws 200 (enabling women to own property and enter into
contracts in their own names). The courts, however, construed these statutes nar-
rowly, stating that it was not their purpose to absolve a woman "from due obedience
and submission to her husband as head and master of his household, or to depose
him from the headship of his family, which the common law gave him." Coleman
v. Burr, 93 N.Y. 17, 24 (1883); accord Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N.Y. 199, 204 (1877)
("the disabilities of a married woman are general, and exist at common law. The
capabilities are created by statute, and are few in number and exceptional"); see
also Heller v. Heller, 172 Misc. 875, 876, 15 N.Y.S.2d 469, 471 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1939), aff'd mem., 259 A.D. 852, 19 N.Y.S.2d 509 (2d Dep't 1940), aff'd,
285 N.Y. 572, 33 N.E.2d 247 (1941); Brandt v. Brandt, 144 Misc. 318, 321, 259
N.Y.S. 100, 102-03 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1932), aff'd, 238 A.D. 831, 262 N.Y.S.
973 (1st Dep't 1933).
12. For example, the New York Legislature has expressly prohibited sex-based
discrimination in employment, see N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 296-301 (McKinney 1982);
education, see N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3201-a (McKinney 1981); extension of credit,
see N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (McKinney 1982); and public accomodations. See
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2) (McKinney 1982). See generally NEW YORK CITY COM-
MISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, LEGISLATIVE ACHIEVEMENTS FOR WOMEN IN NEW
YORK STATE: A 20-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE 1965-1985 (1985).
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acceptable frequency must endure a climate of condescension, in-
difference and hostility. Whether as attorneys or court employees,
women are too often denied equal opportunities to realize their
potential.
The problems women face-rooted in a web of prejudice, cir-
cumstance, privilege, custom, misinformation, and indifference-
affect women of every age, race, region and economic status. When
women are poor or economically dependent, their problems are
compounded. They often must traverse the justice system alone,
facing indifference or contempt. Problems are perpetuated by some
attorneys' and judges' misinformed belief that complaints by women
are contrivances of overwrought imaginations and hypersensitivities.
More was found in this examination of gender bias in the courts
than bruised feelings resulting from rude or callous behavior. Real
hardships are borne by women. An exacting price is ultimately paid
by our entire society. The courts are viewed by a substantial group
of our citizenry as a male-dominated institution disposed to dis-
criminate against persons who are not part of its traditional con-
stituency.
This perception and the reality on which it is based require the
immediate and sustained attention of New York State's judicial and
political leadership and the professional legal community. Active
leadership by New York's judicial hierarchy that makes clear that
gender-based discrimination in the courts will not be tolerated is an
indispensable component of meaningful reform. The assistance and
cooperation of bar associations, law enforcement agencies, public
employee unions and law schools should be enlisted to ensure that
all court system participants are aware of the adverse conditions
women face in our courts and of the means by which these conditions
can be eliminated. Appropriate administrative and legislative action
should then follow.
III. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE TASK FORCE'S
INQUIRY
The Task Force was determined to learn about the experiences
of women who have dealt with New York's court system in its
judicial or administrative capacities. The following summarizes the
approach of the Task Force and the fact-finding methods and sources
it employed. 3
13. All materials that comprise the Record of the Task Force are available for
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The Task Force considered relevant to its inquiry the following
questions: What are the perceptions of women and men-judges,
lawyers and laypersons-of the treatment of women in the courts?
What treatment do women actually receive? Are women treated
differently from men?
In attempting to answer these questions, the Task Force took the
following steps:
A. Review of Research and Literature
The Task Force reviewed numerous articles in legal, judicial and
social science publications respecting issues affecting women in the
courts, including the areas of domestic violence, rape, equitable
distribution, maintenance, child support, support awards enforce-
ment, juvenile and adult sentencing, and the courtroom treatment
of women litigants, witnesses and attorneys.14 The Task Force also
reviewed published materials from task forces in other states. 5
B. Selection of Advisors
The Task Force selected four advisors knowledgeable about issues
relating to women in the courts:
Hon. Marjory D. Fields, Judge of the Family Court, Bronx
County, Co-Chair of the Governor's Commission on Domestic
Violence, author of numerous articles and handbooks in the field
of domestic violence and former Managing Attorney of the Family
Law Unit of Brooklyn Legal Services Corporation B;
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Esq., Director of the National Judicial
Program to Promote Equality for Women in the Courts, which,
since 1980, has designed and participated in judicial education
programs about gender bias for more than twenty state and
national judicial colleges; Member of the New Jersey Supreme
Court Task Force on Women in the Courts and of the National
inspection at the Office of Court Administration, 270 Broadway, New York, New
York 10027.
14. For a bibliography of introductory materials on issues affecting women in
the courts reviewed by the Task Force, see infra Appendix B.
15. See generally THE FIRST YEAR REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (1984). New Jersey Chief Justice Robert
N. Wilentz established the New Jersey Task Force, the first of its kind, in 1982.
See id. at 5. Similar investigations are underway in Rhode Island and Arizona.
See Empirical Study Finds Gender Bias in Rhode Island Courts, Nat'l L.J., Feb.
17, 1986, at 13, col. 1.
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Gender Bias Task Force of the National Association of Women
Judges; Advisor to the Rhode Island Supreme Court Committee
on the Treatment of Women in the Courts and the Arizona Task
Force on Gender and Justice;
Lucia Beadel Whisenand, Esq., Member of the New York Com-
mission on Child Support and a Law Clerk to the Supervising
Judge of the New York Family Court, Onondaga County; First
Director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Legal Studies at Syra-
cuse University College of Law and Formal Chairperson of the
Syracuse Human Rights Commission;
Norma Juliet Wikler, Ph.D., First Director of the National Judicial
Education Program to Promote Equality for Women and Men
in the Courts, Member of the National Gender Bias Task Force
of the National Association of Women Judges, Advisor to the
New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in the Courts,
and Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Cali-
fornia, Santa Cruz.
C. Public Hearings
The Task Force held four public hearings over a period of seven
months-one in Albany, one in Rochester and two in New York
City-at which eighty-five witnesses testified. 16 The Task Force spe-
cifically invited testimony from persons with special expertise in
matters affecting women in the courts, including matrimonial lawyers,
prosecutors in sex crimes units and representatives of women's and
father's rights organizations and battered women's shelters. The
public, public officials and bar associations were notified of the
time, place and nature of the hearings and invited to give testimony
on any subject relevant to the Task Force's inquiry. 7 Many witnesses
submitted written materials to the Task Force. These included per-
sonal statements of attorneys and litigants about their experiences
in the courts and scholarly commentary and research on issues
affecting women in the courts.
16. For a schedule of witnesses who appeared at the public hearings, see infra
Appendix C. Witnesses are identified in this Report according to their affiliations
at the time they testified. Citations refer to the transcripts of the individual hearings.
17. Advance publicity included issuing press releases and, for the fourth hearing,
mailing 3,000 notices to organizations throughout New York State. Signers for the
deaf attended each hearing.
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D. Regional Meetings with Judges and Attorneys
Through local bar associations, attorneys practicing in the regions
surrounding, and including, Albany, Buffalo, Kingston, New York
City, Rochester and Syracuse were invited to engage in informal
discussions with groups of Task Force members. Judges received
personal invitations. At each meeting, attendees were asked to assess
how gender bias affects the courtroom environment and the appli-
cation of substantive law, to relate the evidence supporting their
assessments, and to suggest how conditions could be improved. The
Task Force also met with members of the New York State Association
of Women Judges to discuss these issues.
E. Regional Listening Sessions
The Task Force was charged with conducting a statewide inves-
tigation. Because the courts' role and presence in communities differ
depending on geographical proximity to an urban center, the Task
Force determined that first-hand information should be obtained
from representative areas not having ready access to the public
hearings and regional meetings. With the assistance of Cornell Uni-
versity's Cooperative Extension Program, the Task Force's Chairman
and an advisor to the Task Force planned and held informal meetings
with residents of Oneida, Oswego, Jefferson, Herkimer and Lewis
Counties. 8 Lay residents who attended the sessions offered their
views on how the courts affect the welfare of women in their
communities.
F. Surrogate's Court Survey of Fee-Generating Appointments
The Task Force received complaints that women attorneys are
disproportionately denied judicial appointments as counsel in lucra-
tive and complex cases. Although limited resources and personnel
18. A 1984 study published by the New York State Legislative Commission on
Rural Resources divided upstate counties into six categories determined by economic,
geographic and demographic considerations. See P. EBERTS, SOCIOECONOMIC TRENDS
IN RURAL NEW YORK STATE: TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY 144 (Sept. 1984). The coun-
ties in which listening sessions were held were chosen so that each classification of
counties would be represented: upstate metropolitan (Oneida); rural under extensive
urban influence (Oswego); rural under considerable urban influence (Jefferson); rural
under moderate urban influence (Herkimer); rural under limited urban influence
(Lewis). See generally REPORT ON LISTENING SESSIONS HELD IN NON-METROPOLITAN
AREAS (undated) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter LISTEN-
ING SESSIONS].
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prevented the Task Force from reviewing all mechanisms by which
counsel are assigned in civil and criminal cases in New York State,
a limited study involving the surrogate's court was attempted.
Questionnaires were sent to the surrogates of each of New York's
sixty-two counties asking them to describe how they appoint counsel
in cases involving probate and the settlement of estates and trusts.
They were asked to tally the number of appointments women at-
torneys received. A similar inquiry was made into appointments of
guardians ad litem.' 9
G. Inquiry into the Judicial Nominating Process
The Task Force examined the appointive and elective processes
for institutional impediments to women's gaining parity in judgeships.
Questionnaires were sent to the judicial nominating commission
for the court of appeals, the governor's judicial screening com-
mittees, and to every bar association that renders recommendations
for judicial candidates. Inquiry was made into the composition of
the panels, the number of women who have applied for judgeships
and who have been favorably reported on, and the existence of any
policies providing for the active recruitment of women candidates
for judgeships. 20
H. Inquiry into the Status of Women Court Personnel: Report
of the Center for Women in Government
The Task Force engaged the Center for Women in Government
at the State University of New York, Albany, which has studied
the status of women in the New York State and New York City
civil service systems, to conduct a study of the employment practices
and working conditions in the Unified Court System as they affect
female nonjudicial employees. The Center's work for the Task Force
had three components: (1) a statistical analysis of women's distri-
bution in the full range of employment grades; (2) structured in-
terviews with employees and administrators; and (3) a textual analysis
of UCS personnel rules with attention to their impact on women.
On November 22, 1985, the Center submitted to the Task Force
19. For a copy of the transmittal letter and the questionnaire sent to the New
York Surrogate's Courts, see infra Appendix D.
20. For a copy of the transmittal letters and questionnaires sent to judicial
nominating commissions and bar association judicial screening committees, see infra
Appendix E.
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its report, entitled: "The Effects of Personnel Practices on Non-
Judicial Female Employees of the New York State Unified Court
System" (Center Report).2 The Center Report is incorporated, in
part, into the section of this Report devoted to the Status of Women
Court Employees.
I. Attorneys' Survey
The Task Force conducted a survey (Attorneys' Survey) of at-
torneys' perceptions and experiences of gender bias in state courts.
The survey instrument-a questionnaire with 107 close-ended ques-
tions and space for narrative responses-solicited information about
forms of gender bias in the courts that had been raised by witnesses
at the Task Force's statewide public hearings, regional meetings,
and rural listening sessions.22
Questions were grouped into the following topics: courtroom in-
teraction; credibility of female litigants and attorneys; equitable dis-
tribution; maintenance; child support; custody; domestic violence;
rape; adult sentencing; juvenile justice; negligence; counsel fees and
fee-generating positions. Respondents were instructed to answer ques-
tions only in those areas of law in which they had had experience
in the past two years. 23 They were encouraged to write detailed
21. See generally C. CHERTOS & R. LASALLE, THE EFFECTS OF PERSONNEL PRAC-
TICES ON NON-JUDICIAL FEMALE EMPLOYEES OF THE NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT
SYSTEM (1985) [hereinafter CENTER REPORT].
22. For a copy of the survey questionnaire distributed to attorneys, see infra
Appendix F.
23. As a result, although 1,759 attorneys responded to the survey (twenty-five
attorneys did not indicate their sex), varying numbers of attorneys responded to
questions relating to each topic:
TOPIC: NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS RESPONDING:
TOTAL FEMALE MALE
Courtroom Interaction 1,759 634 1,100
Credibility 1,759 634 1,100
Equitable Distribution 659 220 431
Maintenance 662 220 436
Child Support 679 241 431
Custody 659 229 423
Domestic Violence 690 251 432
Rape 243 77 165
Adult Sentencing 489 122 362
Juvenile Justice 395 108 285
Negligence 619 117 494
Counsel Fees & Fee-
Generating Positions 959 284 664
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comments pertaining to the questions asked, to call the Task Force's
attention to aspects of gender bias not dealt with in the questionnaire,
and to submit transcripts documenting problems.
The purpose of the Attorneys' Survey was to collect systematic
data on attorneys' perceptions and experiences of gender bias in the
courts. It was also intended to provide a vehicle for attorneys to
communicate directly (and in detail, if desired) to the Task Force
their views about the effects of gender on courtroom interaction,
on the application of substantive law, and to raise other issues
pertaining to gender bias in the courts. 24
Through the cooperation of several bar associations, the ques-
tionnaires were distributed widely to attorneys throughout the state.
The New York State Bar Association included 42,500 questionnaires
as inserts in the June, 1985 issue of the New York State Bar News.
Six other bar associations and a legal service unit mailed an additional
7,500 questionnaires to their members. 25 Completed questionnaires
were received from 1,759 attorneys, of whom approximately thirty
percent added written comments.
26
Slightly more than one-third of the survey respondents (634) were
women; almost two-thirds (1,100) were men. (Twenty-five respond-
ents did not indicate their sex). Inasmuch as women constitute an
See R.L. ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS' PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER BIAS WITHIN THE NEW.
YORK STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, app. A, at 9, 21, 25, 30, 39, 48, 57, 66, 71, 73,
76, 79 (Dec. 1985) [hereinafter R.L. ASSOCIATES].
24. There was a wide range of reactions to the distribution of the survey. An
upstate prosecutor told a Task Force member that by reading the questionnaire he
became more conscious of a number of. issues and, as a result, spoke with the
women attorneys in his office about their own experiences and perceptions of gender
bias in the courts. Another survey respondent wrote:
Many male colleagues have singled me out with laughing questions about
the survey. Many of them think it a nuisance-something very unimportant
and they refuse to answer and return it. Not only do they not want to
think about these issues, they also are oblivious of the role they play
in perpetuating destructive attitudes.
Twenty-nine-year-old rural female.
Id., app. B, at 11-12 (Survey Respondent No. 0326F).
25. These associations are Broome County Bar Association, Chemung County
Bar Association, Erie County Bar Association, National Lawyer's Guild, New York
Chapter, Rockland County Bar Association, Suffolk County Bar Association, Wom-
en's Bar Association of the State of New York and District Counsel 37 Municipal
Employees Legal Services.
26. The response rate to this survey should be calculated on the basis of all
attorneys who litigate in New York State courts. This number is not known. Some
rough measure can be gained from combining the memberships of the New York
State Bar Association Trial Lawyers and Family Law Sections, which stand, re-
spectively, at 5,093 and 2,961. See Women in the Legal Profession (NYSBA Mar.
1986) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
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estimated fifteen to twenty percent of attorneys admitted to practice
in New York State,2 7 there was a disproportionately higher response
from women than from men.
The survey revealed that male and female attorneys often hold
very different perceptions of the existence and frequency of unde-
sirable courtroom behaviors, the extent to which gender affects
credibility and the degree to which the application of substantive
law is disadvantageous to women. In this sample, women attorneys
saw gender bias as a much more frequent and pervasive problem
than did male attorneys.
The survey data were also analyzed by age category (below age
35, 36-50, above 51) and by region (downstate, upstate urban, and
upstate rural). 28 The statistical profile of responses shows that, al-
though there was a slight trend toward younger attorneys of both
sexes perceiving more gender bias than did older attorneys, age was
not a significant factor. Similarly, apart from a few questions,
responses were consistent across the three regions. 29
27. There exists no precise, readily available compilation of the number of
women currently admitted to practice law in New York. Henry Miller, Esq., President
of the New York State Bar Association, estimated that in 1984, 14 percent of
attorneys in New York were women. See New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts Public Hearing 54 (Nov. 19, 1984) (New York City) (testimony of Henry
Miller) [hereinafter New York City Hearings I]. In 1985, 18 percent of attorneys
nationwide were women. See BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS Table 22, at 175 (Jan. 1986).
28. The following counties were included in each region: Downstate: Bronx,
Kings, New York, Queens, Richmond, Nassau, Suffolk and Westchester; Upstate
Urban: Albany, Broome, Dutchess, Erie, Niagara, Oneida, Onondaga, Orange,
Rensselaer, Saratoga, Schenectady and Ulster; Upstate Rural: the remaining 42
counties in New York. Narrative responses quoted in this Report were identified
by region, with the downstate region further identified as "New York City" and
"Suburban" (Westchester, Nassau, and Suffolk). Narrative responses from upstate
regions were denominated simply as "Urban" and "Rural."
29. When interpreting the survey results and considering their implications, two
important methodological questions arise: (1) to what extent do the views expressed
by attorneys in this sample reflect the views of other attorneys in New York State?
and (2) to what extent do they reflect objective reality? The survey responses
received by the Task Force cannot be generalized to describe the perceptions and
experiences of all New York attorneys who currently litigate in New York State
courts. This degree of generalization would have required a scientifically selected
probability sample of attorneys drawn from a known "universe" of attorneys who
had been identified as having certain relevant characteristics.
This survey investigated the perceptions and personal experiences of responding
attorneys. The extent to which these perceptions correspond to actual conditions
can be measured, in part, by comparison to other data collected by the Task Force.
The survey results and data from the public hearings, regional meetings, listening
sessions, existing studies and transcripts consistently revealed similar concerns
throughout the state and are mutually corroborative.
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IV. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The remainder of this Report sets forth in detail the Task Force's
findings relating to the status and treatment of women litigants,
women attorneys and women court employees in New York State's
court system. The subjects treated are not an exhaustive list of issues
affecting women in the courts. Given the magnitude of the Task
Force's charge, its most difficult decision was the initial selection
of areas of investigation. Time and resource limitations precluded
full examination of "all aspects of the [court] system, both sub-
stantive and procedural." 30 Accordingly, the Task Force limited its
study to those matters that appeared to have the most profound
effect on the welfare of the greatest number of women. In making
these choices, the Task Force recognized that areas other than those
studied are also worthy of scrutiny in the future.'
During the course of its inquiry, more than 2,000 judges, lawyers
and laypersons communicated with the Task Force through public
hearings, regional meetings, rural listening sessions, the Attorneys'
Survey and letters. The opinions and views expressed reflect a wide
spectrum of personal experiences, backgrounds and agendas. Because
of the often elusive nature of the subject matter and the gravity of
many claims made, the Task Force was committed to examining the
record it compiled thoroughly, deliberately and dispassion-
ately. Findings were adopted only when well-corroborated in the
record. The factual basis underlying the findings and the identity
of sources are set forth at length.
Recommendations to improve conditions follow each general topic.
They range from general recommendations for the exercise of lead-
ership by the judiciary and the organized bar to specific administrative
and legislative reforms. They call for the participation of all persons
and groups-judges, legislators, attorneys, court employees, law en-
forcement agencies, bar associations, court administrators, law schools
and public employee unions-who affect the operations of the courts.
A separate section of this Report is devoted to overarching rec-
ommendations for institutionalizing reform and monitoring progress.
V. STATUS OF WOMEN LITIGANTS
From the threshold of the judicial process to the ultimate dis-
position of the case there are obvious signs of women litigants'-
particularly poor and minority women-underclass status in our
30. Remarks of Cooke, supra note 2, Appendix A.
31. For the Task Force's recommendations of topics for future study, see infra
Appendix G.
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courts. Throughout New York State, women litigants: (1) have lim-
ited access to the courts; (2) are denied credibility; and (3) face a
judiciary underinformed about matters integral to many women's
welfare.
Problems of inadequate information are best understood in the
context of how they affect specific areas of substantive law that
particularly involve women litigants' claims: domestic violence, rape,
post-divorce division of assets, spousal and child suport, and custody.
In each of these areas, cultural myths about women's role in the
family and in society and expectations about appropriate modes of
behavior at times obscure considerations that are highly relevant to
the decision-making process.
Women's lack of credibility is apparent in the way they are
treated in the courthouse and in the judicial decision-making pro-
cess. Women are sometimes treated dismissively, like burdensome
children, or disrespectfully, like sexual objects. This affects women's
access to the courts by creating an inhospitable environ-
ment. Decision-making is marred when the results reached in cases
consciously or unconsciously reflect not the merits of the case or
the spirit of the law to be applied, but instead prejudiced views of
sex roles and characteristics-that women's claims are not to be
believed and that women are subordinate to men in the marital
relationship.
Problems of access arise, in part, from many women's financial
inability to retain counsel in civil cases and the inadequacy of public
mechanisms for appointing counsel. Women are, therefore, often
unable to plead their causes effectively. Courthouse facilities often
fail to accomodate the special needs of women. No place is provided
for the children whom many women have no alternative but to bring
to court.
The Task Force's discussion of the status of women litigants is
divided into four principal parts: (1) the courts' response to violence
against women; (2) the courts' enforcement of women's economic
rights; (3) the courts' consideration of gender in custody determi-
nations; and (4) the courtroom environment.
A. The Courts' Response To Violence Against Women
Violence against women is a problem of dramatic proportions in
New York. In 1984, there were 41,688 calls to police in domestic
violence-related cases.32 During the same year, New York Family
32. See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1984 CRIME
& JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 122.
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Court figures show that 24,737 new family-offense petitions were
filed, the overwhelming majority of which were brought by women
against their husbands. 3 In 38.5% (24,565) of the 63,853 divorces
granted in New York during 1984, physical cruelty was cited as the
reason for termination of the marriage.34 There were 5,471 reported
incidents of rape and attempted rape in New York during 1984, of
which 1,536 involved the use of a weapon."
New York's courts are principally charged with performing two
functions in redressing violence against women: (1) they must review
and enforce civil and criminal petitions and orders seeking or man-
dating protection of women against abuse from spouses or other
family members; and (2) they must hear criminal prosecutions brought
against men charged with committing assaults and sex-related crimes
against women.
1. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
"Domestic violence is the physical or psychological abuse of one
family member by another. This violence occurs in all social groups.
Any family member can be a victim, but experience has shown that
women, children and elderly relatives are the most frequent vic-
tims."3 6
Over the past decade, there has been an impressive legislative
response to domestic violence against women in New York. In 1979,
the Governor's Task Force on Domestic Violence (since reconstituted
33. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS (1984).
34. See NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, 1984 VITAL STATISTICS; MARRIAGE
IN UPSTATE NEW YORK AND DISSOLUTIONS OF MARRIAGE IN NEW YORK STATE Table
11 (in press). Section 170(1) of the New York Domestic Relations Law provides that
a divorce shall be granted based upon "[tlhe cruel and inhuman treatment of the
plaintiff" when the conduct of the "defendant so endangers the physical or mental
well being of the plaintiff as [to render] it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to
cohabit with the defendant." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (McKinney 1977). The
nature of violence in the marital setting can in part be measured by the fact that
under this statute, courts have held that one or two separate single blows by the
defendant are not sufficient grounds to grant a diyorce. See Rios v. Rios, 34 A.D.2d
325, 311 N.Y.S.2d 664 (1st Dep't 1970), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 840, 277 N.E.2d
786, 327 N.Y.S.2d 853 (1971); Melville v. Melville, 29 A.D.2d 970, 289 N.Y.S.2d
416 (2d Dep't 1968); see also Cinquemani v. Cinquemani, 42 A.D.2d 851, 346
N.Y.S.2d 875 (2d Dep't 1973) (Munder, J., dissenting).
35. See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 1984 CRIMES
AND JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT. The United States Department of Justice estimates
that 47% of rapes nationwide go unreported. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE CRIME OF RAPE BULLETIN Table 7, at 3 (Mar. 1985).
36. TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STATE OF NEW YORK, DOMESTIC VIOL-
ENCE: SECOND REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 2 (Nov. 1982)
[hereinafter TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SECOND REPORT].
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by Governor Cuomo as the Governor's Commission on Domestic
Violence) was established to "advise the Governor and the Legislature
as to the most effective way for State government to respond to
the critical law enforcement and social problems posed by domestic
violence." '3 7 Because of the work of the Commission and guber-
natorial and bipartisan legislative support, many legal reforms have
been enacted. 8
Principal among these reforms was the amendment of Article 8
of the Family Court Act, which governs the procedure in family-
offense cases. As originally drafted in 1962, the article decriminalized
family offenses; its focus was "not punishment, but practical help." 3 9
As amended, the article provides that "a family court proceeding
is a civil proceeding and is for the purpose of attempting to stop
the violence, end the family disruption and obtain protection. '40 It
also provides that no law enforcement official, prosecutor, court
employee or other "official ... shall discourage or prevent any
person who wishes to file a petition or sign a complaint from having
access to any court for that purpose. '41
The victim of a family offense has two options when seeking
court-ordered protection4 2 from harassment, menacing, reckless en-
dangerment, assault and disorderly conduct. 43 The most widely used
mechanism is a family court order of protection, which is granted
37. N.Y. Exec. Order No. 90 (May 17, 1979).
38. See generally TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SECOND REPORT, supra
note 36, at 6-21. Reform was sometimes difficult to effectuate. As the Domestic
Violence Commission observed:
[Albuse of women and children was once sanctioned at common law.
Until 100 years ago, children and wives had no legal status; they were
deemed the property of their fathers and husbands and were under their
exclusive control. The influence of that historical legal system has resisted
explicit changes in law and ostensible changes in social values. It survives
today in the form of tacit condonation of abuse of weaker family
members.
TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, STATE OF -NEW YORK, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE 2 (Feb. 1980).
39. REPORT OF JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMM. ON COURT REORGANIZATION OF N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney 1983); see 1962 N.Y. Laws 3428, 3444.
40. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 1983).
41. Id. § 812(3).
42. For excellent practitioners' and laypersons' guides to family-offense matters,
see M. FIELDS, TRIAL OF FAMILY OFFENSES IN THE FAMILY COURT (1984) [hereinafter
TRIAL OF FAMILY OFFENSES); M. FIELDS & E. LEHMAN, HANDBOOK FOR BEATEN
WOMEN (rev. ed. 1984). Copies can be obtained free of charge by writing to the
Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence, Erastus Corning Building, Albany,
New York 12223.
43. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985); see also
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(1) (McKinney 1984).
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upon a showing (after filing a verified petition) that the petitioner
has suffered or is likely to suffer abuse at the hands of a family
member. 44 Indigent petitioners and respondents have a statutory right
to court-appointed counsel. 45
The same procedure exists in the criminal courts. Once a sworn
accusatory instrument is filed, any complainant or witness may
request an order of protection.4 6 Prosecutorial discretion to decline
to prosecute the case limits the availability of this option. 47
An order of protection may, among other things, direct the of-
fending party to cease all abusive conduct and to leave or remain
away from the family home. When children are involved, the order
may require supervised or restricted visitation or may prohibit vis-
itation. A violation of the terms of an order of protection subjects
the offending party to arrest and to being held in contempt of
court.4
The Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law, by and
large, provide an effective framework for providing relief from
domestic violence. A petitioner is granted prompt access to court
44. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828, 841(d), 842 (McKinney 1983).
45. See id. § 262(a)(ii). The Family Court Act provides for the hearing of
petitions for orders of protection on an expedited basis. See id. § 153-c. When a
temporary order is requested, the petition must be filed "without delay on the
same day such person first appears at the family court, and a hearing on that
request shall be held on the same day or the next day that the family court is
open." Id. Upon a showing of "good cause," temporary orders of protection
may be granted ex parte. See id. § 828. A temporary order is not a finding of
wrongdoing. See id.
46. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.11-530.13 (McKinney 1984).
47. The options for proceeding in the family court or in the criminal courts
are mutually exclusive. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 813, 821, 845 (McKinney 1983
& Supp. 1985); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 100.07 (McKinney 1981). The petitioner
may, within 72 hours of filing, however, transfer the matter from the family court
to the criminal court, provided that there has been no determination on the merits.
See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 812(2)(e), 813(3), 821(2)-(3) (McKinney 1983); see also
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(2)(e) (McKinney 1984). Even after 72 hours have
passed, a judge of the family court may, with the consent of the petitioner and
notice to the prosecutor, transfer the matter to a criminal court in the "interests
of justice.". N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 813(1) (McKinney 1983).
48. An order of protection is analogous to a warrant for the arrest of a person
violating its terms. See id. §§ 155, 168(1). Upon its issuance, the police are deemed
to owe a "special duty" to the person to be protected. Sorichetti v. City of New
York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 482 N.E.2d 70, 492 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1985). In New York
City, police officers are directed to arrest the "offender if there is probable cause
to believe he/she has violated an existing, current Order of Protection, and [the]
complainant wants arrest effected." CITY OF NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT, INTERIM
ORDER No. 16, at 3 (Apr. 2, 1984). "An arrest must be made in all felony cases,
including cases where the victim does not want the offender arrested." Id. at 2
(emphasis omitted).
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and, when indigent, appointed counsel. The court has broad dis-
cretion in fashioning relief. Law enforcement agencies have a special
duty to protect the beneficiary of a protection order.
This abstract efficacy stands in stark contrast to the reality some
women face when seeking court-ordered protection. Seventeen public
hearing witnesses-judges, lawyers, academics and representatives
from shelters for battered women-addressed the issue of domestic
violence in their testimony. They were unanimously of the opinion
that barriers to the fulfillment of the laws' remedial purposes remain.
Information obtained by the Task Force at its regional meetings,
at its listening sessions, through the Attorneys' Survey and in tran-
scripts confirms this view. Judges, law enforcement officials and court
personnel often misconceive the nature and effect of violence against
women. Women's claims are too often met with incredulity or are
ascribed to ulterior motives. The courts appear indifferent and women
are denied effective relief.
(a) Understanding Domestic Violence
The Task Force found that many judges appear not to understand
the nature of domestic violence and the characteristics of offenders
and victims. The quality of justice women receive is affected ac-
cordingly,
[Blattered women are characterized by low self-esteem, passivity,
feelings of helplessness and hopelessness, both emotional and
financial dependence on [their] partner[s], isolation and a lack of
social support .... The battered woman frequently experiences
ambivalence in her life structure. She tends to blame herself and
accepts responsibility for the abuse. A battered woman encounters
a society loaded with harmful myths about her, few real facts
about the reality of domestic violence, and even fewer services
for her and the abuser.4 9
Ironically, the conflicted psychological state of family-violence vic-
tims-and the failure of some judges to recognize it-prevents women
from gaining the relief to which they are entitled.
Judge Richard D. Huttner, Administrative Judge of the New York
City Family Court, testified that he had "heard some colleagues
49. New York Task Force on Women in the Courts Public Hearing 48 (Mar.
5, 1985) (Rochester) (testimony of Mary Lee Sulkowski) [hereinafter Rochester
Hearings]. See generally L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984)
[hereinafter BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME].
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state"50 and at one time agreed (but has since changed his view)
that:
I don't feel sorry for them. Why don't they just get up and
leave? They have been taking these beatings all these years and
now they want me to intercede. All they have to do is get out
of the house. It is as simple as that. What do they want from
me?"1
Barbara Bartoletti, Director of Women's Issues and Social Policy
for the New York State League of Women Voters, described the
findings of a League study that included interviews with judges,
intake officers, advocates and shelter personnel:
[A]IIl too often professionals in the court system are not adequately
trained in the psychology of battering on the battered wife syn-
drome and its effects on the victim. Too often ... it is still
believed that women must like being battered or they would leave
their abusers. Intake officers, often the first court personnel to
see the victim, are not taking this crime seriously unless the physical
signs are too obvious to ignore. Consequently, they may not
inform the victims of their options.12
Some judges' seeming lack of understanding of the nature of domestic
violence causes them to fail to credit petitioners' claims of victim-
ization. Police, court personnel and judges too often presume that
the victim provoked the incident, and that the assumed provocation
excuses the violence.
Victim blaming is common .... Judges say to a woman when
she walks in the courtroom, "What did you do to provoke him?"
It is incomprehensible to a judge that this woman could have
been battered without some justifying action on her part. 3
50. New York Task Force on Women in the Courts Public Hearing 123 (May
7, 1985) (New York City) (testimony of Richard D. Huttner) [hereinafter New
York City Hearings H].
51. Id.
52. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 155-56 (testimony of Barbara
Bartoletti).
53. Id. at 115 (testimony of Marjory D. Fields). Barbara Harris, director of a
shelter for battered women at the Rockaway YM-YWHA, advised the Task Force that
"court personnel [are] most unsympathetic to the plight of battered women ....
-[Miore than one judge has made remarks like, 'What did you do to deserve this
treatment?' " Letter from Barbara Harris to Hon. Edward McLaughlin (June 26,
1985). Many of the women utilizing this shelter are Orthodox Jews. See id. According
to Ms. Harris, "These observant women have had particular difficulty in the court.
[There are] slurs like 'What is a nice Jewish girl doing in a situation like this?'
This is certainly most unprofessional on the part of court personnel." Id.
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More pernicious still is some judges' requirement of visible physical
injuries before granting an order of protection. More than thirty-
five percent of male and female respondents to the Attorneys' Survey
reported that judges in family court and criminal courts "some-
times" or "often" ask petitioners why they have no visible injuries.14
Although evidence of physical injury is relevent to the request for
an order of protection, it is not the sine qua non of domestic violence.
Psychological abuse, threats of violence and menacing with a weapon
do not leave physical scars.5 Injuries are often to parts of the body
covered by clothing: breasts, abdomen, groin. 6 The judicial requests
for visible proof of injury are perceived to betray an attitude that
women's testimony is not credible unless corroborated by a bruise,
a laceration or a black eye.
The heightened scrutiny of battered women's credibility is "in
direct contrast to the facts of the domestic-violence litera-
ture: Battered women don't exaggerate; they tend to minimize, to
deny the severity and the extent of the abuse, to protect the abuser
and to hide their shame." '5 7
54. Female and male survey respondents reported that petitioners for orders of
protection are asked why they have no visible injuries:
IN FAMILY COURT (F%/M%):
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/2 16/13 24/23 22/26 13/18 22/18
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 60.
IN CRIMINAL COURT (F%/M%):
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/3 16/12 25/25 17/22 9/16 30/22
Id., app. A, at 61.
55. See L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 43, 74-75 (1979) [hereinafter BAT-
TERED WOMAN]; see also Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, in DARK
SIDE OF FAMILIES 20 (1983); M. PAGELOW, WOMAN-BATTERING: VICTIMS AND THEIR
EXPERIENCES (1981).
56. See A. Flitcraft, Battered Women: An Emergency Room Epidemiology with
a Description of a Clinical Syndrome and Critique of Present Therapeutics 19
(1977) (Yale Medical School unpublished dissertation).
57. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 49-50 (testimony of Mary Lee Sul-
kowski). One observation shared by a number of witnessess appearing before the
Task Force is that courts fail to inquire into all the incidents of abuse set forth
in the petition. Instead, they focus only on the most recent incident. In gaining
only a limited perspective of the claim before them, these judges erroneously tend
to mitigate the seriousness of the case. In other instances, the police department's
intent on settling the case and accepting lesser charges for the husband's violent
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(b) Access to Court and Availability of Counsel
It appears that some judges, court personnel and law enforcement
officials are indifferent to the criminal nature of domestic violence
and ignore the statutory prohibition against discouraging domestic-
violence victims' Choice of seeking legal relief in either a criminal
court or the family court.5" Family violence victims with unambiguous
claims that a crime has been committed are dissuaded from pro-
ceeding in criminal court.
Forty-eight percent of women and thirty percent of men responding
to the Attorneys' Survey reported that women are "sometimes" or
"often" discouraged from seeking orders of protection in criminal
court.5 9 Fifty-eight percent of both women and men survey respond-
ents reported that district attorneys are "sometimes" or "often"
unwilling to prosecute domestic-violence complaints in criminal court.6
This conduct reinforces battered women's perception that their claims
are not treated seriously by the courts.
Witnesses and survey respondents recounted numerous incidents
of domestic-violence victims being referred from court to court by
police, court personnel and judges. Jo-Ann Mullen, Community
Services Coordinator of Families in Violence, a project of the Sche-
nectady YWCA, testified:
It is the stated policy of at least one Police Court to give no
orders of protection. It was the policy of the Albany Police.Court,
stated to me by the court clerk and the assistant district attorney[,]
that all married women who come to that court are routinely
actions ignores the facts of the abuse entirely. See New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts Public Hearing 147-48 (Jan. 29, 1985) (Albany) (testimony of Jo-
Ann Mullen) [hereinafter Albany Hearings].
58. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(3) (McKinney 1983); see also N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 530.11(3) (McKinney 1984).
59. Female and male survey respondents (FV/Mo) reported that family-violence
victims are discouraged from seeking orders of protection in criminal courts:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/3 23/12 25/18 18/30 10/20 21/18
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 63.
60 Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that district at-
torneys decline to prosecute domestic violence complaints in criminal courts:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
4/3 32/27 26/31 15/22 5/6 17/10
Id., app. A, at 59.
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sent to [flamily [clourt. Women report to me that the [f]amily
[clourt gatekeepers and judges in that county turn all the unmar-
ried women back to police court, even in cases where the law gives.
the victim access to [flamily [c]ourt. 6 1
A family court judge, responding to the Attorneys' Survey, con-
curred:
There continues to exist in the "law enforcement community"
(police, prosecutor, criminal [c]ourt judges) a belief that domestic
violence cases are "only" family problems and not criminal mat-
ters. We continue to receive "transfers" from the [c]riminal [c]ourt.
In other cases, the [c]riminal [c]ourt judge "forces" the petitioner
to go to [flamily [c]ourt and file a new petition. Both are in-
appropriate.
Thirty-nine-year-old rural male family court judge62
Twenty-four percent of men and thirty-five percent of women re-
sponding to the Attorneys' Survey reported that domestic violence
victims are "often" or "sometimes" discouraged by court or pro-
bation personnel from petitioning for orders of protection in family
court .63
(c) Victims' Failure to Press Complaints
A significant number of domestic-violence victims fail to follow
through with family court and criminal court proceedings. During
1982, 39.8% (9,017) of the 22,647 family-offense petitions brought
statewide in family court were either withdrawn or dismissed because
of failure to prosecute. 64 Judge Edward Spain of the Troy Police
Court testified that women's failure to proceed has "caused some
concern among prosecutors and many mixed feelings among our
judiciary as to the prudent way of dealing with issues arising out
61. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 145-46 (testimony of Jo-Ann Mullen).
62. R.L. AssocLATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 41 (Survey Respondent No.
0978M).
63. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that potential
petitioners are discouraged by family court or probation personnel from seeking
orders of protection:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
2/1 12/8 23/16 31/34 11/25 21/16
Id., app. A, at 62.
64. See FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS
Table A-45, at 173 (1983).
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of a woman's reluctance to press an existing domestic violence
complaint.' '65
Battered women who bring petitions but fail to proceed are deterred
in part because of the treatment they receive in court. Joan Bukoskey
of Unity House Families in Crisis Program, located in Troy, testified:
Another problem is the ridiculing, belittling and verbal abuse that
some battered women receive not only by [p]olice [clourt person-
nel[,] but by [p]olice [clourt judges as well. One woman appeared
in court, and the judge's initial statement was, "Well, well, well,
we had a little domestic squabble, did we? Naughty, naughty. Let's
kiss and make up, and get out of my court." When women are
subjected to repeated sarcasm [and] ridicule not only from person-
nel but [p]olice [clourt judges, it's no wonder that they are fearful
to both carry through and initiate charges in [ciriminal [c]ourt."1
Virginia Burns, Lecturer in Criminal Justice at the State University
of New York at Brockport, testified:
The rationale for prosecutors' reluctance in acting on cases of
wife battering is that most women drop the charges. But the
reality is that attorneys fail to see how their own attitudes affect
victims. Women in victim crisis internalize the blame implied by
authorities, perceive their handling by the courts as a secondary
victimization and often abandon legal recourse. 67
Judge Amy Juviler of the New York City Criminal Court testified
that "men and women in the court system" have one of two responses
to women's failure to proceed: either they smile, thinking that the
court's "minor intercession" has left "these people living happily
ever after," or they "snicker. ' 68 Judge Juviler said of the "snick-
ering" response:
65. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 100 (testimony of Edward Spain). Judge
Spain added that among the reasons for not proceeding are that "most of them
have either been threatened by the defendant or at least threatened by the hardships
brought about by their dependence on the defendant. I believe that we have a
responsibility to [the victim] despite her unwillingness to cooperate." Id. at 104.
66. Id. at 212 (testimony of Joan Bukoskey). Judge Amy Juviler testified that
whatever reluctance a domestic violence victim may feel about seeing the batterer
jailed is compounded in the Bronx and Manhattan by the fact that "complaining
witnesses are left to prosecute criminal cases forever on their own, and ... that
is an impossible task." New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 238 (testimony
of Amy Juviler).
67. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 179 (testimony of Virginia Burns).
68. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 244-45 (testimony of Amy
Juviler).
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I don't think it is because the people in the court system believe
that the woman made a false complaint. . . . I think that what
they think is that the woman who accepts this violent behavior
and reconciles with the man[,] even if she reconciles in a split but
doesn't pursue the case, isn't worthy of our respect because she
does not respect herself, and I believe that that is unfair and I
believe that is one place where we have to rethink. 69
Judge Spain suggested that despite the reasons a victim may give
for seeking to withdraw, such as that the parties have reconciled
or that she is concerned that he will lose his job by going to jail
or that she is responsible for his violence, "it is probable that a
great many of these non-cooperative victims have been intimidated
by the defendant." 7 0 Jo-Ann Mullen shared this view, stat-
ing: "Waiting rooms to the courts do not separate victims from
assailants. The man is free to sit and harass and coerce the woman
or to try to cajole her into dropping the charges. Judges do not
ask if the woman was coerced."
' 71
Effective help, once a woman finally seeks protection, increases
the likelihood that she will pursue her legal rights. "[W]hen the
police come on the scene and effectively intervene, backing up the
woman and telling her she has the right to get something done .. .
she is reinforced in her ability to follow through. ' 72 Timely avail-
ability of counsel or assistance of an advocate is also critical.
A courtroom has an intimidating male-dominated atmosphere.
Some judges may tolerate verbally abusive or harassing behavior
by the abuser towards the victim because they are husband and
wife. Thus we may have the dilemma of a doubly intimidating,
even hostile system versus a passive immobilized domestic violence
victim who needs to be assertive not only to get her legal rights
and due process, but to find out what they are. 73
69. Id. at 245-46.
70. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 101 (testimony of Edward Spain).
71. Id. at 166 (testimony of Jo-Ann Mullen). At the Kingston regional meeting,
Ulster County Family Court Judge Karen Peters reported that there is only one
uniformed guard in the court and that there have been incidents of violence when
petitioners and respondents were in the waiting room together with no security
officer present.
72. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 169-70 (testimony of Jo-Ann Mullen).
73. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 56 (testimony of Mary Lee Sulkowski).
Advocates affiliated with battered-women's shelters may appear in court only to
the extent the court permits. Jo-Ann Mullen testified:
[Aidvocates are allowed into [flamily [clourt only if the judge sees fit.
Some counties do not permit advocates in the courtroom at all. The
terrified woman is often bullied by the judge even when an advocate is
present. . .. I hear from women all the time that it is much worse when
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Although indigent domestic-violence petitioners are entitled to ap-
pointment of counsel, in practice they do not receive the full benefit
of counsel. Under the Family Court Act, those entitled to court-
appointed counsel receive assistance from a lawyer only after their
first appearance in the courtroom. 4 They are, therefore, deprived
of crucial pre-appearance advice, petition drafting and representation
during that first appearance.
(d) Mutual Orders of Protection
Mutual orders of protection direct each party not to harass,
menace, recklessly endanger, attempt to assault or assault the other
party. The Task Force found that many family court judges routinely
enter mutual orders of protection in family-offense proceedings upon
the mere oral request of respondents or sua sponte without prior
notice to petitioners and without an opportunity for rebuttal tes-
timony by petitioners. Nearly two-thirds of male (sixty-five percent)
and female (sixty-six percent) survey respondents reported that judges
"often" or "sometimes" issue mutual orders even though respond-
ents have not filed petitions. 75
Mutual orders of protection issued in this manner create the
appearance that both parties have been found to be violent, not-
withstanding the absence of proof of the petitioner's conduct. 76 As
Judge Richard Huttner testified:
[T]he woman who came to court for help, is now herself a subject
of the order of protection, having had no notice of the allegations
made by the respondent, totally unprepared to meet them, not
having had the opportunity to consult with an attorney beforehand,
the man had usually six weeks to seek counsel and to prepare his
case, and the lady six seconds. This is not due process, and it is
unfair."
no advocate is present.
Albany Hearings, supra, note 57, at 155 (testimony of Jo-Ann Mullen).
74. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 262(a) (McKinney 1983).
75. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that mutual orders
of protection are issued even though respondents have not filed petitions:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
5/1 38/28 27/38 14/18 5/7 11/8
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 59.
76. Indeed, the family court lacks jurisdiction to issue a mutual order of
protection when no cross-petition has been filed by the respondent. See N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT §§ 821, 826 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985).
77. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 133 (testimony of Richard
D. Huttner).
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In subsequent family court proceedings, the petitioner will be seen
as aggressive, provocative or violent-equally responsible for the
violence or abuse. As a result, the court may be reluctant to grant
a more restrictive order of protection directing the respondent to
stay away from the marital home or to hold the respondent in
contempt if there is another violent incident. The domestic-violence
victim with a mutual order of protection is in a worse position than
if she had no order.
The issuance of such orders reinforce[s] the historical fallacy that
battered women are responsible for partners' behavior and are
equal and active participants in the violence .... A woman who
experiences difficulty in [en]forcing a mutual order of protection
is left with little protection and her partner is given the message
that his behavior is excusable and he will not be held accountable
for his violence, thus perpetuating the cycle of battering.7 8
A mutual order gives police ambiguous direction regarding its
enforcement. Officers are put in the position of doing nothing or
of arresting both parties because of a violation of the order.
The police don't know what to do with [mutual orders]. They
go into a domestic violence situation and are very confused, getting
conflicting reports of what happened. And I've talked with them,
and when there is a mutual order of protection, they throw up
their hands. They have no guidance. They don't know what to
do, and, in general, arrests are not made. 79
The victim may withdraw the request for police assistance because
the arrest of both parents requires placement of the children with
child protective services. She may be unaware of the true import
of a mutual order 0 and call the police, to her ultimate regret.
One rationale proffered for issuing mutual orders of protection
78. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 211-15 (testimony of Nancy Lowery).
79. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 215 (testimony of Joan Bukoskey). At
the Rochester hearing, Phyllis Korn, Executive Director of Alternatives for Battered
Women, Inc., a Rochester shelter, and a member of the Governor's Commission
on Domestic Violence, played a tape recording made by a domestic-violence victim
who called the police when her husband, who had previously strangled and raped
her, attempted to gain entry to her home. When the police arrived and saw that
she had a mutual order of protection, they insisted that she allow her husband
into the house and talk with him. See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 93-
96 (testimony of Phyllis Korn).
80. In a June, 1984 New York City Family Court transcript provided to the
Task Force, a judge issued a mutual order of protection "on consent" at the
request of the husband's attorney, when no grounds were alleged and the petitioner
did not speak. The judge mischaracterized the mutual order to the petitioner by
saying it meant only "he is not to assault, menace, harass, or endanger [you]."
(transcript available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
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is that women sometimes request orders of protection as "tactics"
in matrimonial actions. Orders of protection are, therefore, made
mutual to "neutralize" perceived tactical advantages. 1
The Task Force believes this view to be ill-founded. Women often
seek an order of protection after starting a matrimonial action
because this is when violence is most likely to occur.
[Plost service of matrimonial summons is an extremely dangerous
point in the violent relationship. The service of a matrimonial
summons is a statement of assertiveness. The woman is standing
up for herself. She is asserting her right to control her own life.
The one thing the wife-beater does not allow is his wife to assert
herself. 82
Moreover, there exist profound disincentives to a petitioner's re-
questing an order of protection as a mere litigation tactic. If the
family court petition and divorce complaint have the same allegations,
a dismissal of the petition could be given collateral estoppel effect
in the matrimonial action. The family court hearing gives the re-
spondent discovery of the petitioner's cause of action for divorce
to which the respondent would not be entitled in the matrimonial
action.83 Finally, the petitioner is required to try her case twice,
creating a record that can be used against her on cross-examination
in a subsequent proceeding. These factors make it unlikely that
petitioners will misuse family-offense proceedings as tactics in ma-
trimonial actions. 84
(e) Custody, Visitation and Removing the Batterer from the
Home
Custody awards to fathers who are acknowledged wife beaters
and the refusal of some judges to order supervised visitation when
the noncustodial father has been violent were cited by many witnesses
as further demonstrating the attitude that "wife beating is not wor-
81. See, e.g., Arlyn T. v. Harold T., 107 Misc. 2d 672, 435 N.Y.S.2d 651
(Family Ct. N.Y. County 1981); Ardis S. v. Sanford S., 88 Misc. 2d 724, 389
N.Y.S.2d 529 (Family Ct. Kings County 1976).
82. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 112-13 (testimony of Marjory
D. Fields).
83. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 3130 (McKinney 1970).
84. It was suggested that respondents may coerce petitioners to consent to a
mutual order of protection. When, for example, a battered woman seeking a divorce
and custody of children also seeks an order of protection, the husband may agree
to give up custody if the wife agrees to a mutual order. See Rochester Hearings,
supra note 49, at 212 (testimony of Nancy Lowery); see also Albany Hearings,
supra note 57, at 216-17 (testimony of Joan Bukoskey).
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thy of serious attention." 85 Fifty-four percent of women and thirty-
one percent of men responding to the Attorneys' Survey reported that
custody awards "sometimes" or "often" disregard the father's violence
against the mother.16 Sixty-six percent of women and fifty-three per-
cent of men reported that petitioners' requests for supervised visita-
tion are "sometimes" or "often" refused or ignored, with nearly one-
third of women (thirty-two percent) reporting "often." 87
Jo-Ann Mullen, of the Schenectady YWCA Families in Violence
program, testified:
Visitation often puts women in jeopardy; and even in the most
serious battering cases, the judge, always, when awarding custody
insists that the husband or father be allowed to see the children.
I know of one case where the father used visitation to have his
wife raped. She was too demoralized to bring any charges.88
Some judges appear to be unaware of or to underestimate the
harm to children associated with the abuse of their mother. Marjory
D. Fields, Co-Chair of the Governor's Commission on Domestic
Violence testified that "[j]udges have said on the record in the
courtroom and in social gatherings, '[j]ust because he beats his wife
does not mean he is a bad father.' "89 Stephen Hassett, Esq., of
the Family Law Unit of Buffalo Neighborhood Legal Services, stated:
[B]atterers have found a new weapon in the custody arena. Battered
women are losing custody because courts refuse to consider a
85. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 284 (testimony of Betty
Ellerin).
86. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that custody awards
disregard father's violence, against mother:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
6/* 24/9 30/22 21/38 9/22 10/8
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 55. The asterisk (*) means less than
half of one percent. See id.
87. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that petitioners'
requests for supervised visitation between respondent and children are refused or
ignored:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
2/1 32/18 34/35 16/29 4/5 12/12
Id., app. A, at 60.
88. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 156-57 (testimony of Jo-Ann Mullen).
89. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 117 (testimony of Marjory
D. Fields).
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batterer's violence as evidence of his parental unfitness. Unless
the battering has been directed at the children themselves, the
courts will generally not deny custody or limit visitation solely
on the basis of the father's violence against the mother ....
[FIrequently courts will believe that wife beating will end with
divorce and that supervised visitation . . . [is] unnecessary, Many
battered women are threatened with loss of custody or contempt
if they attempt to take precautions to protect themselves from
access by the batterer. 9°
This problem persists at the trial court level, notwithstanding ap-
pellate decisions holding that spouse abuse witnessed by children is
a basis for suspension of visitation or for requiring supervised vis-
itation.91
Children who witness their fathers beating their mothers suffer
slowed development and sleep disturbance and feel helpless, fearful,
depressed and anxious. 92 Studies show that these children also suffer
90. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 16-17 (testimony of Stephen Hassett).
In Blake v. Blake, 106 A.D.2d 916, 483 N.Y.S.2d 879 (4th Dep't 1984) (reversing
trial court, unreported decision), a family court judge awarded custody to the father
despite uncontroverted evidence that the father had physically abused the mother
for several years, on occasion in the presence of the childeren. See Hearing Transcript
at 83, Blake v. Blake, No. 0-47-84 (Family Ct. Jefferson County Mar. 20, 1984).
The judge stated that he based his decision on having "walked past" the battered
women's shelter to which the woman and children had fled and determined that
this was an inappropriate living arrangement for the children and the father therefore
provided a better home. Id. Phyllis Korn pointed out that in addition to the gender
bias implicit in awarding custody to the more affluent spouse evidenced in this
case, "[plermanent custody determinations further incorporate gender bias . . . in
domestic-violence cases when they fail to recognize that children frequently side
with the perceived position of power, and may choose to align themselves with
the male abuser." Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 90 (testimony of Phyllis
Korn). A survey respondent wrote:
I have been particularly stumped by the judicial attitudes and orders in
child custody over the last few years. I have seen joint custody awarded
to batterers when the women and children are living in shelters at time
of [the] hearing.
Thirty-two-year-old suburban female
R.L. ASSOcIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 26 (Survey Respondent No. 0680F)
(emphasis in original).
91. See Katz v. Katz, 97 A.D.2d 398, 467 N.Y.S.2d 223 (2d Dep't 1983)
(supervised visitation); Goldring v. Goldring, 73 A.D.2d 955, 424 N.Y.S.2d 270
(2d Dep't 1980) (visitation suspended); Molier v. Molier, 53 A.D.2d 996, 386
N.Y.S.2d 226 (3d Dep't 1976) (visitation suspended), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 718, 385
N.E.2d 1299, 413 N.Y.S.2d 372 (1978); Serrano v. Serrano, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1986,
at 17, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Kings County Jan. 16, 1986) (visitation denied).
92. See A. WOHL & B. KAUFMAN, SILENT SCREAMS AND HIDDEN CRIES 10, 135
(1985); Hilberman & Munson, Sixty Battered Women, 2 VICTIMOLOGY 460, 463
(1978) [hereinafter Hilberman & Munson]; Pfouts, Schopler & Henley, Forgotten
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somatic symptoms; they have more hospitalizations, colds, sore throats
and bedwetting than children from homes in which there was no
violence. 93 A high correlation was found between spouse abuse and
child abuse. 94
Witnesses and survey respondents also expressed concern at the
unwillingness of some judges to remove a batterer from the family
home in situations that appear to warrant such action. 9 Brooklyn
District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman testified that some judges er-
roneously believe that when the man holds title to the home, he
cannot be required to leave, and they force the woman who is the vic-
tim to find shelter elsewhere.96 Thirty-eight percent of women and sev-
enteen percent of men responding to the Attorneys' Survey reported
that judges "rarely" or "never" issue orders of protection directing
respondents to leave the marital home to enable women and children
who have left because of violence to return. Two respondents wrote:
Protective orders may be granted but exclusive use and occupancy
of the marital residence is very difficult to obtain. Only in cases
of extreme violence, when the woman and children are in a shelter,
is this relief readily granted.
Thirty-five-year-old rural female97
Judges will not remove a party from the home unless there has
been a severe beating.
Thirty-year-old rural female98
Victims of Family Violence, 27 Soc. WORK 367-68 (1982); see also BATTERED
WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 49, at 63-64.
93. See Pagelow, Children in Violent Families: Direct and Indirect Victims, in
YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 59 (Hill & Barnes eds. 1982); HILBERMAN
& MUNSON, supra note 92, at 463.
94. See Rosenbaum & O'Leary, Children: The Unintended Victims of Marital
Violence, 51 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 692, 698-99 (1981).
95. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that when a woman
is in a shelter or otherwise out of the marital home because of violence, judges
issue orders of protection directing respondents to leave the marital home to enable
the women and children to return:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/6 12/34 35/30 30/14 8/3 12/13
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 57.
96. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 48-49 (testimony of
Elizabeth Holtzman).
97. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 79 (Survey Respondent No.
1747F).
98. ld., app. B, at 36 (Survey Respondent No. 0893F) (emphasis in original).
A recent issue of the Park Slope (Brooklyn) Safe Homes Project newsletter described
a case in which a judge refused to remove a batterer from his home despite requests
for such action from the man's psychiatrist and New York City's Special Services
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Judge Richard Huttner acknowledged that many judges are re-
luctant to exclude a man from the house absent what they perceive
as severe danger, and that this forces the children out of the home, 99
away from school and friends, and into a shelter, because the mother
cannot stay and she is not going to leave the children. 1°°
(f) Enforcement, Mediation and Self-Defense
Witnesses charged that courts do not enforce orders of protection
and that delay compounds the violation. According to Mary Lee
Sulkowski of Haven House, a Buffalo battered women's shelter:
A woman who files a violation of the order of protection will
for Children. See Levy, Abusers Protected, Abused Neglected, 2 WIVES' TALES No.
3, at 3 (undated) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office).
99. Ellen L. Bassuk, M.D., Associate Professor of Psychiatry at Harvard Medical
School and author of a study of homeless families living in shelters, estimates that
forty percent of women who seek aid from public shelters are battered wives. The
findings of Dr. Bassuk's study, which involved 116 homeless mothers and 205
children staying in 14 family shelters and 10 welfare hotels throughout the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts, was published in the spring of 1986. See Homeless
Kids: "Forgotten Faces," NEWSWEEK, Jan. 6, 1986, at 20.
100. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 137 (testimony of Richard
Huttner). Marjory D. Fields, Esq., Co-Chairman of the Governor's Commission
on Domestic Violence, testified about a case in which a husband had been convicted
of assault in the second degree against his wife. See New York City Hearings I,
supra note 27, at 118 (testimony of Marjory Fields). During the period between
conviction and sentencing the judge refused to order him out of the marital home,
in effect forcing the victim and the children to stay in a shelter at the state's
expense. See id.
The refusal of many judges to exclude a man from the home can have critical
consequences for the woman who seeks such an order specifically to protect her
children. For instance, Carolyn Kubitschek reported a case in which a woman
sought an order excluding her husband from the home because he beat up their
teenaged son. See id. at 162 (testimony of Carolyn Kubitshek). Although this
order was refused, the Department of Social Services, which is routinely notified
by the probation officer handling intake when child abuse is involved, asserted
that the judge had issued such an order, charged the mother with abuse and neglect
for allowing the husband in the home and removed the teenaged son and a nursing
infant from the home. See id. at 162-63. This woman is now suing the New York
Department of Social Services for damages. See Complaint, Davis v. Kong, 84 Civ.
No. 7372 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1984). The attorney for the woman, David Lansner, of
New York City, advised the Task Force that it is not uncommon for women to have
their children removed from the home when they go to court seeking protection for
them from the father, and that this is particularly true in sexual abuse cases. Telephone
Interview with David Lansner, Esq., in New York City (Feb. 21, 1986). He described
a case in which a sixteen-year-old girl was placed in foster care and could not under-
stand why she, who had done nothing wrong, was removed from her home, but
her father was allowed to stay. See id. Mr. Lansner stated that he is handling a
similar case at the current time. See id.
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probably wait at least six weeks to come before the judge, and
during that period of time [she] experience[s] more abuse and
ha[s] to file another violation. When the abuser appears before
the judge, he will probably be scolded: it is extremely rare for
a judge to arrest an abuser and send him to jail or even to
remand him to [a] rehabilitation counseling program for batter-
ers . . . . So, in fact, there are no consequences for violating an
order of protection.' 0'
Wynn Gerhard, Esq., Acting Director of Neighborhood Legal
Services in Buffalo, shared this view:
Another recurring problem in family offense cases involves the
inadequate enforcement of orders of protection by the courts.
These orders are only effective if the courts back them up....
[T]he Family Court Act gives judges discretion regarding enforce-
ment, including the authority to commit a recalcitrant respondent
to jail for up to six months, or to make and suspend such a
sentence.... [T]he [flamily [clourt should not ignore the avail-
ability of strong enforcement measures which could also have a
deterrent effect in other cases. 02
District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman testified that "[d]efendants
against whom a written order of protection is issued may not be
verbally admonished to obey it. If they disobey it or if they are
convicted of a crime associated with their battering, they are likely
to receive a light punishment, if any at all."'0 3 Joan Bukoskey stated
that in her two years as an advocate for domestic-violence victims
she had "never seen anyone jailed by a [flamily .[c]ourt judge for
a violation."'0 Mary Lee Sulkowski pointed out that judges' failure
to use arrest as a sanction reflects unawareness of recent studies
demonstrating the effectiveness of arrest as a deterrent. 105
101. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 55 (testimony of Mary Lee Sulkowski).
102. Id. at 83 (testimony of Wynn Gerhard).
103. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 48 (testimony of Elizabeth
Holtzman).
104. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 218 (testimony of Joan Bukoskey).
105. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 55-56 (testimony of Mary Lee Sul-
kowski). In 1981-82, the Police Foundation conducted a study in which police
officers were directed to respond to domestic-violence complaints in one of three
ways selected by lottery: arresting the suspect; sending the suspect away from the
scene of the assault for eight hours; or offering "some form of advice." The
Minneapolis Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE FOUND. REP. I (Apr. 1984).
According to police records, the percentage of repeat violence over the next six
months was 24% for suspects sent away, 19% for suspects advised and 10% for
suspects arrested. See id. As a consequence of this study, police departments in
many cities have directed their officers that arrest is the first choice response in
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Some courts are referring petitioners to mediation to resolve do-
mestic-violence complaints. Mediation is not an acceptable alternative
to swift and sure enforcement in domestic-violence cases.
The use of mediation ignores the relationship of the battering
couple. It ignores the legitimate fear of the battered woman,
... trivializes her victimization and disregards that the empow-
erment of the two parties is disproportional .... It is ...
extremely unrealistic to expect a battered woman to speak openly
and without fear. Her fear of retaliation by her partner prevents
her from putting her real concerns on the table.' 06
Many experts believe that mediation is inappropriate when there
has been spouse or child abuse.' 7 The basic predicate of successful
mediation is equality of bargaining power between the parties. It is
widely agreed by those who work in the criminal justice system that
violence in the family destroys the power balance and renders me-
diation ineffective. 10 8
When women defend themselves against abuse, their problems are
compounded. Professor Elizabeth M. Schneider of Brooklyn Law
School addressed what she described as three distinct but interrelated
manifestations of gender bias in the criminal justice system faced
by women charged with homicide or assault after killing or wounding
their batterers. Such women are seen as not credible because they
have violated the norms of appropriate female behavior. They are
viewed as perpetrators responsible for the violence done to them
rather than as people who acted in self-defense. They are blamed
domestic-violence cases. See More Police Seeking Arrests in Instances of Domestic
Assault, N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1986, at A13, col. 1.
106. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 216 (testimony of Nancy Lowery).
107. See REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON
FAMILY VIOLENCE 23-24 (1984); UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER
THE RULE OF THUMB 61-76 (1982); INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE,
TRAINING KEY 245, WIFE BEATING 1-3 (1976); INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS
OF POLICE, TRAINING KEY 246, INVESTIGATION OF WIFE BEATING 1-2 (1976); NEW
YORK CITY POLICE DEP'T, PATROL GUIDE PROCEDURE No. 110-38, at 2 (1982); see
also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 116 (1982); POLICE EXECUTIVE RESEARCH
FORUM, RESPONDING TO SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING 33-50 (1980); Lerman,
Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolu-
tion on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57-113 (1984).
108. See R.E. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES 207-22 (1979);
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, supra note 49, at 145-46; M. Fields, Wife Beating:
Government Intervention Policies and Practices, in UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, BATTERED WOMEN: ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 249-56 (1978). See
generally THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 55, at 64, 206-10 (1979) (police have
difficulty interrupting domestic violence); Stulberg, A Civil Alternative to Criminal
Prosecution, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 359, 360-70 (1975) (general discussion of mediation).
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for not fleeing their homes when faced with continuous violence by
their husbands.' °9
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Domestic violence-the physical or psychological abuse of one
family member by another-is a problem of dramatic proportions
for women in New York State.
2. The Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law, by and
large, provide an adequate framework for providing relief to
victims of domestic violence.
3. Notwithstanding the existence of adequate statutory protections,
barriers to the laws' remedial purposes remain:
a. Judges and other professionals in the court system are too
often underinformed about the nature of domestic violence
and the characteristics of victims and offenders.
b. Victims' access to the courts is limited by their being dissuaded
by law enforcement officials and court personnel from pro-
ceeding in criminal and family courts and by having their
claims trivialized or ignored.
c. Victims are often presumed to have provoked the attack and
are not considered credible unless they have visible injuries.
4. Some judges, attorneys and court personnel erroneously presume
that petitions for orders of protection filed by women during
the course of a matrimonial action are "tactical" in nature. This
assumption fails to appreciate the many legal disincentives to
filing a petition as a litigation tactic and that, in a violent
relationship, violence is particularly likely to occur after a divorce
action has been commenced.
5. Many family court judges routinely enter mutual orders of pro-
tection in family offense proceedings upon the mere oral request
of the respondents or sua sponte, without prior notice to the
petitioners and without opportunity for rebuttal testimony by
the petitioners:
a. Mutual orders of protection issued in this manner deny the
petitioner due process and create the appearance that both
parties have been found to be violent notwithstanding the
absence of proof of the petitioner's conduct.
b. Because the petitioner may subsequently be viewed as equally
responsible for the violence or abuse, a court may be reluctant
109. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 62-77 (testimony of
Elizabeth Schneider).
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to grant a more restrictive order of protection or to hold
the respondent in contempt if there is another violent incident.
c. A woman with a mutual order is in a worse position than
if she had no order at all; the police are given ambiguous
direction as to its enforcement, often being forced to choose
between doing nothing or arresting both parties and placing
children with protective services.
6. Judges making custody and visitation determinations too often
fail to consider a man's violent conduct towards his wife and
its well documented detrimental effect on children.
7. Some judges are unwilling to remove a batterer from the family
home, forcing the mothers and children to live in shelters.
8. A significant number of women who bring petitions for court-
ordered protection fail to follow through, leading to dismissals
for failure to prosecute. Women who fail to proceed are deterred
in part by the hostile or indifferent treatment they receive in
court. Intimidation by the respondent is another cause, although
judges rarely inquire into whether the petitioner has been coerced.
9. Judges too often fail to enforce orders of protection. Because
of the inequality of bargaining power of the parties, mediation
is not an acceptable alternative to swift and sure enforcement.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
1. Take necessary steps to assure that judges, court clerks and
security personnel are familiar with the nature of domestic-viol-
ence, the characteristics of domestic violence victims and of-
fenders and the impact of adult domestic violence on children
in the home, including:
a. The battered woman syndrome.
b. The need for calendar preferences for violation of order of
protection cases.
c. The statutory prohibition against dissuading domestic-violence
victims from seeking court relief as provided in section 812(3)
of the Family Court Act.
d. The powers of local criminal courts in cases of domestic
violence and harassment.
e. The appropriateness of permitting advocates and others to
accompany domestic-violence victims into the courtroom as
provided in section 838 of the Family Court Act.
f. The due process violations inherent in granting a mutual
order of protection when the respondent has not filed a
petition.
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g. The efficacy of educational programs for those found to have
been violent toward members of their families.
h. The effectiveness of ordering those found to have committed
family offenses to vacate the family home.
i. The appropriateness of jail for those found to have violated
orders of protection issued by both the family courts and
criminal courts.
j. Issues of self-defense as they pertain to women who kill men
who have abused them.
2. Ensure availability of a judge to issue temporary orders of
protection seven days a week, twenty-four hours a day, pursuant
to section 161(2) of the Family Court Act.
FOR THE LEGISLATURE:
Enact legislation that:
1. Prohibits mutual orders of protection unless the respondent has
filed and served a cross-petition requesting that relief.
2. Provides that adjournments in contemplation of dismissal may
be conditioned upon the defendant's attendance at educational
programs for those charged with family violence.
3. Provides that abuse of one's spouse is evidence of parental
unfitness for custody and a basis for termination of visitation
or a requirement of supervised visitation.
4. Permits visitation in supervised locations now utilized for children
in placement when there has been violence against the custodial
parent by the noncustodial parent.
FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEYS:
1. Establish domestic-violence prosecution units in those jurisdictions
with sufficient volume to justify a unit.
2. Ensure that assistant district attorneys receive training as to the
nature of domestic violence, the characteristics of domestic-viol-
ence victims and offenders and the impact of adult domestic
violence on children in the home, including the same particular
areas recommended for judges and court personnel.
3. Provide for paralegal and social work support for domestic-
violence victims or link to existing services in the community to
assure that the safety and social service needs of the victims are
met.
4. Request orders of protection for victims of family violence when
there is a prosecution pending or upon a conviction.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
Conduct continuing education programs on domestic violence in-
cluding the same particular areas recommended for judges and court
personnel, and also including:
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1. The need for consent from a fully informed client before agreeing
to mutual orders of protection as a settlement.
2. The availability of community resources and the need for social
work and other support services for clients who are victims of
domestic violence.
FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEES:
Make available to all members information concerning the nature
of domestic violence and the characteristics of domestic-violence
victims and offenders and the impact of adult domestic violence on
children in the home, including the same particular areas recom-
mended for judges and court personnel.
2. RAPE
Rape is a violent crime that until recently was virtually unpro-
secutable in New York."10 Successful prosecutions were rare because
the law provided more quarter for the accused than protection to
the victim."' In several steps, New York reformed its former rape
law that had: (1) considered a woman's complaint, standing alone,
incredible as a matter of law; ' 2 (2) required as an element of proof
110. In 1972, Governor Hugh Carey noted that "in a recent, typical year, only
18 rape convictions were obtained in the courts of New York, versus thousands
of complaints." Governor's Approval Memorandum No. 16 (May 22, 1972), reprinted
in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16, practice commentary at 457 (McKinney 1975).
Ill. Rape law in the United States is rooted in the English common law, which
focused attention on the conduct of the complainant rather than the defendant.
See Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10 (1977). The 17th century jury charge of Lord Chief Justice
Sir Matthew Hale, which became standard throughout the United States, provides
that a rape accusation "is one which is easily made and, once made, difficult to
defend against, even if the person accused is innocent." Id. Therefore, "the law
requires that you examine the testimony of the [complainant] with caution." Id.
112. Prior to 1972, New York State's law of corroboration in sex offense cases
was considered the strictest in the country. Corroboration of the victim's testimony
was required to "extend to every material fact essential to constitute the crime."
People v. Radunovic, 21 N.Y.2d 186, 190, 234 N.E.2d 212, 214, 287 N.Y.S.2d
33, 35 (1967). The 1972 amendments permitted a conviction if the alleged victim's
testimony was supported by evidence that she did not consent but was forcibly
compelled to submit. See 1972 N.Y. Laws 373. In 1974, New York took a major
step to eliminate the corroboration requirement for forcible rape, sodomy and
sexual abuse in all but a very limited category of cases. See 1974 N.Y. Laws 14
(codified as N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16 (McKinney 1975)). Corroboration was still
required if the victim was under 17 years of age, mentally defective or incapacitated.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.16, practice commentary at 458 (McKinney 1975). The
Governor's Approval Memorandum spoke explicitly to the issue of women's cred-
ibility:
[Tihe implicit suggestion in the corroboration rule that the testimony of
women, who are most often complainants in sex cases, is inherently
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a victim's "earnest resistance" of her attacker;" 3 (3) permitted a
virtually unbridled expos6 in open court of the victim's past sexual
conduct;" 4 and (4) held that a man's act of rape (forcible, nonconsen-
sual intercourse) against his wife was not rape." 5
Notwithstanding the law's reform, all witnesses testifying on the
subject of rape concurred that problems in enforcement and pro-
tection of the victim remain. Lorraine Koury, Esq., Coordinator of
the Erie County Citizen's Committee on Rape and Sexual Assault,
commented:
suspect and should not be trusted without the support of the independent
evidence, is without justification and contrary to our strong belief in the
principle of complete equality for women in our society.
Id. (citing Governor's Approval Memorandum No. 2 (Feb. 19, 1974)).
113. Not until 1982 was the requirement that a rape victim prove her "earnest
resistance" to her attacker repealed. See 1982 N.Y. Laws 560 (amending N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKinney Supp. 1984)). This requirement created a particular
irony given the advice of law enforcement officials that women submit rather than
risk greater injury or death during a struggle. The amended law continued to
require that the physical force or threat involved placed the victim "in fear of
immediate death or serious physical injury." Id. The word "serious" was deleted
in 1983. See 1983 N.Y. Laws 449 (amending N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.00(8) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1984)).
114. A 1975 amendment to the Criminal Procedure Law limited the defendant's
rights to introduce evidence of the complainant's past sexual conduct subject to
certain exceptions, particularly evidence of the victim's past sexual relationship with
the defendant. See 1975 N.Y. Laws 230 (codified as N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42
(McKinney 1981)). Other exceptions are evidence of a conviction for prostitution
within the prior three years, evidence necessary to rebut certain evidence introduced
by the prosecution, and a catchall provision permitting admission of evidence of
the victim's sexual conduct if it is "relevant and admissible in the interests of
justice." Id.
115. Efforts to repeal the marital rape exemption succeeded only to the extent
that under a law passed in 1978, the husband could be prosecuted if the couple
were living apart pursuant to a court order or were legally separated under an
agreement stating that the husband could be prosecuted. See N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.00(4) (McKinney Supp. 1984). An effort to totally repeal the marital rape
exemption passed the state assembly but failed in the state senate in 1984. See
Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 67 (testimony of May Newburger). In that year,
the New York Court of Appeals held that the marital rape exemption was un-
constitutional. See People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 164, 474 N.E.2d 567, 573,
485 N.Y.S.2d 207, 213 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2029 (1985). Chief Judge
Sol Wachtler wrote:
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent.
Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the bodily integrity
of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm .... To ever imply consent to such an act is irrational
and absurd .... [A] marriage license should not be viewed as a license
for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman
has the same right to control her own body as does an unmarried woman.
64 N.Y.2d at 164, 474 N.E.2d at 573, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 213.
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[I]n the Citizens Committee's interaction with criminal justice
personnel, we have heard many attorneys, prosecutors, and even
judges state privately to us that if they or a loved one were
sexually assaulted, they would not use the criminal justice system.
A system which would not be used by the very people who
administer it needs to change its response to the problem it attempts
to solve." 6
Cultural stigma and myths about the nature of rape, its perpetrators
and victims, still narrow the law's protective reach. The criminal
justice system's response to the unique trauma rape victims suffer
is incomplete, compounding distress and discouraging complaints of
a most underreported crime.
(a) Equal Protection of Victims
The view of rape as a crime of sex rather than one of violence
led to untoward scrutiny of elements of a woman's character un-
related to her veracity or powers of observation. Harsh cultural
judgment was explicit: a woman-whose dress, demeanor, conduct,
associations or lifestyle reasonably or unreasonably could be viewed
as at odds with traditional notions of womanly virtue and chastity-
implicitly consented to, assumed the risk of or was unworthy of
protection against rape.7
Making the woman the issue became more difficult when the New
York Legislature enacted legislation limiting cross-examination of
the complainant about her prior sexual conduct and dispensing with
the requirement that the victim resist her attacker." 8 But victims
continue to be unfairly judged and unfairly denied the protection
of our rape laws. The law, even as reformed, incompletely removes
the focus on the woman. The attitudes embodied in former law and
116. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 196-97 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
117. Examination of some of the most prominent legal and trial practice au-
thorities' writings on rape over the last decades reveals that judges, like all members
of the legal profession, have not only been exposed to cultural myths about rape
victims, but have been taught that "[pirosecuting attorneys must continually be on
guard for the charge of sex offense brought by the spurned female that has as its
underlying basis a desire for revenge, or a blackmail or shakedown scheme."
Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
217, 223 (1960); see 3A J. WIGMORE, EVrDENCE § 924a, at 737 (1970) (advocating
that every complainant of sexual offense be examined by psychiatrist to determine
whether she fantasized attack); see also F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, CRIMES OF
VIOLENCE: RAPE AND OTHER SEX CRIMES 277 (1973) (stating that "the average
woman is equipped to interpose effective obstacles to penetration by means of the
hands, limbs, and pelvic muscles").
118. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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which resisted its reform continue to operate in the minds of some
judges, jurors, attorneys and prosecutors.
(i) Rape Victims' Credibility. "Because of the prior misconceptions
about rape, society still does not understand its true nature, and
courtroom procedures reflect these misconceptions."119 Supreme Court
Justice Betty Ellerin, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for the
courts within New York City, explained that "[w]hile the overt snick-
ering. and insensitivity to victims which characterized the manner in
which sex crimes were handled not so long ago have moderated,
there are still all too many instances of the woman victim being
put on trial with an underlying insensitivity permeating the court-
room. ' .120 Evaluation of a criminal complainant's credibility-through
observation of her demeanor and appearance as well as a consid-
eration of the circumstances surrounding the alleged crime-is central
to the fact-finding process. There exists a perception, however, that
rape victims' credibility is judged by irrelevant or unduly high stand-
ards:
High standards for witness credibility become gender biased when
they presuppose that females, by nature and behavior tempt sex
offenders, thereby, inviting sexual assault, and bear further burdens
of self-protection from this crime due to sex-role stereotyping that
male sexual urges must be guarded against by the female who is
expected to protect her "virtue."'12'
Lorraine Koury, Esq., Coordinator of the Erie County Citizen's
Committee on Rape and Sexual Assault, asked: "If rape is a violent
crime, why should the criminal justice system treat rape differently
from other violent crimes?" 122 She responded:
One answer is that the community perceives both the rapist and
the rape victim much differently than other victims and criminals.
The community stigmatizes rape victims to a much greater degree
than other crime victims, and often blames the victim for the
attack. And because society is reluctant to place the proper re-
sponsibility for the rape on the rapist, the community is more
reluctant to convict rapists of that crime. 23
119. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 195 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
120. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 283-84 (testimony of Betty
Ellerin).
121. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 35 (testimony of Judith Condo).
122. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 196 (testimony of Lorraine Koury);
accord Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 60-61 (testimony of May Newburger).
123. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 196 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
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Grand jurors and petit jurors-many of whom "have been raised
with incorrect attitudes and beliefs concerning rape victims"' 2 -
"want to know that the victim is a nice person and a nice girl." 12 5
The concept "that 'good girls' or women do not get raped . .. and
that a woman with an active sexual past cannot be raped" 12 6 was found
by Deborah Sorbini,' 27 an Assistant District Attorney in Erie County,
to be manifested in "an expectation on the part of judges and juries
as to how women sex crime victims will conduct themselves in the
court." 2 '
There is that expectation on the part of judges and juries that a
woman is going to come into court dressed very nicely, that she
is going to be above [reproach] in many respects, and if a woman
comes into court in tight jeans or high boots or whatnot, I think
there is an automatic prejudice that still arises in the minds of some
juries, some judges, [that] perhaps this woman is promiscuous,
perhaps the old consent idea. Whether or not [consent] is the ac-
tual defense in the case, that may arise.' 29
Mary Ann Hawco, an Assistant District Attorney in Monroe County,
noted that a prosecutor cannot "ignore the fact that it is [g]rand
Ulurors and jurors that ultimately decide these cases" and that unless
the victim "was beaten to death's door, they want to form an
opinion about her character." 1 30
Finally, when a victim testifies, her credibility is questioned as
she discusses a highly personal and humiliating attack. The com-
munity looks at her credibility, her lifestyle, her reputation, her
virtue, while the defendant, to a large degree is spared that
scrutiny. 3'
Judith Condo, Executive Director of the Albany County Rape Crisis
Center, reported:
124. Id. at 64 (testimony of Beverly O'Connor). Examples cited by Ms. O'Connor
were: " 'Rape victims ask for it,' 'Rape is a crime of sex,' 'Rapists are sex-starved
psychopaths,' and 'Rape victims are always young and attractive.' " Id.
125. Id. at 256 (testimony of Mary Ann Hawco).
126. Id. at 193 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
127. Ms. Sorbini was speaking on behalf of Sheila DiTullio, Chief, Comprehensive
Assault, Abuse & Rape Bureau (CAAR), Erie County District Attorney's Office.
See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 24-25 (testimony of Deborah Sorbini).
128. Id. at 26.
129. Id. at 29. Ms. Sorbini also noted that sex crime victims are expected to
exhibit some emotion but not too much. Calm, matter-of-fact testimony, due,
perhaps, to the passage of time, is deemed to be indifference. Anger or hostility
is viewed as irrational. Jurors expect "perhaps some crying, some upsetness." Id.
at 26-28.
130. Id. at 256 (testimony of Mary Ann Hawco).
131. Id. at 195-96 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
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This form of gender bias, coupled with the seeming intransigence
at all levels of law enforcement, [1]egislature and [clourt
[a]dministration to reeducate and replace mythical notions about
victims with the volumes of current data on the psychology of
the types of sex offenders, encourages sexual assault against women
and children and returns adult and juvenile sex offenders to the
street to repeat their crimes.
1 32
Lorraine Koury voiced a similar conclusion, stating "[tihese deter-
rents, as well as the sometimes unsympathetic or insensitive attitude
of law enforcement and criminal justice officials, illustrate why the
overwhelming majority of victims do not use the criminal justice
system." I33
(ii) Incomplete Legal Protections. New York's rape shield law-
which, subject to specific exceptions, renders inadmissable in a rape
prosecution "[e]vidence of a victim's sexual conduct"' 34-has been
described as an attempt "to strike a reasonable balance between
protecting the privacy and reputation of a victim and permitting an
accused, when it is found relevant, to present evidence of a vic-
tim's sexual conduct."' 35 Although the law has eliminated the
132. Albany Hearings; supra note 57, at 34 (testimony of Judith Condo).
133. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 196 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
Greene County Court Judge John J. Fromer was disciplined by the Judicial Conduct
Commission for remarks he made to the press after accepting a rapist's guilty plea
to a charge of third degree rape and sentencing him to one year's imprisonment
with time off for good behavior. See In re Judge John J. Fromer, Determination
of New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct (Oct. 25, 1984). The rapist
had entered the victim's apartment wearing a stocking mask and raped her several
times. See id. at 2. Judge Fromer commented:
As I recall, [the defendant] did go into [the victim's] apartment without
permission .... He was drunk, jumped into the sack with her, had sex
and went to sleep. I think it started without consent, but they ended
up enjoying themselves. It's not like a rape on the street .... People
hear "rape" and they think of the poor girl in the park dragged into
the bushes. But it wasn't like that.
The Register-Star, Aug. 19, 1983, at A-16, col. 2.
The Judicial Conduct Commission, in ordering that Judge Fromer be censured,
stated:
Respondent's statements were humiliating and demeaning to the victim
of the rape, in no small measure because respondent was, in effect,
publicly stating that she had probably consented to the sexual intercourse.
... Moreover, such comments have the effect of discouraging complaints
of rape and sexual harassment. The impact upon those who look to the
judiciary for protection from sexual assault may be devastating.
In re Judge John J. Fromer, Determination of New York State Commission on
Judicial Conduct 5-6 (Oct. 25, 1984).
134. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.42 (McKinney 1981).
135. Id., practice commentary at 564.
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more flagrant kind of cross-examination abuses, and although, ac-
cording to survey respondents, a number of judges are invoking the
rape shield law sua sponte if need be when the improper questioning
is specifically related to the complainant's prior sexual conduct,
3 6
it appears that some defense attorneys successfully play on juror
prejudice about rape victims.
Professor Virginia Burns testified about research that describes the
way in which jurors are influenced by the way defense attorneys
portray rape victims. "A sexist [defense] based on these stereotypes
of women [as masochistic and provocative] may result in victims
being tried for defying sexual stereotypes and acquittal of a rape
defendant because of gender bias and not legal evidence."' 37 She
reported that in preparation for her testimony she sought to learn
from women working in the Monroe County criminal courts whether
their experience bore out the findings in the literature.
I was told by women working in the courts that the way victims
of rape ... are treated is a disgrace .... that defense attorneys
are very sexist in their questioning, that judges overlook or fail
to overrule the line of questioning that is posed by defense at-
torneys. 3 '
Erie County Assistant District Attorney Deborah Sorbini testified
that defense lawyers "will never cease to probe as to what [a victim's]
lifestyle is like."' 3 9
Does she live with a man, does she live with another woman in
a homosexual relationship, . . . is she divorced? Any one of a
number . . . of clearly improper areas of questions come up in
an attempt to subtly impeach the witness, to have her lifestyle
negatively reflect on her ability to simply be the victim of a sex
crime. 140
By contrast, Linda Fairstein, Esq., Director of the Sex Crimes
136. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that when there
is improper questioning about complainant's prior sexual conduct, judges invoke
the rape shield law sua sponte if the prosecutor does not:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
5/20 14/22 29/24 21/8 6/2 25/22
R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 68.
137. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 182 (testimony of Virginia Burns)
(citing H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966)).
138. Id. at 189.
139. Id. at 29-30'(testimony of Deborah Sorbini).
140. Id.
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Unit in the New York County District Attorney's Office, stated that
she could not think of one example in ten years of sex crimes
litigation "in which a judge has allowed any improper questioning
of a victim."'' Ms. Fairstein pointed out that the fact "[t]hat some
women have been [made] uncomfortable in the process [of cross-
examination] is inevitable, but I distinguish that from the propriety
of the proceedings," and stated that her unit has witnessed "a far
more humane and dignified treatment of the rape survivor as witness
with no erosion of defendant's legal rights.' '1 42
The rape shield law permits introduction of evidence of a com-
plainant's prior relationship with the accused. It appears that this
entire class of prosecutions-sometimes known as "acquaintance
rape" and "date rape"-is one in which the victim is inadequately
protected.
There are conflicting claims about whether more rapes are com-
mitted by strangers or known assailants. Although the Federal Bureau
of Justice Statistics asserts that "[a] woman is twice as likely to be
attacked by a stranger as by someone she knows,' 14 this claim is
disputed by experts in the field who believe the majority of rapes
are committed by someone known to the victim.1'4
Judith Condo of the Albany County Rape Crisis Center testified
that prosecutorial discretion and reluctance to accept or take to trial
cases dissimilar to those previously taken before juries "compounds
the problems of reeducating jurors and judges" and "den[ies] the
majority of the victims, those who know the offender, equal pro-
tection under the law. 1 45 Ms. Condo reported that her agency's
annual review of local victim reports revealed complaints from a
large number of victims who indicated that after reporting a crime
to the police and submitting to the hospital evidence-gathering pro-
cedure, either nothing happened, there was an initial investigation
but no arrest even when the offender was known, or the offender
received a very light sentence and was already back on the street
or would be shortly. This led the Center to compare data from
victim reports, police reports, signed complaints, warrants issued,
conviction figures and plea bargains. The data revealed that at many
141. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 199 (testimony of Linda Fairstein).
142. Id. at 199-200.
143. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, THE CRIME OF RAPE,
BULLETIN 2 (Mar. 1985).
144. E.g., Ozer & Tovo, Why Rape Statistics Lie, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1985,
at A26, col. 1 (Letter to Editor) (Washington, D.C. Rape Crisis Center asserting
that more than half of victims know their assailants).
145. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 35, 37 (testimony of Judith Condo).
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stages of the process the police and prosecutors were interposing
their judgments about victim credibility and either declining to go
forward with a substantial number of cases or accepting plea bargains
"that left the victim unsatisfied with the sentence and removed her
completely from the process of stating her case against the accused,
the major rational[e] for her initial police report. ' '14 6
A majority of respondents to the Attorneys' Survey reported a
clear distinction between the way courts deal with stranger rape and
acquaintance rape. The majority of both women and men respond-
ents reported that there is less concern on the part of the judges,
prosecutors and attorneys about rape cases in which there is a current
or past relationship between the complainant and defendant. 147 Fifty-
nine percent reported judges to be less concerned; sixty percent
reported the same about prosecutors and about attorneys.
Seventy-three percent of men and eighty-two percent of women
also said that bail is "sometimes," ''often" or "always" set lower
in rape cases when the parties knew each other than when they were
strangers.'48 Sixty-two percent of men and seventy-three percent of
women reported that sentences in rape cases are "sometimes," "often"
or "always" shorter when parties knew one another than when they
were strangers. 1
49
146. Id. at 39.
147. Female and male (F1 7o/M7o) survey respondents, asked whether judges,
prosecutors, and attorneys demonstrate less concern about rape cases when the
parties have a current or past relationship/acquaintance, responded:
YES No No ANSWER
Judges 74/53 10/22 16/25
Prosecutors 66/58 22/24 12/18
Attorneys . 68/58 19/25 13/18
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 69.
148. Female and male (F%/M%) survey respondents, reported that bail in rape
cases when parties knew each other is set lower than in cases when parties were
strangers:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
21/2 31/30 30/41 6/12 3/6 9/8
Id., app. A, at 67.
149. Female and male (F%/M%) survey respondents reported that sentences in
rape cases are shorter when parties knew one another than in cases when parties
were strangers:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
17/1 31/20 25/41 12/14 3/12 13/12
Id., app. A, at 68.
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New York County Assistant District Attorney Linda Fairstein noted
the impropriety of distinguishing sex offenses involving assaults by
strangers from those committed by acquaintances: "once the legal
elements of the crime are satisfied by the assailant, once he has
subjected his victim to sexual intercourse by forcible compulsion,
we cannot afford the victim of any kind of incident any less respect
as a witness than we would to another victim."' 50 Assistant District
Attorney Mary Ann Hawco suggested that a way to increase indict-
ments in acquaintance rape cases would be to have more felony
categories for forcible rape than just the current B felony. It is her
belief that if grand juries were offered a charge with a sentence less
than that of a B felony, they would be more likely to indict in
many instances, including those in which the grand jury believes the
facts as presented by the prosecutor but sympathizes with the defend-
ant, as often happens in cases of acquaintance rape. '
(b) Responses to Victims' Special Needs
Sexual assault is uniquely traumatic in terms of the immediate
and long-term psychic injury to the victim and frequently, the cen-
sorious response of the community. Linda Fairstein, Esq., explained:
We have learned that the damage inflicted by the sex offender
is not measured by the physical injury a woman sustains. In fact,
such injury occurs, if at all, in less than one-third of all sexual
assaults, since victims are often most wise to submit to threats
of violence when the assailant has the means to take her life.
Rather, the survivor's injury is incapable of assessment in physical
terms like a visible scar might be.1 2
Public hearing witnesses stated that specialized prosecutorial divisions
150. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 198 (testimony of Linda Fairstein).
151. See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 250 (testimony of Mary Ann
Hawco); see, e.g., MICH. Comp. LAWS § 750.520(b)-(e) (West Supp. 1985) (containing
four degrees of criminal sexual conduct, all having similar elements).
152. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 198-99 (testimony of Linda Fairstein).
A recent, long-term research study conducted by the Medical University of South
Carolina and People Against Rape under a grant from the National Center for
the Prevention and Control of Rape found that for three .years post-rape, victims
still suffered in varying degrees from many symptoms of post-traumatic stress
disorder including fear, anxiety and phobic anxiety. See Kilpatrick, The Sexual
Assault Research Project: Assessing the Aftermath of Rape, 8 RESPONSE TO THE
VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN 20 (Fall 1985); see also Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 617-19 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that statute providing for exclusion of general public from trials of sex
crimes involving victims under age of eighteen constitutionally "prevent[s] the risk
of severe psychological damage" to the child).
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and legislation assuring confidentiality of victim-rape counselor com-
munications are necessary to ensure that the criminal justice system
does not aggravate this trauma.
(i) Specialized Prosecutorial Divisions. The Task Force received
detailed testimony about the effectiveness of specialized prosecutorial
divisions that handle only sexual offense cases in making the victims
feel more comfortable and better able to negotiate and survive the
prosecution process.
Linda Fairstein, Esq., explained that the Manhattan District At-
torney's Sex Crimes Unit, established in 1974, was the first unit in
a prosecutor's office in the country to be exclusively dedicated to
investigating and prosecuting rape, sodomy and sexual abuse cases.
The special bureau grew out of a belief that sex offenses pose
unique problems for prosecutors, of course, but, more importantly,
for the crime victims and survivors and that if specialized legal
knowledge and understanding of the psychological factors involved
were applied to the handling of the cases not only would there
be an increase in the low conviction rate, but again, more im-
portantly, the women's experience in the courtroom as witnesses
would be made more comfortable and they would not again be
made victims in the process.153
In the Manhattan District Attorney's office, every sex offense case
is diverted from the regular intake system to the office Sex Crimes
Prosecution Unit, which is staffed with experienced men and women
attorneys trained to recognize the problems unique to these cases
and to anticipate the defenses frequently interposed. Each victim
works with one unit member from the first interview through the
disposition of her case, so that she need not repeat her story to
many different individuals at different stages of the proceedings.
An effort is made to present the case to the grand jury on the same
day the witness first appears in order to spare her repeated trips
to the courthouse. The victim is never made to testify at a preliminary
hearing and face the defendant at that stage of the proceedings.
The unit also refers the victim for appropriate medical or counseling
services and encourages her to communicate with the assigned at-
torney about any questions she may have and with the assigned
detective if she, or a member of her family, is subjected to harassment
by the defendant or members of his family. Witnesses are prepared
to understand the defendant's rights and to anticipate defense tactics
including vigorous cross-examination. Ms. Fairstein testified:
153. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 193 (testimony of Linda Fairstein).
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One of our greatest pleasures often comes at -the conclusion of
a trial, when a rape survivor, perhaps reluctant to have reported
the crime originally and whose only prior exposure to the criminal
justice system was a made for TV movie about rape trials and
their horrors-when such a woman calls to say, "I am glad I
did this. It was much easier than I expected it to have been. I
never thought he would be convicted and he has been. Your
assistant was wonderful to us. The judge was fair." Those calls
are quite common. 54
Deborah Sorbini, an Assistant District Attorney in Erie County (Buf-
falo), testified that a Comprehensive Assault, Abuse & Rape Bureau
was recently established there. As in New York County, a victim need
deal with only one district attorney and will not have to retell her
story to others at each stage of the proceeding. Ms. Sorbini testified
that the unit came about through a realization in the District At-
torney's office that "shuffling sex crime victims from D.A. to D.A."
was "counterproductive," "insensitive" and "was only adding to the
trauma that these people have already endured.""'
Judith Condo testified that Albany County has a specialized vertical
prosecution unit and that this is one of the elements of a victim/
criminal justice interface recommended at the 1984 National Sym-
posium on Sexual Assault sponsored by the Department of Justice
and the FBI.'56
(ii) Victim-Counselor Confidentiality. Rape crisis centers staffed
with counselors trained to provide information and support to rape
victims are of critical importance in easing the trauma of this crime
and increasing prosecutions.'57 Beverly O'Connor of the Syracuse
Rape Crisis Center testified about the need for legislation to protect
the confidentiality of communications between crisis counselors and
154. Id. at 200.
155. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 31-32 (testimony of Deborah Sorbini).
156. See Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 37-38 (testimony of Judith Condo).
Another witness urging specialized prosecution units, Lorraine Koury, also urged
specialized court parts so that "both prosecutors and judges [would have] the
special expertise and experience needed to prosecute and preside over these trials."
Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 197 (testimony of Lorraine Koury).
157. Lois Davis, past president of the Rochester Judicial Process Committee,
commented on the fact that the impetus for improved treatment of rape victims
has come from outside the criminal justice system:
[W]ith the advent of rape crisis centers, women have been encouraged
to file charges and are given support through the court process. But it
is not the court that has given them help, but the non-profit agencies.
There are still judges and attorneys who consider the women partly
responsible for these crimes.
Id. at 221 (testimony of Lois Davis).
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victims. Failure to extend confidentiality to crisis counseling incurs
the risk of undermining the effectiveness of the counseling. Some
victims who need this kind of help now fear to seek it. Without
the protection of confidentiality, victims have found their files sub-
poenaed by the defense and feel betrayed when thoughts and feelings
that they considered private are open to public scrutiny in a court-
room.' Ms. O'Connor pointed out that statutes extending confi-
dentiality to counseling by psychologists and psychiatrists were passed
before the importance of victim counseling was recognized. 15 9 Under
these statutes,'16 only those who can afford private treatment are
protected.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Until recently, New York's rape law codified the view that
women's claims of rape are to be skeptically received. Through
a slow process of reform, the most detrimental provisions have
been repealed or struck down as unconstitutional.
2. The attitudes embodied in the former law and which resisted its
reform continue to operate in the minds of some judges, jurors,
defense attorneys and prosecutors.
3. As a result, cultural stigma and myths about rape's perpetrators
and victims still narrow the law's protective reach.
a. Elements of a woman's character unrelated to her powers
158. See id. at 63 (testimony of Beverly O'Connor). One court, as a matter of
common law, has barred a rape defendant from obtaining the records of the
complainant's conversation with a rape crisis center counselor. See People v. Pena,
127 Misc. 2d 1057. 487 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985). At least one
state already has such a statute. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5945.1(b) (Purdon
1981).
159. See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 63 (testimony of Beverly O'Connor).
The courts' use of pre-sentence victim impact statements in assessing the injury to
rape victims was discussed by two witnesses. Beverly O'Connor of the Syracuse
Rape Crisis Center testified: "Judges should allow for, and give appropriate weight
to, input at sentencing from victims of rape .... [t]he impact of the crime on the
victim's physical, financial and psychological well-being must be explained." Id.
at 65.
Judith Condo of the Albany County Rape Crisis Center urged that "prosecutors
and judges should use victim impact statement to assess plea bargain implications
for the victim and the society at large prior to drastically reducing charges and
sentences to avoid court time." Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 40-41 (testimony
of Judith Condo).
160. See N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 4504 (physician-patient) (McKinney 1983 &
Supp. 1985); id. § 4507 (psychologist-client) (McKinney Supp. 1985); id. § 4508 (social
worker-client) (McKinney Supp. 1985). See generally Rochester Hearings, supra note
49, at 64 (testimony of Beverly O'Connor).
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of observation and veracity-such as her manner of dress,
perceived reaction to the crime and lifestyle-continue to be
unfairly deemed relevant to a determination of the defendant's
guilt or innocence.
b. Victims of rape who had any level of past relationship or
acquaintance with the perpetrator are less likely to see his con-
viction and appropriate punishment.
4. Certain legislative and prosecutorial measures can offer a more
appropriate response to the unique trauma rape victims suffer.
a. Specialized prosecution units trained to recognize rape victims'
psychological trauma and designed to minimize the need for
the victim to repeat her story to many individuals and to
appear in court have been successfully implemented in a
number of counties.
b. A statute creating victim-rape counselor confidentiality, sim-
ilar to that applied to communications between psychiatrists
and patients, would permit victims to utilize important crisis
services without fear that privately-related statements would
be admitted in court.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
Take necessary steps to assure that judges are familiar with:
1. The substantial current data about the nature of the crime of
rape, the psychology of offenders, the prevalence and seriousness
of acquaintance rape and the long-term psychic injury to rape
victims.
2. The difference between vigorous cross-examination that protects
the defendant's rights and questioning that includes improper
sex stereotyping and harassment of the victim.
3. The appropriate utilization of victim impact statements.
FOR THE LEGISLATURE:
1. Enact legislation providing for the confidentiality of communi-
cations between rape victims and rape counselors.
2. Consider legislation adding one or more felony grades to the
crime of rape that are not dependent on the complainant's age.
FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEYS:
1. Establish specialized prosecution units that permit rape victims
to deal with only one assistant district attorney through all stages
of the proceeding.
2. Ensure that assistant district attorneys receive training as to the
same particular areas recommended for judges.
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3. Ensure that acquaintance rape cases are treated with the same
seriousness as stranger rape cases.
FOR POLICE DEPARTMENTS:
1. Establish specialized units to deal with sex offenses.
2. Ensure that police officers receive training as to the same par-
ticular areas recommended for judges.
3. Ensure that acquaintance rape complaints are treated with the
same seriousness as complaints of stranger rape.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS: .
Coordinate efforts with rape crisis centers, prosecutors and police
to provide community education similar to that recommended for
judges.
FOR LAW SCHOOLS:
Ensure that criminal justice courses provide accurate information
about rape similar to that recommended for judges.
FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEES:
Make available to all members information about rape similar to
that recommended for judges.
B. The Courts' Enforcement of Women's Economic Rights
The "feminization of poverty"-the disproportionate representa-
tion of women among New York's poorest citizens-has impelled
the legislative 6' and executive'62 branches of government to identify
causes and seek solutions. For most women, unlike men, divorce
causes extreme economic dislocation and thus has contributed sig-
nificantly to the swelling ranks of female single-parent heads of
households living in poverty. 63
The courts directly influence the economic welfare of a substantial
161. See generally NEW YORK CITY COUNCIL, THE FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY,
AN ANALYSIS OF POOR WOMEN IN NEW YORK CITY (1984); THE STATUS OF OLDER
WOMEN: A REPORT ON STATEWIDE PUBLIC HEARINGS CONDUCTED BY THE ASSEMBLY
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN'S ISSUES AND THE ASSEMBLY STANDING COMMITTEE ON AGING
(1983).
162. See generally Minutes, Hearings on the Feminization of Poverty before
New York Department of State, New York City (June 14, 1984); id. Hauppauge (June
13, 1984); id. White Plains (June 12, 1984); id. Syracuse (June 6, 1984); id. Buffalo
(June 5, 1984) [hereinafter Feminization of Poverty Hearings].
163. See D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY: THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT (1979); G. STERIN & S. DAVIS, DIVORCE AWARDS AND OUTCOMES (1981);
J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP (1980); L. WEITZMANN, THE
DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR
WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985); cf. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, 1983 CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-23, No. 141, CHILD
SUPPORT & ALIMONY (1985) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT].
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number of women in New York when they adjudicate women's rights
to: (1) property and maintenance upon dissolution of a marriage;
and (2) child support. To determine whether the courts have con-
tributed to the well documented trend of increased economic hardship
for women, the Task Force examined the courts' decisions under
the Equitable Distribution Law and child support laws.
1. THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LA W
New York's Equitable Distribution Law (EDL)16'-the statute that
governs the economic rights of husband and wife upon the dissolution
of a marriage-was enacted in 1980. Immediately prior to the EDL's
enactment, New York was one of few remaining states in which
property-i.e., real estate, securities, bank accounts, businesses and
other assets-was distributed strictly to the titleholder. Because wives
rarely had assets in their own names, and because few assets other
than the marital home were jointly held, property accumulated during
the marriage usually went solely to the husband after divorce. A
wife's years of contributions as homemaker, spouse and primary
caretaker for the children had no impact on property distribution.
Alimony was terminated on the husband's death and the former
wife had no right to inheritance.
In 1985, the New York State Court of Appeals characterized the
"conceptual base upon which the [EDL] rests" as an "economic
partnership theory" of marriage. 65 The court expressly adopted a
view of the EDL that one lower court "said so well": 66
[T]he function of equitable distribution is to recognize that when
164. See 1980 N.Y. Laws 281.
165. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 66 N.Y.2d 576, 489 N.E.2d 712, 498 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1985). In O'Brien, the issue was whether a license to practice medicine, "the
parties' only asset of any consequence," constituted "marital property subject to
equitable distribution." Id. at 580, 489 N.E.2d at 713, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 744. In
holding that the license was subject to distribution, the New York Court of Appeals
reversed the decision of the Appellate Division, Second Department, and overruled
a decision of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department. See Lesman v. Lesman,
88 A.D.2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (4th Dep't 1982) (holding that a license to practice
medicine, earned during marriage, is not marital property within § 236 of New York
Domestic Relations Law). Judge Richard D. Simons of the Court of Appeals wrote:
The words [of the Equitable Distribution Law] mean exactly what they
say: that an interest in a profession or professional career potential is
marital property which may be represented by direct or indirect contri-
butions of the non-title-holding spouse, including financial contributions
and non-financial contributions made by caring for the home and family.
66 N.Y.2d at 584, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
166. Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748.
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a marriage ends, each of the spouses, based on the totality of
the contributions made to it, has a stake in and right to a share
of the marital assets accumulated while it endured, not because
that share is needed, but because those assets represent the capital
product of what was essentially a partnership entity.
1 67
Contributions to the formation and growth of marital assets are
to be "recognized, considered and rewarded" whether they are direct
or indirect.' 61 Indirect contributions not only include a spouse's
services-such as child rearing and household management-that free
the other spouse to pursue directly income-generating careers and
the acquisition of assets, but also embrace the concept of opportunity
cost. By undertaking homemaker's tasks, which require the devel-
opment of skills not readily transferable to the paid labor market,
the spouse makes an additional indirect contribution to the part-
nership enterprise by sacrificing her "own educational or career goals
and opportunities." 16 9
Over twenty witnesses appearing at the Task Force's public hearings
presented their views on the EDL. Some submitted articles and
written commentaries on the reported decisions. Professor Henry
Foster and others stated that "New York's EDL is alive and well
and is being fairly administered,"' 170 and that women are in a sub-
stantially better position now than in pre-equitable distribution days.' 7 '
Few witnesses concurred.
Current application of the EDL was overwhelmingly viewed as
167. Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 717-18, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 748-49 (quoting Wood
v. Wood, 119 Misc. 2d 1076, 1079, 465 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County 1983)).
168. Id. at 587, 489 N.E.2d at 718, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 749.
169. Id. at 585, 489 N.E.2d at 716, 498 N.Y.S.2d at 747.
170. Foster, A Second Opinion: New York's EDL Is Alive and Well and Is
Being Fairly Administered 1 (May 7, 1985) (unpublished manuscript available at
Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter Second Opinion]. Even these
individuals agreed that pendente lite awards for counsel and experts have been
inadequate, see id. at 8; that courts have applied the concept of rehabilitative
maintenance inappropriately, see Statement Of Julia Perles, at 7 (undated) (available
at Fordham Urban Law Journal office) [hereinafter Perles Statement]; and that
substantial assets have been erroneously excluded from consideration as marital
property. See id. at 9; Foster, N.Y.L.J., May 10, 1985, at 2, col. 6 (Letter to
Editor).
171. See Perles Statement, supra note 170, at 2. Attorney Herbert Siegel stated:
I don't mean to say for a moment that women are not doing much
better today under equitable distribution than they were doing prior to
1980, but it is my position in reference to day-to-day practice, that the
economic partnership that I thought was established by way of the passage
of the law is a long way off . . ..
Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 172 (testimony of Herbert Siegel).
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working "unfairness and undue hardship" on women.' New York
City matrimonial attorneys Harriet N. Cohen and Adria S. Hillman
studied seventy reported EDL decisions and offered the following
overview which was confirmed by a similar study submitted by Joel
R. Brandes, Esq.:
[D]ependent wives, whether they worked in home or in the paid
market place were relegated to one. or a combination of the
following in an aggregate of forty-nine out of the fifty-four cases
susceptible of this analysis: less than a fifty percent overall share
of marital property; short term maintenance after long term mar-
riage; de minimis shares of business and professional practices
which, in addition, the courts undervalued; terminable and mod-
ifiable maintenance in lieu of indefeasible equitable distribution
or distributive awards; and inadequate or no counsel fee awards.17 1
The results of many lower court decisions involving property
distribution and maintenance awards ignore the irretrievable economic
-losses women incur when they forego developing income-generating
careers and vested retirement rights to become homemakers for the
benefit of their families. Rather than recognizing the economic part-
nership theory of marriage, some judges appear predisposed to ensure
that the EDL does not "make reluctant Santa Clauses out of ex-
husbands.'' 74 Equitable sharing of this permanently lost earning
172. Statement of Joel R. Brandes, at 2 (undated) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office) [hereinafter Brandes Statement]. Lester Wallman, a New York
matrimonial lawyer and member of the committee that drafted the New York Equal
Distribution Law, recently stated: "Judges are completely misconstruing it, and
women are being treated unjustly .... The answer is to make some very, very
substantive changes in the law." Dullea, Women's and Bar Groups Fault Divorce
Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1985, at Al, col. 3. See generally Joint Public Hearings
of the Senate and Assembly Standing Comms. on the Judiciary Respecting Proposed
Revisions to the Equitable Distribution Law (Mar. 15, 1985) (statement of New
York City Commission on the Status of Women); Feminization of Poverty Hearings,
supra note 162.
173. H. COHEN & A. HILLMAN, ANALYSIS OF SEVENTY SELECT DECIsIONs AFTER
TRIAL UNDER NEW YORK STATE'S EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW, FROM JANUARY
1981 THROUGH OCTOBER 1984, 4-5 (1984) [hereinafter COHEN-HILLMAN STUDY]; see
H. COHEN & A. HILLMAN, REPORT TO TASK FORCE, DIAGNOSIS CONFIRMED: EDL
IS AILING 4 (1985) [hereinafter DIAGNOSIS CONFIRMED]. The authors pointed out
that only seventy EDL decisions were reported between July, 1980 and October
15, 1984. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 79-80 (testimony of
Cohen & Hillman). Joining Mr. Brandes, who reported sixty-five cases, see id. at
171 (testimony of Joel Brandes), the authors urged that more decisions be published.
See id. at 79 (testimony of Cohen & Hillman). They also noted that it is these
seventy judicial decisions that set the parameters for the 90 percent of matrimonial
cases that end in negotiated settlements. See id. at 79, 87 (testimony of Cohen &
Hillman).
174. See Foster & Freed, Law and the Family: O'Brien v. O'Brien, N.Y.L.J.,
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capacity upon a marriage's dissolution does not, as some have
written, confer a "free meal ticket" to the economically dependent
spouse175 but constitutes a recognition that each partner's contribution
to the marital enterprise-whether through affirmative performance
or through foregoing opportunity-will be equitably compensated
out of assets accumulated during the marriage and the post-marriage
earning capacity of each party.
(a) Distribution of Marital Property
The EDL directs the courts to consider two types of property
upon the dissolution of a marriage: "marital" property and "sep-
arate" property. Separate property is defined as property acquired
before the marriage or by descent or as a gift from a party other
than the spouse or as compensation received for personal injuries.
The appreciation in the value of separate property is not distributed
and remains with the title-holding spouse "except to the extent that
such appreciation is due in part to the contributions or efforts of
the other spouse." 1 7
6
Marital property is defined as "all property acquired by either or
both spouses during the marriage and before the execution of a
separation agreement or the commencement of a matrimonial action,
regardless of the form in which title is held." '' 7  Assets deemed
marital property must be divided "equitably" according to nine
statutory factors and "any other factor which the court shall expressly
find to be just and proper. '
Jan. 9, 1986, at 1, col. 1; id. at 2, col. 3 (chastising "enemies of equitable
distribution" as having "abandoned the principle of equal rights" and advocating
" 'grandmother clauses' in order to make reluctant Santa Clauses out of ex-
husbands they may have rejected").
175. Id.
176. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(l)(d)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1985).
177. Id. § 236B(l)(c).
178. Id. § 236B(5)(d)(10). Section 236B(5)(d) of the Domestic Relations Law
provides:
In determining an equitable disposition of property, ... the court shall
consider: (1) the income and property of each party at the time of
marriage, and at the time of the commencement of the action; (2) the
duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the
need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence and
to use or own its household effects; (4) the loss of inheritance and
pension rights upon dissolution of the marriage as of the date of dis-
solution; (5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this
part; (6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect con-
tribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party
not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions
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Judicial valuation and division of property determine many wom-
en's post-divorce economic well-being.' 79 Lower courts in New York
have construed the provisions of the EDL relevant to property
division in a manner that greatly disadvantages women and pre-
determines inequitable results. Economically dependent women's
ability to litigate is hampered by inadequate awards of attorneys'
and experts' fees. Property divisions place an inappropriately low
value on homemakers' services and permanently lost earning capacity.
(i) Women's Ability to Litigate. The EDL empowers the courts
to require either spouse to pay the other's attorney's fees so as "to
enable that spouse to carry on or defend the action or proceeding."' ' s0
Judges' refusals to award adequate or timely counsel and expert
fees were repeatedly cited as critical barriers to women's receiving
adequate representation in matrimonial cases.
Most women do not have the necessary resources to retain an
attorney, who is very familiar with the law and its practice. No
matter how well off the husband, by the time the parties are
ready to retain lawyers the wife has been left with very little.
Most attorneys require a retainer at the comrfiencement of their
representation and are forced to finance the case after the retainer
has been fised up. As a general rule, where an attorney has been
paid a retainer, no matter how small the amount, the courts will
not award pendente lite counsel fees. This creates financial pres-
sure on the attorney to conclude the case and on the spouse who
has to worry about the increasing cost of litigation.'
Respondents to the Attorneys' Survey said of counsel fees:
The courts do not make reasonable allocations for legal services
and services as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to
the career or career potential of the other party; (7) the liquid or non-
liquid character of all marital property; (8) the probable future financial
circumstances of each party; (9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating
any component asset or any interest in a business, corporation or profes-
sion, and the economic desirability of retaining such asset or interest
intact and free from any claim or interference by the other party.
Id. § 236B(5)(d).
179. Due to the insufficiency of maintenance and child support awards and the
extreme difficulty in enforcing them, many economically dependent wives may rely
heavily on marital property awards for economic security and survival. See infra
notes 194-209, 228-89 and accompanying text,
180. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 237(a)(5) (McKinney Supp. 1985).
181. Brandes Statement, supra note 172, at 4. The Cohen-Hillman Study revealed
that in the forty-seven reported decisions where counsel fees were at issue, twenty-
one economically dependent wives received no counsel fees at the conclusion of
trial. See COHEN-HILLMAN STUDY, supra note 173, at 91.
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rendered to female litigants in matrimonial cases which has the
effect of depriving female litigants of proper representation in
situations where the husband controls the family purse strings
and/or has the greater income-which is true in most cases.
Seventy-year-old rural male'82
The greatest area of discrimination in Monroe County involves
court awards of counsel fees to women. The courts are excessively
stingy and inconsistent in cases where [the] wife has no identifiable
assets and husband is able to pay. As a result, members of the
private bar will not accept this type of matrimonial case, and
deserving women go unrepresented.
Thirty-year-old rural male'83
I've curtailed my matrimonial practice because I can't afford to
handle the cases. Most contested matters are guaranteed losers
for the wife. Most of [those] I've handled, the husband has the
resources to enter into protracted litigation while the wife does
not. If I've invested $5,000-$10,000 worth of time into one of
these divorces, the court might-on a good day-award me $2,500.
The women who most need my services will never have the
resources under the present system to be able to pay my fee.
Thirty-six-year-old urban female84
The EDL provides that funds for retaining accountants and ap-
praisers may be awarded to needy spouses "as justice requires."' 85
Because the wife must prove the value of the husband's assets,
business or professional practice, fees for experts are essential. This
"prove it or lose it" aspect of EDL litigation often presents, in
practice, acute problems for the economically dependent spouse.
Herbert M. Siegel, a Buffalo attorney, testified that "applications
to the courts . . . for accounting fees, for appraisal fees and eval-
uation fees are not being met kindly."' He described a case in
which his firm advanced $5,000 for an appraisal of a husband's
business and was awarded only $400 as reimbursement. Noting that
few law offices are willing or able to make large disbursements for
182. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 5 (Survey Respondent No.
0125M).
183. Id., app. B, at 10 (Survey Respondent No. 0288M).
184. Id., app. B, at 50 (Survey Respondent No. 1163M).
185. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 237 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985); see also Gueli
v. Gueli, 106 Misc. 2d 877, 878, 435 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1981).
186. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 168 (testimony of Herbert Siegel).
The Appellate Division, Second Department has held that expert fees are not to
be "granted routinely." Ahern v. Ahern, 94 A.D.2d 53, 58, 463 N.Y.S.2d 238,
241 (2d Dep't 1983).
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experts in matrimonial cases, Mr. Siegel concluded that "oftentimes
women are not obtaining the necessary expert analysis that they
should have prior to going to trial."' 87
(i) Property Division. The pattern of property division in reported
decisions reveals that the view of marriage as an economic partnership
has not taken hold. Lillian Kozak, C.P.A., Chair of the NOW-New
York State Domestic Relations Task Force testified:
An examination of decisions reveals that one family asset which
is divided 50/50 most of the time is the marital residence. Since
the vast majority of houses are jointly owned and were therefore
divided equally under the old law, the equal division of houses
is hardly evidence of an egalitarian perspective. In the few cases
where the wife has been awarded the whole marital residence, she
has been deprived of a far greater interest in income-producing
property, including businesses, and in pension plans and to ob-
viously-hidden wealth.
Although cash savings are also being divided, where they have
been substantial there has not been an equal division.
In the realm of property division, the valuation of businesses
... has been a hoax, and the percentage of the hoax awarded to
the wife has been [twenty-five] percent or less. There seems to be
no offset, in the main, for leaving the husband with this major
income-producing asset., 8
The Cohen and Hillman study analyzed fifteen reported cases in
which a marital business property was at issue, of which thirteen
involved marriages of long duration ranging from seven years to
forty-one years. Eighteen percent of marital property was the median
award to wives.8o9 In only two cases were equal awards made. In
six cases, the wife was completely denied a share of the business
property. 190
The courts appear to be ignoring wives' "contributions and services
as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and . . . the
187. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 168 (testimony of Herbert Siegel).
The combined effect of a heavy burden of proof, courts' denial of awards and
"often unrealistic" awards of pendente lite experts' fees, significantly undercuts
the EDL's purpose, making "possession ... 9/10ths of the law." Second Opinion,
supra note 170, at 8; see Brandes Statement, supra note 172, at 7.
188. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 141 (testimony of Lillian
Kozak).
189. See COHEN-HILLMAN STUDY, supra note 173, at 90.
190. One appellate division opinion suggested that the wife's homemaker services
should be rebuttably presumed to be equal in value to the husband's earnings. See
Conner v. Conner, 97 A.D.2d 88, 103, 468 N.Y.S.2d 482, 493 (2d Dep't 1983).
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career or career potential of the other party."' 9' These criteria (which
apply both to distribution of marital property and to awards of
maintenance) require the courts to consider the contributions made
to the "economic partnership," by the nontitleholding, non-wage
earning spouse. 192 Supreme Court Justice Betty Ellerin, Deputy Chief
Administrative Judge for Courts within the City of New York,
testified that "the value of a homemaker/wife's contribution to a.
marriage is again all too often valued in terms of societal attitudes
the deprecate the woman's role or contribution."' 3 Attendees at
the Oswego County listening session reported that farmers' wives
who have spent all their adult lives helping to keep a farm going
do not have their contribution valued and end up with very little
in equitable distribution.
One reason for the undervaluation of homemakers' contributions
suggested by a survey respondent is that some judges "cannot con-
ceive of a woman having a right to a share of 'the man's business[.]'
Judges, too, often refer to it as 'his business' and 'their house' and
'his pension[.1' Under equitable distribution it should be thought of
as 'their business' and 'their pension[,'] etc.'' 19
4
Among survey respondents, seventy-two percent of women and
thirty-two percent of men reported that equitable distribution awards
"sometimes," "often" or "always" reflect a judicial attitude that
property belongs to the husband and a wife's share is based on
how much he could give her without diminishing his current life-
style. 195 Sixty-two percent of the male respondents and twenty percent
191. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(5)(d)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1985); see id.
§ 236B(6)(a)(8).
192. Professor Thomas Kershner of the Department of Economics at Union
College testified that "economists have made considerable economic advances in
identifying and measuring the various jobs and tasks that homemakers, wives and
mothers do." Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 229-30 (testimony of Thomas
Kershner). However, Judith Avner, Esq., Assistant Director of the New York State
Women's Division, cautioned that evaluation of the value of particular services as
the sole measure of a homemaker's contribution, as opposed to the joint enterprise
concept, can deteriorate into a debate at the level of whether the homemaker left
a "ring-around-the-collar." Id. at 138 (testimony of Judith Avner); see Avner,
Valuing Homemaker Work: An Alternative to Quantification, 4 FAIRSHARE 11
(1984).
193. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 284 (testimony of Betty
Ellerin).
194. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 78 (Survey Respondent No.
1745F) (emphasis in original).
195. Female and male survey respondents (F70/M%) reported that equitable
distribution awards reflect a judicial attitude that property belongs to the husband,
and a wife's share is based on how much the husband could give her without
diminishing his current lifestyle:
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of the female respondents reported that this occurs "rarely" or
"never. "
Seventy percent of women and forty-four percent of men also
reported that judges "sometimes," "often" or "always" refuse to
award fifty percent of property or more to wives even though
financial circumstances are such that even with such an award hus-
bands will not have to reduce their standard of living substantially
but wives will. 196 Forty-nine percent of the men and eighteen percent
of the women reported that this occurs "rarely" or "never."
Other witnesses and respondents stressed the fact that the judiciary
is overwhelmingly male and may have little understanding of what
homemaking involves. Some judges appear unaware of the economic
opportunity cost to the one who has devoted long years to unpaid
labor for her family. Rockland County Legislator Harriet Cornell
observed:
[Miale perspective on family life has skewed decisions in equitable
distribution cases. The perception of most men-and the judiciary
is mostly male-is that care of the house and children can be
done with one hand tied behind the back. Send the kids out to
school, put them to bed, and the rest of the time free to play
tennis and bridge. They think any woman-no matter her age or
lack of training-can find a nice little job and a nice little
apartment and conduct her later years as she might have done
at age [twenty-five]. 197
Lillian Kozak's reference to the valuation of businesses as "a
hoax" was also noted in the Cohen-Hillman study, which cited
several cases in which courts credited the husband's experts' valuation
even while acknowledging the husband's financial chicanery. These
cases can be read as encouraging a husband to undervalue or hide
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
12/2 35/10 25/20. 13/31 7/31 9/6
Id., app. A, at 26.
196. Female and male survey respondents (F7o/M%) reported that judges refuse
to award 50076 of property or more to wives even though the probable future
financial circumstances indicate that even with such an award husbands will not
have to substantially reduce their standard of living but wives will:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
10/2 41/16 19/26 12/31 6/18 11/8
Id.
197. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 51-52 (testimony of Harriet Cornell).
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assets because such behavior is ultimately rewarded in the division
of marital property.198
(b) Maintenance
The EDL provides for the ordering of "temporary maintenance or
maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of a party to the ma-
trimonial action in such an amount as justice requires" as determined
by ten factors. 99 In his legislative memorandum in support of the
EDL, Gordon Burrows of the Assembly Judiciary Committee stated:
The objective of the maintenance provision is to award the recipient
spouse an opportunity to achieve independence. However, in mar-
riages of long duration, or where the former spouse is out of
the labor market and lacks sufficient resources, or has sacrificed
her business or professional career to serve as a parent and
homemaker, "maintenance" on a permanent basis may be nec-
essary.
2
00
Maintenance awards are critical to the economic security of the
vast majority of economically dependent wives. Lillian Kozak tes-
tified: "The greatest asset in most families is the earning power of
the supporting spouse to which the homemaker has contributed. The
only possible distribution of this asset is via alimony-maintenance. '20 1
198. See COHEN-HILLMAN STUDY, supra note 173, at 6-7.
199. Section 236B(6Xa) of the Domestic Relations Law provides, in relevant part:
[I]n any matrimonial action the court may order temporary maintenance
or maintenance to meet the reasonable needs of a party to the matrimonial
action in such amount as justice requires .... In determining the amount
and duration of maintenance the court shall consider: (1) the income
and property of the respective parties ... including marital property
distributed pursuant to subdivision five of this part; (2) the duration of
the marriage and the age and health of both parties; (3) the present and
future capacity of the person having need to be self-supporting; (4) the
period of time and training necessary to enable the person having need
to become self-supporting; (5) the presence of children of the marriage
in the respective homes of the parties; (6) the standard of living established
during the marriage where practical and relevant; (7) the tax consequences
to each party; (8) contributions and services of the party seeking main-
tenance as a spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the
career or career potential of the other party; (9) the wasteful dissipation
of family assets by either spouse; and (10) any other factor which the
court shall expressly find to be just and proper.
N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985).
200. Memorandum of Assemblyman Gordon W. Burrows, reprinted in [1980] N.Y.
LEGIS. ANN. 130. The fact that the term "permanent maintenance" is not used in
the statute may mislead some judges. At a New York City regional meeting an
attorney described an argument before a Nassau County judge who insisted that
the EDL bars permanent maintenance.
201. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 143 (testimony of Lillian
Kozak).
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(i) Duration of Award. The legislature intended maintenance awards
to be short-term when the non-wage earning or economically de-
pendent spouse is young or has a strong potential to become self-
supporting after a period of support for education or training. The
Task Force found that this concept of "rehabilitative" maintenance
is being widely abused. Judges are too frequently awarding minimal,
short-term maintenance or no maintenance at all to older, long-
term, full or part-time homemakers with little or no chance of
becoming self-supporting at a standard of living commensurate with
that enjoyed during the marriage.20 2 Among survey respondents, sixty-
two percent of women and thirty-eight percent of men reported that
older, long-term homemakers with little chance of obtaining em-
ployment above minimum wage are "sometimes," "rarely" or "never"
awarded permanent alimony. Survey comments on maintenance in-
cluded:
While I generally support rehabilitative maintenance, I do not
believe that a [fifty-]year-old woman who has always been a
housewife can be rehabilitated. However, permanent awards for
such women are almost non-existent.
Thirty-six-year-old urban female03
I am very disturbed by the court's reluctance and often refusal
to award adequate and/or long-term maintenance orders to wives
especially those from lengthy marriages (15-30+ years). I am also
disturbed by the meager temporary (pendente lite) awards of
support which are usually "barely getting by" awards, especially
when the cases involve husbands and fathers with significant
income ($50,000 and more).
Fifty-four-year-old-rural male2°4
A woman who is minimally self-supporting often receives no
maintenance or minimal [maintenance] ($25-$50/week) for a lim-
ited period of time, when the man may be earning $30,000-$50,000/
year.
Twenty-eight-year-old urban female205
202. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that older displaced
homemakers, with little chance of obtaining employment above minimum wage,
are awarded permanent maintenance after long-term marriages:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
4/15 24/43 36/24 21/10 5/2 10/6
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 30.
203. Id., app. B, at 50 (Survey Respondent No. 1181F).
204. Id., app. B, at 25 (Survey Respondent No. 0652M) (emphasis in original).
205. Id., app. B, at 64 (Survey Respondent No. 1496F). Another survey respond-
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Cohen and Hillman analyzed forty-nine reported decisions in-
volving requests for maintenance. In forty-seven of these cases, the
marriages ranged from seven and a half years to fifty-seven years
in duration. In ten cases, economically dependent wives married
between ten and fifty-seven years (with eighteen years of marriage
being the median) were totally denied a maintenance award. In fifteen
cases, economically dependent women who had been married between
eight and thirty-six years (twenty years of marriage being the median)
were awarded only rehabilitative maintenance for periods ranging from
one and a half years to five years. In the remaining nineteen cases,
economically dependent women were awarded long-term or perma-
nent maintenance. 20 6
(ii) Amount of Award. Some judges appear to be ignoring "the
standard of living established during the marriage" and are relying
on a parsimonious interpretation of the wife's "reasonable needs."
As a result, even women who can obtain employment enjoy a far
less generous post-divorce standard of living than do their husbands.
The question of post-divorce parity was raised by Herbert Siegel,
Esq., who asked:
When it comes to equitable distribution and the talk of economic
partnership, why should there not be an economic partnership
not only in property, but in the ability to support themselves or
live in a way to maintain a certain standard of living .... I
think there should be some parity when it comes to the dissolution
of marriages and the question of maintenance itself. 207
ent sought to explain the reasons behind courts' failure to award appropriate
maintenance:
The attitude seems to be one of "You've gotten your fair share of the
marital assets and you're capable of working (whether the wife is 25 or
55 years old; having been married 5 years or 35 years) therefore if you
are careful and invest what you have received you will be able to get
along." This attitude prevails irrespective of the standard of living of
the couple prior to divorce, the presence of children in the wife's home
(pre-school or otherwise), past employment or lack thereof by the wife,
her level of education or job training, and the disparity of post-divorce
income of the couple. (Almost no effort is given to fashioning parity,
even for a short duration.) ... The inequities are apparent, yet the courts
(including the appellate courts) have for the most part chosen to ignore
them .... The insensitivity of the courts in this regard is egregious.
Forty-nine-year-old urban male
Id., app. B, at 68-69 (Survey Respondent No. 1584M).
206. See COHEN-HrLLMAN STUDY, supra note 173, at 93. The range of duration
of marriage of the latter group was seven-and-a-half to forty-one years, with the
median duration of seventeen years. See id.
207. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 170-71 (testimony of Herbert Siegel).
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Julia Perles, Esq., Chairperson of the Equitable Distribution Com-
mittee of the Family Law Section of the New York State Bar
Association, testified that inadequate maintenance awards are "un-
fair," but they are "not the fault of the EDL; I think it's the fault
and the prejudice of particular judges who hear the cases. '208
Justice William Rigler, Presiding Judge of Special Term, Part 5
(the matrimonial part), in Kings County Supreme Court, suggested
that the problem is that this kind of gender bias is injected by the
parties themselves. He cited a case in which a physician husband
admitted to a net annual income of about $50,000 and the wife,
who had worked to put the husband through medical school and
had no college degree, requested support for herself and her children
and funds to complete her education. The husband rejected this
request and submitted his own estimates of what his wife's expenses
should be. "His list included only the bare necessities for his wife,
while his own list of expenses was quite expansive and generous,
taking into account the social and professional position as a phy-
sician. ",209
(c) Provisional Remedies and Enforcement
Despite statutory provisions for full financial disclosure, the pres-
ervation of assets, enforcement of awards and interest on arrears,
enforcement is seriously deficient.
Practitioners assert that there are no useful sanctions in the EDL
to compel disclosure. As a result, "stonewalling" is commonplace. °10
If effective temporary restraining orders are granted to maintain the
status quo for equitable distribution, 21 judges rarely impose mean-
Female and male survey respondents (F/M) reported the duration of rehabilitative
maintenance awards based on length of marriage as:
DURATION OF MARRIAGE AVERAGE YEARS OF MAINTENANCE
10-20 4/5
21-30 6/8
More than 30 8/9
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 30.
208. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 29 (testimony of Julia Perles).
209. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 101 (testimony of William
Rigler).
210. Brandes Statement, supra note 172, at 5-6.
211. Female and male survey respondents (Fo/M%) reported that effective
temporary restraining orders are granted to maintain the status quo for equitable
distribution:
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ingful sanctions when they are violated. 212
In an enforcement action, the EDL requires a judge to enter a
judgment for arrears unless "good cause" is shown for failure to
seek relief from the amount of maintenance awarded. 213 Ex-husbands
often respond to enforcement actions with meritless motions for
downward modification or claims that they are financially unable
to comply. Myrna Felder, Esq., Chair of the Matrimonial Committee
of the Women's Bar Association of the State of New York, testified
that a motion for downward modification "automatically stops en-
forcement proceedings in their tracks, ' 21 4 leading to nine to twelve
months of delay before the Special Referee's hearing and confir-
mation of the Referee's report by the supreme court judge who
made the reference.
If a year later, after hearings and the entry of contempt, it turns
out that he was able to comply all along, is there a penalty for
the man? No. Are there damages? No. Is there an extraordinary
counsel fee? No. The fellow has learned a lesson that our courts
are teaching the men around the state: It's better not to be so
quick to pay.2"5
Survey respondents reported that courts do not uniformly grant
maintenance retroactive to the initial motion date as required by
the Domestic Relations Law and Family Court Act, 21 6 or effectively
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
2/4 15/30 35/37 33/15 4/5 11/8
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 25.
212. Female and male survey respondents (F6/M%) reported that judges impose
meaningful sanctions, including civil commitment, when injunctions are violated:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
*/2 5/9 12/20 46/45 26/14 10/10
Id. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
213. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 244 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985).
214. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 247 (testimony of Myrna
Felder).
215. Id. at 248.
216. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B(6)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 440(1) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985).
Female and male survey respondents (Fo/M%) reported that maintenance is
granted retroactive to the initial motion date:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
10/16 19/29 26/23 31/20. 5/6 9/6
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 32.
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enforce the maintenance awarded. 217 Sixty percent of women and
fifty-six percent of men survey respondents reported that interest is
"trarely" or "never" awarded on arrears.2 18 The inability of women
to afford counsel and the refusal of the courts to award realistic
counsel fees were also cited as a factor in enforcement problems.219
SUMMAR Y OF FINDINGS
1, The manner in which judges distribute a family's assets and
income upon divorce profoundly affects many Women's economic
welfare. Women who forego careers to become homemakers
usually have limited opportunities to develop their full potential
in the paid labor force.
2. The New York Court of Appeals has recognized that the EDL
embraces the view of marriage as an economic partnership in
which the totality of the nonwage-earning spouse's contribu-
tions-including lost employment opportunity and pension rights-
is to be considered when dividing property and awarding main-
tenance.
3. Many lower court judges have demonstrated a predisposition not
to recognize or to minimize the homemaker spouse's contributions
to the marital economic partnership by:
217. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that the courts
effectively enforce maintenance awards:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
1/4 12/27 27/38 45/22 10/3 4/5
Id.
218. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that interest on
arrears is awarded as provided by statute:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
2/4 10/5 19/17 40/39 20/1 10/7
Id., app. A, at 34.
219. The importance of fees sufficient to vigorously litigate were expressed by
a survey respondent who wrote:
The courts' failure to enforce child support and maintenance awards,
whether pendente lite or after trial, is a disgrace. I am ashamed to tell
my female clients that an award of maintenance and/or child support
and/or arrears for same is generally not worth the paper it is written
on unless (a) there is an endless supply of money to litigate enforcement
or (b) the defendant-husband voluntarily complies with the order directing
the award.
Fifty-five-year-old New York City female
Id., app. B, at 30 (Survey Respondent No. 0752F).
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- a. awarding minimal, short-term maintenance or no maintenance
at all to older, long-term, full- or part-time homemakers with
little or no chance of becoming self-supporting at a standard
of living commensurate with that enjoyed during the marriage.
b. awarding homemakers-wives inequitably small shares of in-
come-generating or business property.
4. Economically dependent wives are put at an additional disad-
vantage because many judges fail to award attorney's fees ad-
equate to enable effective representation or experts' fees adequate
to value the marital assets.
5. Many judges fail to order provisional remedies that ensure assets
are not diverted or dissipated.
6. After awards have been made, many judges fail to enforce them.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
Take necessary steps to assure that judges are familiar with the
statutory provisions governing and the social and economic consid-
erations relevant to equitable distribution and maintenance awards,
including studies, statistics and scholarly commentary on the eco-
nomic consequences of divorce, women's employment opportunities
and pay potential, and the cost of child rearing.
FOR THE LEGISLATURE:
Enact legislation that:
1. Makes equitable sharing of the homemaker's lifetime reduced
earning capacity an express factor in the division of property
and awarding of maintenance.
2. Provides that a spouse's indirect contribution to the appreciation
of separate property (e.g., through homemaker's services) causes
such property, to the extent of appreciation, to become marital
property.
3. Requires the judge to assume a primary role in the identification
and valuation of assets through court appointment of special
masters or through required compensation from marital assets
of necessary experts retained by the parties.
4. Provides that marital standard of living, not the "reasonable
needs" of the party seeking maintenance is the standard by
which maintenance should be awarded and that if assets and
income are insufficient to maintain both parties at that standard,
the reduction in living standard should be equally shared.
5. Provides for mandatory awards pendente lite of counsel fees
appropriate to the duration and complexity of the case sufficient
to enable both parties to pursue litigation.
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FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
1. Develop informational materials respecting the social and eco-
nomic considerations relevant to equitable distribution and main-
tenance awards including studies, statistics and scholarly com-
mentary on the economic consequences of divorce, women's
employment opportunities and pay potential, and the costs of
child rearing, and make these materials available to members
for use in submissions to courts considering petitions for equitable
distribution and maintenance awards.
2. Invite judges to join in continuing legal education programs
concerning EDL.
FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEES:
Make available to all members information concerning the eco-
nomic consequences of divorce similar to that recommended for
judges.
2. DAMAGE AWARDS IN PERSONAL INJURY SUITS
Concerns raised in other jurisdictions led the Task Force to attempt
to determine whether gender affects the amount of damage awards
women receive in personal injury suits. 20 Marion Silber, Esq., a
New York personal injury lawyer, testified that after extensive re-
search, discussion with other litigating attorneys and a review of
recent cases, she concluded that it appears that juries today are
awarding women and men comparable damages for comparable
injuries, a significant change from her experience in prior years.
Implicit in this perception, as contrasted with attorneys' perceptions
concerning property and maintenance awards in matrimonial actions,
is that in personal injury cases homemakers' services are being
adequately valued and compensated. This fact might be explained
by a greater availability of counsel in contingency-fee cases who
may, in turn, have greater incentive to advance fees for expert
witnesses. Another possibility is that the equity of awards is more
apparent in the case of a physically injured plaintiff. A third is that
these cases are heard by juries..
Ms. Silber advanced three reasons for the improvement in damage
awards to women: (1) there are now more women on juries;22'
220. The Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court Task Force on Women in
the Courts recognized the lack of a jury charge that recognizes the economic value
of women's unpaid work in the home and some judges' refusal to admit expert
testimony on this point as problems in New Jersey. See FIRST YEAR REPORT OF
THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS 25-32
(1984).
221. Ms. Silber's theory that changes in jury attitudes toward female personal
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(2) these women are themselves in the workforce and are familiar with
and able to understand the issues involved in awarding damages;
and (3) plaintiffs are introducing expert economic testimony as to
the value of homemaker work into personal injury and wrongful
death cases. 222
After the decision of the New York State Court of Appeals in
De Long v. County of Erie,23 the jury charge relating to homemaker's
and maternal services was added. It provides:
In fixing that value you must take into consideration the circum-
stances and condition of her husband and children; the services
she would have performed for her husband and children in the
care and management of the family home, finances and health;
the intellectual, moral and physical guidance and assistance she
would have given the children had she lived. In fixing the money
value of decedent to the widower and children you must consider
what it would cost to pay for a substitute for her services,
considering both decedent's age and life expectancy and the age
and life expectancy of her husband and each of her children.24
It appears that counsel in New York have the incentive and zeal
to seek adequate awards for women who are killed or injured and
that the technical legal framework is present to protect such women.
The equity of awards is, however, more difficult to assess. Attorneys'
Survey respondents were almost evenly split as to whether men receive
higher awards for pain and suffering than do women.225 More per-
injury plaintiffs are due in part to the increased presence of women on juries is
of particular interest. New York women were barred from jury service until 1940
and granted automatic exemption from jury duty until 1975. See supra notes 9-
10 and accompanying text.
222. See Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 90-92 (testimony of Marion Silber).
223. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983). In De Long,
the court held:
It is now apparent, as a majority of courts have held, that qualified
experts are available and may aid the jury in evaluating the housewife's
services not only because jurors may not know the value of those services,
but also to dispel the notion that what is provided without financial
reward may be considered of little or no financial value in the marketplace.
Id. at 307-08, 457 N.E.2d at 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18 (citation omitted).
224. 1 NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CIVIL 2:320.2 (Supp. Feb. 1986).
225. Female and male survey respondents (Fo/M67o) reported that men receive
higher awards than women for pain and suffering:
ALWAYS OFTEN- SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
2/1 16/6 31/19 31/34 9/31 12/9
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app.- A, at 76.
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ceived that women employed outside the home received higher awards
than homemakers received for pain and suffering, 226 and that hus-
bands received higher awards than did wives for loss of consortium. 227
3. CHILD SUPPORT
Children living with their mother alone are almost five times as
likely to be poor as children in two-parent families. In 1984, 34.5%
of female-headed single-parent families were in poverty as compared
to 13.106 of male-headed single-parent families. Only 6.9% of two-
parent families were poor. 28
Gross inadequacies, nationwide, in the ordering and enforcement
of child support led Congress to enact the Child Support Enforcement
Amendments of 1984.229 In response to the Act's requirement that
states conform their laws to the new federal requirements, the New
York 1985 Support Enforcement Amendments were enacted.
230
226. Female and male survey respondents (F%/MOo) reported that women em-
ployed outside the home receive higher awards than homemakers for pain and
suffering:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
9/3 36/28 26/28 9/19 3/11 17/12
Id., app. A, at 77.
227. Female and male survey respondents (FO70/M%7) reported that husbands
receive higher awards than wives for loss of consortium:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
7/1 25/12 29/23 20/27 5/25 15/12
Id., app. A, at 76.
228. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P-60, No. 149, MONEY INCOME AND POVERTY STATUS OF FAmmLEs
AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED STATES: 1984 (1985) [hereinafter MONEY INCOME].
229. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378,
98 Stat. 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 26 and 42 of the
United States Code).
230. See 1985 N.Y. Laws 809. The principal provisions of this law require: (1)
hearing examiners in family court to provide an expedited process for establishing
and enforcing obligations of support, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 439, 439-a
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985); (2) an income execution or court-ordered income
deduction from salary and other income to be triggered automatically whenever a
payment arrearage accrues that is equal to the amount of support payable for one
month, or when the person owing support fails to pay three payments on the dates
they were due, see N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 5241, 5242 (McKinney Supp. 1985);
(3) elimination of the current three-tiered statute of limitations for instituting pater-
nity proceedings, and establishment of a uniform statute of limitations that allows
a cause of action until the child's twenty-first birthday and gives a child standing
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
Provisions of the newly enacted New York law address problems
brought to the' Task Force's attention, including long delays in
obtaining orders of support and inadequate enforcement of support
orders. Expedited procedures are authorized. Hearing examiners or
judges must make an immediate temporary (or permanent order.23'
Child support must take priority over all other levies. 232 New, flexible
income-execution and income-deduction procedures are provided.
State-tax refund intercepts for past due support are authorized, and
services of support collection units are now available to persons who
are not receiving public assistance. The federal law also requires
states to develop guidelines that more realistically establish the amount
of support that should be awarded.233
These changes in the law make clear the judiciary's obligation to
assist in ensuring, and the strong public policy favoring, timely and
adequate child support. Notwithstanding these legislative advances,
the policies and practices that made this remedial legislation necessary
bear continuing examination. Without recognition of the informa-
tional and attitudinal barriers in the judiciary that, in part, con-
tributed to the child-support crisis, reform will be incomplete.
On October 1, 1985 the New York State Commission on Child
Support, established by Governor Cuomo in conformance with the
requirements of the Federal Child Support Enforcement Amendments
to commence paternity proceedings, see N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517 (McKinney Supp.
1985); (4) broader use of state tax refund interception for past-due child and spouse
support by making it available to persons receiving child or spouse support who
are not recipients of public assistance, see N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW §§ 111-m, 111-n
(McKinney Supp. 1985); (5) release by local social services districts of information
concerning past due support in amounts over $1,000 to consumer credit reporting
agencies who request such information, see id. § 111 -c; (6) availability to non-AFDC
recipients of all the enforcement tools previously available only to AFDC recipients.
See id. § 111-n.
Prior to the enactment of this law, the New York Family Court Act and Domestic
Relations Law already provided for numerous enforcement remedies, including
income deduction orders, posting of surety, sequestration, money judgment for
arrears, interest on arrears and contempt, commitment, probation and criminal
proceedings for nonsupport of a child. See NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON
CHILD SUPPORT REPORT 52 (Oct. 1, 1985) [hereinafter CHILD SUPPORT REPORT].
The Child Support Commission reported that the greatest number of complaints
it received asserted that "Uludges are unwilling to require compliance with court-
ordered support or to impose penalties for willful-noncompliance." Id. at 73.
231. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 433(b), 435(b) (McKinney Supp. 1985).
232. See N.Y. Cirv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5241(h), 5242(c) (McKinney Supp. 1985).
233. New York has enacted legislation on the guidelines. See 1986 N.Y. Laws
892. Guidelines used in some states are based on a percentage of gross income,
others on net income. Some give priority to the needs of first families. Some take
into consideration the needs of second families. Very different results may be
reached depending upon the guidelines adopted by a state.
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of 1984, submitted its report, documenting in detail the massive
failure of the system and making extensive recommendations for
reform. The Task Force's independent inquiry revealed the attitudes
in our judicial system that compelled federal intervention in what
had always been a state function and raised profound concerns as
to how effectively the new laws will be administered. The Task
Force received compelling evidence of human suffering resulting
from: unconscionable delays in courts' hearing child-support peti-
tions; inadequate child-support awards; courts' failure to impose
sanctions for nonpayment of awards as authorized by law; and
courts' forgiveness of arrears of unpaid child support. Children living
in single-parent households, headed by their mothers, are the fastest
growing group of persons living in poverty in the United States
today.
(a) Judicial Attitudes Towards Husbands and Wives
Judith Reichler, Esq., Project Director of the New York State
Commission on Child Support, summarized the situation that many
women face:
It may seem fanatical to allege that the run around these women
are getting in court is a result of gender bias since some men
would also tell you that they receive similar treatment, but I
believe that what we are seeing is a not-so-subtle form of bias
against women as we continue to see them through this process
as litigious, vexatious, harassing, and a little bit crazy, if they
continue to pursue something to which they are entitled.
It is almost like a little game, a game where a person with power
can put his hand on the head of the person who is angry and
let that person flail away, continue to move until he drops from
exhaustion, and many do drop from exhaustion. In fact, perhaps
the most stable of them do drop from exhaustion or say "[t]he
hell with it, let's let him keep his money.) 234
The views of almost all the fifteen witnesses who testified about
child support were reflected in the testimony of Carol Lefcourt,
Esq., Counsel to the New York State Division for Women, who
reported:
Each year ... I have spoken to hundreds of women who call
and write the women's division and other organizations and at-
234. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 81-82 (testimony of Judith
Reichler).
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torneys, seeking help with their child support problem. They have
invariably had a disappointing if not devastating experience in
the courts. . . They complain of low court ordered support
awards, minimal enforcement of their support orders, even after
they have secured them, and disrespectful treatment from anyone
from guards in the courthouse, to judges.2"
Lynn Vallone, Chair of the Coalition of Women for Child Support,
a Buffalo-based organization that includes women from all parts of
western New York and all walks of life, testified that, on average,
members have spent over seven years trying to have court-ordered
child support enforced. Four-fifths of the members have had to
apply for public assistance after divorce, although none of these
women had been on welfare before. Ms. Vallone testified,
"[i]ndividually we have been told that our unsuccessful attempts to
collect uncollected child support builds character. . . .We have also
been told that we are vindictive, money-grabbing, that we made our
bed[s] and now we must lie in them. '236
New York Secretary of State Gail Shaffer testifed that "[flamily
[c]ourt has made women feel that their attempt to support their
children is vindictive, unimportant or even a joke. '237
At the Jefferson County listening session, attendees asked: "Why
must the burden be put on the custodial parent to look for services?"
"Why do social service people and the courts treat women like they
were criminals because they have no money?"
By contrast, several witnesses and survey respondents reported that
fathers' oral representations about their finances are accepted without
a demand for proof.239 At the Rochester regional meeting, an at-
torney reported that that afternoon she had been at a conference
in chambers on behalf of a woman who had been attempting to
enforce a child-support award for fourteen years. The father's attorney
235. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 222 (testimony of Carol
Lefcourt).
236. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 35 (testimony of Lynn Vallone). A
random sample study of the members showed that over 50% of the women had
their already low child support awards reduced over time whereas only 15% had
their awards increased. See id. at 39. Among the membership is a group of 20
mothers to whom $225,000 in child support arrearages is owing, and who have
collectively made over 275 court appearances in their efforts to collect. See id. at
39-40.
237. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 21 (testimony of Gail Shaffer).
238. LISTENING SEssIoNs, supra note 18, at 11.
239. See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 36 (testimony of Lynn Vallone);
see also New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 146 (testimony of Lillian
Kozak).
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said to the judge, "[aifter all these years, why doesn't she leave
him alone?" and the judge said to the mother's attorney, "Yes,
why doesn't she leave him alone?" 2"
At the Oneida County listening session, another woman who has
spent years trying to enforce child support stated that every time
she went to court she was "put on the dime" and made to defend
every item she had purchased for the children, whereas very little
was said about the fact that her husband was not paying.
24
'
Carol Lefcourt, Esq., reported that one chief clerk told her that
the judges he knew did not enter money judgments because they
did not want to ruin fathers' credit ratings.
242
Judith Reichler, Esq., testified that judges around the state have
told her they will not set a temporary award because they might set
it too high and the respondent, usually the father, would be stuck
with it. This prospective concern for the father leaves the total
burden of support on the mother.
243
Fran Mattera of For Our Children and Us, Inc. (FOCUS), a
nonprofit agency that assists in the collection of child support in
Queens, Nassau and Suffolk, said that many judges are unwilling
to issue a wage deduction order against a father out of concern for
a negative reaction from his employer. 244 Similarly, Secretary of State
Gail Shaffer testified:
The judicial branch does not often treat the child as a legitimate
creditor with interests in unpaid, accrued child support that should
not be compromised by parent or by judge without fiduciary
accountability.
The Judiciary must insist that child support be the first deduction
from [the father's] disposable earnings and not the last. It should
come before the boat or the house or the luxury items that are
often put at the top of the list . . . [with the attitude that] "Well,
when we get to the bottom, we'll decide what we do with the
children with what's left over. 2 45
240. One survey respondent noted: "Almost daily, I am at a loss to explain to
women clients why their husbands can cease or never start obeying a court order,
and the court will do little more than (after 2-3 months) order him, again, to do
it." R.L. AssoctATEs, supra note 23, app. B, at 65 (Survey Respondent No. 1498F).
241. LISTENING SESSIONS, supra note 18, at 6.
242. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 227-28 (testimony of
Carol Lefcourt).
243. See New York City Hearings M, supra note 50, at 83 (testimony of Judith
Reichler).
244. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 130-31 (testimony of Fran
Mattera).
245. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 24-25 (testimony of Gail Shaffer).
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(b) Custodial Mothers' Access to Counsel
Numerous respondents pointed out that, as in divorce litigation,
the inability of women to afford counsel makes it virtually impossible
for them to enforce child support awards. Fran Mattera of FOCUS
testified:
Many men conceal their assets. A woman as a petitioner has the
burden of proof when she goes into court. But because women
have exhausted their resources ... to engage a private attorney,
and because free legal services are unavailable to them on support
matters, the burden of proof is too difficult. However, a man
as a respondent in a case is entitled to legal aid if he can prove
financial hardship. It seems the court bends over backward to
protect a man's rights, but children's rights, through their mother's
actions in court, are not being protected. 246
Typical of the comments on the Attorneys' Survey is the following:
I have found it almost impossible to obtain counsel fees for
relatively indigent clients, thus effectively shutting them out of
effective enforcement procedures.
Thirty-seven-year-old rural female247
Judith Reichler, Esq., pointed out that although a petitioner can
go into family court in the first instance without an attorney, she
will not know and will not be told how, for example, to subpoena
the father's financial records. Moreover, if an order is made which
she believes is incorrect, it will be extremely difficult for her to
appeal the decision without the assistance of an attorney.2 48
(c) Timeliness of Awards
The new child-support legislation requires hearing examiners to
make an award upon the custodial parent's first appearance. This
provision seeks to remedy the financial hardship to mothers with
custody of their children who have frequently been denied child
support awards immediately upon the separation of the parties.
Among respondents to the Attorneys' Survey, thirty percent of
246. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 131-32 (testimony of Fran
Mattera).
247. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 49 (Survey Respondent No.
1149F)
248. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 78 (testimony of Judith
Reichler).
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women and twenty-two percent of men indicated that temporary
child support is "rarely" or "never" granted pending a hearing on
the motion pendente lite.2 49 The Child Support Commission stated
that "the inability to obtain temporary support orders was reported
in most of the cases that came to the attention of the commission. ' 250
Judges are perceived to be more favorably disposed toward the
interests of the father and reluctant to award support without a
hearing. Such hearings are easily delayed for several months because
of court congestion.
The primary problem is that custodial parents must wait months
before obtaining any relief including child support and mainte-
nance. Thus, there is no interim support and the household suffers
drastically.
Thirty-five-year-old New York City female25
Wynn Gerhard, Esq., acting director of a neighborhood legal
services program serving low income residents of Buffalo and Erie
County testified:
In a typical case, a woman left with children and no income
applies to the [flamily [c]ourt for an order of support, hoping
to avoid applying for welfare. At the initial court hearing, despite
requests and a clear showing of immediate need by the woman,
the [f]amily [c]ourt declines to issue a temporary order of support,
and instead refers the case for further hearings, which can take
literally months before a final determination is made. The woman
is left with no choice but to apply for public assistance to support
herself and her children. 25 2
(d) Adequacy of Awards
There appears to be little consistency in the way the amount of
child-support awards is determined. Amounts awarded are frequently
249. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M07o) reported that temporary
child support is granted pending a hearing on the pendente lite motion:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY No ANSWER
11/15 45/52 26/23 6/4 10/5
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 40.
250. CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 230, at 39.
251. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 76 (Survey Respondent No.
1723F).
252. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 79 (testimony of Wynn Gerhard).
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inadequate. Only twenty-eight percent of all survey respondents,
fourteen percent of the women responding and thirty-six percent of
the men responding, reported that child support awards "always"
or "often" reflect a realistic understanding of local child-raising
costs, particular children's needs and the custodial parent's earning
capacity. 253 Judges often appear to ignore statutorily prescribed fac-
tors such as the prior standard of living for the family, special needs
of the children and the expenses and nonmonetary contributions
of the custodial parent. 24 Others are perceived to give dispropor-
tionate weight to what the father can comfortably afford. Testimony
by the father as to his limited ability to pay tends to be accepted
without substantiation while the mother must prove the expenses of
the children. Moreover, there is a strong perception that the father
is deemed entitled to retain for himself as much of his own income
as possible. 255 Child support awards are often insufficient to furnish
even one-half of the actual cost of rearing a child. 216 Consequently,
the income of women and children is dramatically reduced from its
level prior to divorce. Attorneys responding to the survey wrote:
253. Female and male survey respondents (F%/MO7o) reported that child support
awards reflect a realistic understanding of the local costs of child raising, particular
children's needs, and the earning capacity of the custodial parent:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER.
1/7 13/29 30/34 39/25 15/3 3/3
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 39.
254. See N.Y. DOM, REL. LAW § 236B(7) (McKinney Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985).
255. Child support payments as a percentage of the average income of men have
remained at about 13 percent since 1978. See CHILD SUPPORT, supra note 163, at
1-3. It is estimated that in two-parent families, child raising costs amount to 30
percent of family spending in one-child families, 40-45 percent of family spending
in two-child families, and nearly 50 percent in three-child families. See P. ESPEN-
SHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN: NEW ESTIMATE OF PARENTAL EXPENDITURES (1984).
256. In 1983, the mean amount received nationwide by all women owed child
support payments, including those who received nothing, was $1,780. See CHILD
SUPPORT, supra note 163, at 2. If the full amount due had been paid to all women,
the mean amount would have been $2,520. See id. at 2-3. For women to whom
court-ordered payments were due, the mean payment due was $2,290, but the mean
amount received was only $1,330-58% of the amount due. See id. at 3.
Women with voluntary written agreements received 88% of the amount they
were due. See id. The mean child support payment owed to these women was
$2,960. See id. The mean amount of child support received by women who received
some payment was $2,340 per family (i.e., regardless of the number of children).
See id. at 2. After adjusting for inflation, average child support payments in 1983
were 150o below the level reported in 1978. See id.
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I can attest to the sexism prevalent in family law practice. Gen-
erally, a mother and two children are to live on the same amount
of income as the father by himself.
Thirty-two-year-old rural male257
[I]t is extremely difficult to get adequate child support increases,
college tuition, and fair property division. Many of my female
clients are close to poverty within a few years of the divorce
while the husbands, although not wealthy, are not struggling to
make ends meet.
Thirty-four-year-old rural female218
Child support awards are ... inadequate, being based on 'what
amount will not cause a hardship on the father,' rather than the
cost of raising a child.
Twenty-eight-year-old urban female259
Only recently has the [f]amily [clourt imposed realistic support
awards taking into consideration the real costs of raising a child.
Thirty-six-year-old rural male260
The awards initially are insufficient support for a child. Judges
desperately need guidelines as to how much support a child needs.
... I am personally aghast at the child support awards. it means
instant poverty and is an outrage.... Not one of twenty clients
with children has been able to properly and adequately support
her children and self without borrowing.
Thirty-five-year-old New York City female261
Fran Mattera of FOCUS, whose paralegals are in Queens, Nassau
and Suffolk County Family Courts on a daily basis testified: "[T]he
support awards of $10, $20 and $25 a week ordered by judges in
[flamily [c]ourt do not provide for even the essentials such as food,
shelter, and sneakers." 262
(e) Enforcement of Awards
Judges' unwillingness to require compliance or impose penalties
for noncompliance was the problem about which the Child Support
257. R.L. ASSOCtATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 37 (Survey Respondent No.
0924M)
258. Id., app. B, at 34 (Survey Respondent No. 0838F)
259. Id., app. B, at 64 (Survey Respondent No. 1496F)
260. Id., app. B, at 16 (Survey Respondent No. 0460M).
261. Id., app. B, at 76 (Survey Respondent No. 1723F) (emphasis in original).
262. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 133-34 (testimony of Fran
Mattera).
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Commission received the greatest number of complaints. 263 The chair
of the Western New York Coalition for Child Support testified that,
in Erie County, enforcement is "virtually nonexistent." 264 Secretary
of State of New York Gail Shaffer reported that, "[t]he word on
the street is that only fools pay child support because payment is
simply not enforced. The message women receive is that child support
is not an important matter and that they are not taken seriously
and that they are wasting their time, money and energy. '265
Respondents to the Attorneys' Survey also reported that many
judges are not using the statutory enforcement mechanisms that were
available to them before enactment of the New York State Support
Enforcement Act of 1985. Seventy-four percent of women attorneys
and sixty-five percent of men reported that "rarely" or "never"
are sequestration and/or bonds ordered to secure future child support
payments .266
Sixty-three percent of women and sixty percent of men reported
that interest on arrears as provided by statute is "rarely" or "never"
263. See CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 230, at 73. Female and male survey
respondents (F%/M%) reported that the courts effectively enforce child support
awards:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
1/7 17/32 32/39 38/18 8/2 4/3
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 41. National Census Bureau data on
child support awards and compliance reveals that since 1978, about three billion
dollars in child support has been uncollected each year. See CHILD SUPPORT, supra
note 163, at 3. According to the Census Bureau's latest report, in 1983, 57.7%
of the 8,690,000 women in the United States with children under twenty-one whose
father was absent from the household had child support agreements or awards.
See id. at 1. Of the 4 million women to whom payments were owed in 1983, 50%
received the full amount due, 26% received partial payment, and 24% received no
payment. See id.
264. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 41 (testimony of Lynn Vallone).
265. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 23 (testimony of Gail Shaffer) (quoting
testimony from Feminization of Poverty hearing).
266. Female and male survey respondents reported (F%/M%) that sequestration
and/or bonds are ordered to secure future child support payments:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
1/5 11/21 51/51 23/14 14/8
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 44. The hyphen (-) means no responses.
See id. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
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awarded.2 67 Eighty-two percent of women and sixty-seven percent of
men reported that respondents who deliberately fail to abide by
court orders for child support are "rarely" or "never" jailed for
civil contempt.2 61
The New York Domestic Relations Law and the Family Court
Act direct that upon a showing that the respondent has defaulted
on a child support order, the court is to enter a judgment for the
arrears with costs and disbursements unless the respondent shows
good cause for failure to apply for relief from the order before the
arrears accrued. 269 The Child Support Commission found that this
provision is being interpreted to allow a motion for downward
modification and reduction arrears "simply because the respondent
alleges an inability to have made the required payments, even though
no formal application for modification is made. 270
267. Female and male survey respondents reported (F07o/M070) that interest on
arrears is awarded as provided by statute:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/4 6/10 19/19 37/42 26/18 9/6
Id., app. A, at 43.
268. Female and male survey respondents reported (F07o/M%) that respondents
who deliberately fail to abide by court orders for child support are jailed for civil
contempt:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
*/* 4/9 6/16 35/42 47/25 8/7
Id., app. A, at 46. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
The rarity of jail as a sanction for child support default in Brooklyn Supreme
Court was illustrated by Kings County Supreme Court Justice William Rigler, who
reported that when he directed that a man be taken to jail, the court personnel
did not know what to do. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 110-
11 (testimony of William Rigler). By the time they found the sheriff and had him
come over, the father's new wife had arrived and paid the $10,000 he was in
arrears at that time. See id.
Refusing to impose a jail sentence for willful failure to pay child support not
only fails to sanction the defaulter but deprives the community of a powerful
incentive to pay. Studies of the impact of different enforcement practices reveal
that counties with high jail rates also have high compliance rates. See D. CHAMBERS,
MAKING FATHERS PAY 317 (1979). A rigorous study of twenty-eight Michigan counties
found that as the number of jailings went up, so did compliance. See id. The six
counties with jailing rates of seven or more per 10,000 persons in the county had
7507o compliance rates. See id.
269. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 244 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 460 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1985).
270. CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 230, at 60.
1986-87]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
Among respondents to the Attorneys' Survey, sixty-eight percent
of women and fifty-six percent of men reported that the courts
"sometimes" or "often" reduce or forgive arrears accrued prior to
the making of a downward modification motion. 271 The Child Support
Commission pointed out that this action works a hardship on the
petitioner and encourages respondents to withhold payments, know-
ing that the accumulated arrears may be reduced prior to judgment
and the costs, disbursements and interest will probably not be as-
sessed .272
The Child Support Commission offered the following two examples
as typical of judges' refusal to use available enforcement mechanisms:
A respondent had been brought before the court many times for
noncompliance with a court order-once on a bench warrant-
and had accumulated a large arrears. Many of the enforcement
techniques had been threatened, but not used. When [it] asked
what had happened the last time the case was in court, the
commission was told by the judge that the case had been adjourned
"to give the respondent an opportunity to voluntarily comply. 2
73
The judge had determined that the respondent was almost $12,000
in arrears, after appearing before the court several times for failing
to comply with a court order for child support. It was determined
that the respondent was in willful noncompliance, and he was
ordered to a jail term-suspended on the condition he make up
the arrears by a particular date and keep payments current. On
the date set, the respondent was found in default, and there was
a new determination that the failure to comply was willful. The
respondent was, however, merely ordered to make current pay-
ments; no penalty was imposed. 27
4
Myrna Felder, a New York City practitioner, and Stanley A.
Rosen, an Albany practitioner, testified that adjournments are freely
given and that court delay results in judgments coming months, even
271. Female and male survey respondents (F% /M°0o) reported that courts reduce/
forgive arrears accrued prior to the making of a motion for downward modification
of support:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
24/11 44/45 15/30 3/6 13/7
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 43. The asterisk (*) means less than
half of one percent. See id.
272. See CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 230, at 60.
273. Id. at 75.
274. Id.
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years, after the initiation of proceedings.275 Seventy-three percent of
women and sixty percent of men responding to the Attorneys' Survey
reported that repeated adjournments are "often" or "sometimes"
granted to the noncustodial parent. 76
Judge Richard Huttner, Administrative Judge of the New York
City Family Court who served as a member of the New York State
Commission on Child Support, described what he found to be the
"usual scenario" of delays women face when seeking enforcement
of child support awards:
A woman takes a day off from her job and usually loses the
day's pay to come to court. After waiting the better part of the
day, she is given an interview with probation services. She is told
that she must return in a week and that her husband will be sent
a letter advising him also to attend a settlement conference where
hopefully the husband and wife will agree to an order of support.
Usually on this date, the wife appears, losing another day's pay,
and the husband is a no-show. Now the woman is marched to
our petition room where a petition for support is prepared, and
is given a summons with instructions on how to have it served.
The date to come back to court is four weeks. On that date she
must appear, losing another day's pay, and [thirty] percent of
the time the husband still does not show despite having been
served with a summons.
The judge at this time takes an inquest. Or he can take an inquest,
rather, and grant a support order and issue a payroll deduction
order, garnish the husband's salary and bringing the matter to
closure, but some, in fact, most of my colleagues, will choose
to notify the husband that a warrant will be issued unless he
shows up the next time. The next time the gentleman may show
up and the woman is there again for the fourth time at a loss
of four days pay.
Our gentleman, seeing that the lady means business, asks for an
adjournment in order to hire an attorney and he gets it. The next
275. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 249-52 (testimony of
Myrna Felder); Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 175-77 (testimony of Stanley
Rosen).
276. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that repeated
adjournments are granted to the noncustodial parent in child support proceedings:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
9/2 41/21 32/39 11/32 1/3 6/3
R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 41.
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time, time No. 5 and five days lost pay for the woman, and
possibly a lost job, all the time she has been losing from work,
the man's attorney finally shows up and what does he do? He
does what seems to me as a trial judge that all attorneys do, he
asks for an adjournment.
By the time the woman has a day in court, months without
support have passed.277
(f) Visitation
Several public hearing witnesses asserted that the reason for fathers'
high default rate on child support is mothers' interference with
visitation and the courts' failure to enforce visitation rights, a point
on which the representatives of father's rights organizations felt
keenly. 278 A survey respondent wrote:
There has been a serious and ongoing problem in Monroe County
with respect to enforcement of the noncustodial parent's right
to exercise visitation. While child support awards are always en-
forced by the courts, visitation orders rarely if ever are. This
instills a perception, which for all intent[s] and purpose[s] is
correct, that the courts are sexist with respect to their treatment
of parents' rights and obligations for their children. This, in turn,
prompts noncustodial parents, who in [ninety-five percent] of all
cases are men, to disregard child support orders.
Thirty-five-year-old rural male219
The feelings of many women were summarized by Lynn Vallone
of the Buffalo Coalition for Child Support:
We continue to send our children on court ordered visits with
nonpaying fathers, yet upon returning to court for child support
enforcement, a cross petition very frequently accuses mothers of
denying visits. The visitation issue becomes a predominant issue.
Child support is initially ignored, and there is a presumption of
denied visits before any evidence is presented .... 210
Attorney General Robert Abrams described a case brought to his
attention by his office's Civil Rights Bureau in which a man $22,000
277. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 129-31 (testimony of Richard
Huttner).
278. E.g., Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 111 (testimony of Richard
Sansone); id. at 127 (testimony of John Rossler).
279. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 22 (Survey Respondent No.
0575M).
280. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 35-36 (testimony of Lynn Vallone).
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in arrears on child support brought a petition in family court alleging
denial of visitation. The judge threatened the wife with contempt,
assuming without discussion that she had deterred the children from
visitation. The judge took no steps to enforce the child support. 28'
Among respondents to the Attorneys' Survey, almost half of women
(forty-six percent) and men (forty-eight percent) reported that child
support enforcement is sometimes denied because of alleged visitation
problems. 282 A survey respondent wrote:
The absolute best defense in a support enforcement action is
defendant's claim of visitation interference and request for change
of custody-including when the father/defendant has been living
out of the area, by his choice, for years.
Thirty-six-year-old female (no region given)283
Courts' failure to enforce visitation is perhaps a function of some
judges' failure to understand why some fathers want to be involved
parents. 2 4 Whatever the motivations of the courts, it appears that
they are not carrying out their enforcement functions adequately
with respect to either child support or visitation.
The New York State Child Support Commission found that while
"visitation interference" is frequently raised as a defense to a petition
for child support compliance, it is less frequently raised or pursued
in an independent action. The commission also found that raising
this defense often resulted in a delay in the support proceedings as
well as a stay of the support order, and that failure of visitation
by the father is far more frequent than visitation interference by
the mother.28 The commission urged that visitation and child sup-
port be treated as separate matters so that children do not suffer
as a result of parental disagreements.28 6
281. See Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 13 (testimony of Robert Abrams).
282. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that enforcement
of child support is denied because of alleged visitation problems:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
19/7 46/48 26/35 3/5 6/4
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 42. The asterisk (*) means less than
half of one percent. See id.
283. Id., app. B, at 26 (Survey Respondent No. 0680F).
284. See generally infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
285. The Commission also pointed out that mothers sometimes deny visitation
because of fear of physical abuse. See CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 230,
at 86.
286. See id. at 85-86. Under the new, expedited support procedures in family
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(g) Family Court Resources
The lack of resources for family court personnel was repeatedly
cited as a major obstacle to the timely resolution of support cases
and as emblematic of the system's attitude toward women. Assembly-
woman May Newburger, Chairperson of the Assembly Task Force
on Women's Issues, stated:
I think that we have relegated women to the back seat of the
judicial bus for too long in terms of dealing with their issues
with parity . . . and nothing reflects this bias more, than the
situation of the [flamily [c]ourt in our court system. This is a
court that should be the lynch-pin court in terms of these kinds
of cases. It is the most neglected, most understaffed . . .most
underattended court in our system. 87
Carol Lefcourt, Esq., Counsel to the New York State Division for
Women, observed that although there were over 73,000 paternity
and support petitions and over 100,000 modification and support
petitions filed in the New York State Family Court in 1983, and
although family court judges handle approximately 1,000 cases for
every 300 cases handled by a supreme court judge, family court
receives a far lower allocation of resources than does the supreme
court and "[w]ith depressive juvenile administration, PINS [Persons
In Need of Supervision and] foster care, little time and effort is
reportedly spent on support cases.""28 At the Task Force's regional
meeting in Kingston, Ulster County Family Court Judge Karen Peters
also noted disparities in case loads and resources of the supreme
and family courts. Legislator Harriet Cornell told of the crippling
personnel shortage in Rockland County Family Court despite vastly
increased case loads and a judge and lawyer who described that
court to her as the "stepchild of the court system '" and "[tihe last
to get what is needed and the first to [have it] take[n] away. '28 9
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. Gross inadequacies, nationwide, in the ordering and enforcement
of child support led Congress to enact the Child Support En-
forcement Amendments of 1984. In response to the Act's re-
quirement that states conform their law to the new federal
court, the custodial parent's alleged failure to permit visitation cannot be raised
before a hearing examiner. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 439(b) (McKinney 1983).
287. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 71 (testimony of May Newburger).
288. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 225-26 (testimony of Carol
Lefcourt).
289. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 45 (testimony of Harriet Cornell).
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requirements, the New York 1985 Support Enforcement Amend-
ments were enacted.
2. The Task Force received compelling evidence of human suffering
resulting from the judicial system's failure to administer child
support laws adequately.
3. The new law seeks to address enforcement problems by estab-
lishing expedited procedures for immediate or temporary support
orders and providing for income execution, income deduction
and state-tax refund intercepts.
4. Attitudes and practices in New York's judicial system that com-
pelled federal intervention raise profound concerns as to how
effectively the new law will be administered. Although New York
law provided numerous enforcement mechanisms prior to federal
intervention, many judges failed to utilize them effectively.
5. Among the most prevalent problems are the following:
a. Awards frequently are inadequate and appear to be based
on what the father can comfortably afford rather than the
standard of living of the children and their special needs.
b. Women's attempts at enforcing support are frequently viewed
by judges as vindictive.
c. Judges are perceived to be more concerned about preserving
the father's credit rating than effectively enforcing awards.
d. Women have inadequate resources to retain counsel to assist
in collecting awards.
e. Child support arrears are frequently reduced or forgiven
without adequate justification.
f. In enforcement proceedings, repeatedly granted adjournments
to nonpaying parents often compromise the custodial parent's
employment because of the necessity of numerous appearances
in court.
g. Visitation problems are improperly considered by the courts
as justification for not enforcing child support.
h. Resources allocated to the family court are perceived to be
unfairly low when compared to the resources of other courts.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
1. Take necessary steps to assure that judges and hearing examiners
are familiar with:
a. Current, accurate information respecting the costs of child
raising, the costs and availability of child care and other
statistical and social data essential to making realistic child
support awards.
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b. The economic consequences of divorce from the standpoint
of ensuring that parents' financial contributions to child sup-
port are proportional to each party's earnings.
c. All available enforcement mechanisms under new and existing
laws and the importance of utilizing them to the fullest extent
of the law.
d. The concept of "good cause" in section 460 of the Family
Court Act and section 244 of the Domestic Relations Law
respecting the reduction of arrears.
2. Collect and publish data to enable effective monitoring of child
support enforcement cases.
FOR THE LEbGISLATURE:
Enact legislation that:
1. Provides counsel for indigent custodial parents in child support
enforcement proceedings.
2. Provides that in any proceeding in which a judgment for support
arrears is sought, the grounds constituting "good cause" for
permitting untimely requests for modification of the support order
be enumerated and strictly limited and that such modifications
may be granted only upon a specific finding by the court on
the record as to which specific ground has been demonstrated.
3. Provides that child support awards can only be modified pro-
spectively.
4. Establishes a new formula for child support that takes into
account the many considerations elaborated in the report of the
New York Child Support Commission.
5. Makes penal sanctions for nonsupport of children more readily
available as a deterrent measure.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
Family law sections and committees should take an active role in
ensuring that the new child support enforcement legislation is working
effectively and in developing a fair and uniform formula for child
support awards in the state.
FOR LAW SCHOOLS:
Family law courses should include information about the award
and enforcement of child support similar to that recommended for
judges and the hardship to children and custodial parents when child
support awards are insufficient and unenforced.
C. The Courts' Consideration of Gender in Custody Determinations
Determinations of child custody are among the most perplexing
and difficult aspects of the judicial function. Custody is an area of
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law in which sex-based stereotypes disadvantage both sexes. Gender
bias against fathers, as expressed in the ostensibly discredited "tender-
years" doctrine, which holds that young children belong with their
mother, is well known. 290 There is much less awareness of the
stereotypes that work to the detriment of mothers. But whether the
gender bias works against one sex or the other, the Task Force
found that some judges are allowing sex stereotypes to influence
their custody determinations rather than "the best interests of the
child," the controlling but vague standard. 29'
There is also confusion about what should be considered evidence
290. In fact, the tender years doctrine in its entirety is biased against mothers
as well. "As between parents adversely claiming the custody . . . other things being
equal, if the child be of tender years, it should be given to the mother; if it be
of an age to require education and preparation for labor or business, then to the
father." OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 11 (1971 & Supp. 1978) (repealed 1983).
291. Domestic Relations Law § 240 provides that in a custody dispute:
[T]he court must give such direction, between the parties, for the custody,
care, education and maintenance of any child of the parties, as, in the
court's discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of
the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the
child. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of
the child in either parent.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1985). "Best interests" includes
many factors which have been developed by the appellate courts. For instance, in
Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 432 N.E.2d 765, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893
(1982), the New York Court of Appeals stated, "[t]he only absolute in the law govern-
ing custody of children is that there are no absolutes." 55 N.Y.2d at 93, 432
N.E.2d at 767, 447 N.Y.S.2d at 895. Courts recognize that stability in a child's
life is of prime importance, see id.; Corradino v. Corradino, 48 N.Y.2d 894, 400
N.E.2d 1338, 424 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1979); Obey v. Degling, 37 N.Y.2d 768, 337
N.E.2d 601, 375 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1975), and, as a result, courts often give weight to
the first award of custody. See Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d at 94, 432 N.E.2d at 768,
447 N.Y.S.2d at 896. The "roller coaster" treatment of custody determinations is
to be avoided. See Dintruff v. McGreevy, 34 N.Y.2d 887, 316 N.E.2d 716, 359
N.Y.S.2d 281 (1974). "While concerns such as the financial status and the ability
of each parent to provide for the child should not be overlooked by the court,
an equally valid concern is the ability of each parent to provide for the child's
emotional and intellectual development." Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167,
172, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1263, 451 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661 (1982). Thus, the "quality of
the home environment and the parental guidance the custodial parent provides for
the child" is of prime importance in determining what custodial arrangement is in
the child's best interests. Id. The court of appeals "has long recognized that it
is often in the child's best interests to continue to live with his siblings. While
this, too, is not an absolute, the stability and companionship to be gained from
keeping the children together is an important factor for the court to consider."
Id. at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1264, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662. "While not determinative,
the child's expressed preference is some indication of what is in the child's best
interests. Of course, in weighing this factor, the court must consider the age and
maturity of the child and the potential for influence having been exerted on the
child." Id. at 173, 436 N.E.2d at 1263-64, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
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of bias. One hearing witness asserted that the fact that approximately
"ninety-five percent" of children live with their mothers after divorce
is evidence of gender bias in the courts. 292 But in the majority of
the divorces, children remain with their mother by parental choice.
There is substantial evidence that when fathers do litigate custody,
they win at least as often as mothers do. 291
1. STEREOTYPES THAT DISADVANTAGE FATHERS
Cultural stereotypes about parenting hold that women are more
capable than men of nurturing behavior. Certain judges believe that,
absent evidence of serious unfitness, a mother is to be preferred in
custody disputes.
(a) Maternal Preferences
Many witnesses and survey respondents agreed with Doris Jonas
Freed, Esq., that, "there remains a hard core of judges today who
are still reluctant to award custody to fathers except in the most
egregious cases of maternal unfitness and unless a demonstrated need
for such an award is shown beyond reasonable doubt. '29 4 Almost
three quarters (seventy-three percent) of female and male attorneys
said that custody awards are "often" or "sometimes" based on an
assumption that children belong with their mothers rather than upon
independent facts. Men (fifty-two percent) responded "often" to
this question more than women (thirty-three percent). 295 Illustrative
survey comments included:
292. See Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 116 (testimony of Sidney Siller).
293. See Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used
in Child Custody Determinations, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 235, 236-37 (Rutgers
Univ. 1983) (citing number of studies from different states and cities). One New
York family court judge awarded custody to men as often as to women during a
five year period in the 1970's. See M. WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN: A LEGAL GUIDE
FOR DIVORCING PARENTS 40 (1980). According to Jeff Atkinson, Chairperson of the
Child Custody Committee, Section of Family Law, American Bar Association:
In 1982, fathers obtained custody in 51% of all reported custody cases
decided nationwide by appellate courts; mothers obtained custody in 49%
of the cases. This marks a dramatic increase in custody for fathers from
1980 when it was estimated that fathers received custody in only one
out of ten contested cases.
Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate Courts,
18 FAm. L.Q. 1, 10-11 (1984).
294. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 8-9 (testimony of Doris Jonas
Freed).
295. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that custody awards
to mothers are apparently based on an assumption that children belong with their
mothers rather than independent facts:
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Despite abrogation of [the] tender years doctrine, most judges
(particularly when the children are young) leave the children with
the mother.
Fifty-five-year-old rural male296
Unless a woman is found to be unfit, a man does not have a
fair chance at custody. Although the laws are supposed to be
gender neutral, I have heard dozens of judges, law clerks, court
personnel, and other attorneys comment to me, "[y]ou know a
mother makes the better parent" or "[hiome is where the mother
is ....
Twenty-eight-year-old suburban female297
[There is] substantial prejudice against males [fathers] in custody
cases at every age group of child. . ... [T]he bench is largely of
the mind that if the mother wants the children she is going to
have them absent evidence that she is truly a horror.
Forty-six-year-old suburban male2
98
John Rossler, Vice President of the Father's Rights Association
of New York State, Inc., was among those who testified that aware-
ness of judges' maternal preference inhibits many men from even
attempting to litigate custody. "[Jiudges' opinions and attitudes reach
way beyond the confines of chambers. The facts are that most
attorneys feel compelled to dissuade, Or at least warn[,J fathers of
the requirements of a custody 'win-.' ",299 When asked on the At-
torneys' Survey: "Do you dissuade fathers from seeking custody
because you think judges will not give their petitions fair consid-
eration?," twenty-one percent of women attorneys and forty-seven
percent of men attorneys responded "sometimes ' or "often. ' ' 300
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
3/7 33/52 36/24 19/11 4/3 3/2
R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 48.
296. Id., app. B, at 23 (Survey Respondent No. 0599M).
297. Id., app. B, at 46 (Survey Respondent No. 1094F).
298. Id., app. B, at 49 (Survey Respondent No. 1162M) (emphasis in original).
299. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 122 (testimony of John Rossler). One
witness was a college professor and had a more flexible schedule than did his wife,
who worked at a 9 to 5 job. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at
35 (testimony of John Henning). He, therefore, took primary responsibility for the
day-to-day care of their children. Id. at 35-36. He testified that although "I had
been a mother except in the biological sense," id. at 36, "I was assured by two
different lawyers, there was no possibility of my getting custody. If your wife
wants custody, she will get it." Id. He never contested custody. See id.
300. Female and male survey respondents (F%'/M%) reported that they dissuade
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(b) Failure to Perceive Men as Involved Parents
Several of the Task Force's respondents suggested that part of
the reason for gender bias against men in custody disputes is the
judicial system's failure to understand some fathers' desire to be
actively involved in parenting.
Richard Kirtland, President of Equal Rights for Fathers in Roch-
ester, New York, testifying about conversations he had with many
attorneys about his own, informal joint custody situation, stated
"they seem hard-pressed to understand my concern and my continued
involvement with my child, and my insistence on remaining contin-
ually involved with it. I would say that these men don't know what
I'm talking about, even though they are also parents." 0' ° The attitude
described by Mr. Kirtland was also noted by a lawyer at the Rochester
regional meeting. She described having a male judge ask her why
her client, a father, wanted custody of his children, as if that were
beyond comprehension, while such a question is rarely asked about
a custody-seeking mother, who is assumed to want custody. 30 2
It appears that assumptions about fathers' abilities to function as
parents, particularly of very young children, color decisions about
visitation as well. Two Attorneys' Survey respondents wrote:
Once a female judge refused visitation to a father because the
child was too young, as if men could not be expected to care
for an infant.
Thirty-one-year-old New York City female303
I have very often lost motions for overnight visitation "in view
of the young age of the child." Judges like to believe fathers
cannot care for their children.
Twenty-nine-year-old suburban female304
fathers from seeking custody because they think judges will not give fathers' petitions
fair consideration:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
1/2 3/17 18/30 28/19 43/28 8/4
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 49.
301. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 159 (testimony of Richard Kirtland).
302. Two witnesses pointed out that this assumption creates its own kind of
gender bias, forcing women to fight for or accept custody regardless of their own
preference, lest they be branded by society as unnatural mothers. See New York
City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 106-07 (testimony of William Rigler); see also
Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 104 (testimony of Richard Sansone).
303. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 77 (Survey Respondent No.
1739F).
304. Id., app. B, at 47 (Survey Respondent No. 1094F) (emphasis in original).
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2. STEREOTYPES THAT DISADVANTAGE MOTHERS
Maternal preference may appear to be an unalloyed boon to
women, but it carries within it negative aspects as well. The stereotype
of a mother on which it is based has negative consequences for the
custody-seeking woman who does not conform to an image which
is both sexist and out of touch with reality. Although some judges
adhere to an overriding maternal preference, there are others whose
stereotyped assumptions about what a mother should be have resulted
in mothers losing custody on grounds unrelated to the child's best
interests, or reflecting a highly stereotyped vision of what constitutes
the child's best interests.
(a) Parenting and Lifestyle Standards
Public hearing witnesses and survey respondents reported that in
custody litigation, some judges evaluate women's parenting and life-
styles differently and more harshly than they do men's. Stephen
Hassett, Esq., of Buffalo Neighborhood Legal Services testified:
[T]he mother's parental fitness becomes tested against the tra-
ditional [mother] standard[,] while the father's parental fitness is
tested against, essentially, the [traditional] father's standard[,] in
other words[,] working outside the home. In this case courts penalize
mothers[,] but not fathers. If a mother places undue emphasis upon
her career, a choice she is ironically under pressure to make in
order to support her children and prevent loss of custody to a father
with his higher income[,] she nevertheless stands in jeopardy of
losing custody. In contrast, the fact that a father has a time-
consuming career is not assumed to hinder his ability to parent
his children.
[Because the father's fitness is tested against the "traditional
father" standard, a] father is not expected to know
about ... mothering [that is], cooking, cleaning, nursing chil-
dren through illness .... His attempts [which usually] begin ...
after separation are regarded by courts as not only sufficient but
commendable. And while it is permissible for fathers to leave
the family at separation and return months, sometimes years
later to seek custody ... [as is the case in most custody] mod-
ification action[s], a mother who does so is frequently viewed as
having abandoned her children .... 3
Respondents to the Attorneys' Survey wrote:
I think a key issue women face unfairly from time to time in
custody disputes is that a less than perfect mother is criticized
305. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 12-13 (statement of National Center
for Women and Family Law, submitted to Task Force by Stephen Hassett).
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for her imperfection while a father who simply wants his kids is
given credit for having that wonderful desire, even if he has done
very little child care.
Thirty-four-year-old rural female °6
If the mother is not a saint, she is at a disadvantage in obtaining
custody, even if she has always been the primary caretaker, the
children are well, and the father will only place the children in
nursery school or in the care of his second wife.
Twenty-eight-year-old urban female30 7
A woman's lifestyle may be judged by a double standard that
holds that a woman's behavior must be blameless, °8 but a man's
306. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 4 (Survey Respondent No.
0092F).
307. Id., app. B, at 64 (Survey Respondent No. 1496F). West Virginia is the
one state to have adopted a primary caretaker presumption as a part of its custody
law. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1980). In Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357
(W. Va. 1981), the court enumerated ten factors that constitute, at least in part,
primary parenting. These included preparing meals, bathing, dressing and grooming,
medical care, arranging social interaction among peers, arranging alternative care
such as babysitters, putting the child to bed and attending to it during the night
and disciplining the child (e.g., teaching manners and toilet training), educating
the child (religion, cultural, social), and teaching elementary skills such as reading,
writing and arithmetic. Id. at 363. The primary caretaker presumption operates
absolutely with a child "of tender years." Id. The judge may consult children
under the age of fourteen to learn their preference and "accord it such weight as
he feels appropriate." Id.
Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court argues that this
presumption: (1) provides a sex-neutral standard which avoids judicial bias as to
what makes a good parent; (2) lends predictability to the law of custody which
reduces husbands' power to threaten custody litigation in order to force their wives
to accept inadequate settlements, see infra note 321; and (3) provides security and
stability for the children. See Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent Rule: Child
Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL. REV. 168 (1984). Two
New York cases also expressly referred to the primary caretaker concept. See
Pawelski v. Buchholtz, 91 A.D.2d 1200, 459 N.Y.S.2d 190 (4th Dep't 1983); Dodd
v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
308. During a 1984 Suffolk County case in which custody of two children was
ultimately awarded to the father, the New York Supreme Court justice opened his
opinion stating that much testimony and a number of witnesses "added very little
to the simple theme that the mother . . . found her spouse . . . to be dull, boring
and sexually inadequate because he was not an ardent or skillful lover .... ." Ira
K. v. Frances K., 115 A.D.2d 699, 704, 497 N.Y.S.2d 685, 690 (2d Dep't 1985)
(Kooper, J., dissenting).
Nowhere in the lower court opinion is there any suggestion that the mother's
relationship to her "paramour" had any impact on the best interests of the children
or that she waited to leave the marital abode until she found a "love nest" able
to accommodate the children. See id. at 704-06, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 690-91. Despite
the judge's statement that the mother's sex life was the "theme" of this case, the
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indiscretions are to be ignored or expected as part of what being
a man is all about.
[T]he double sexual standard is prevalent. A woman with a boy-
friend still gets the Scarlet "A" while it is expected of a separated
male. A woman who leaves the children with her husband is a
monster; the opposite is readily accepted.
Forty-seven-year-old suburban female3°9
Some decisions appear to be shaped by the idea that a good
mother is one who stays home with her children.310 Yet given the
inadequacy of maintenance and child support awards and the failure
of enforcement"' few newly divorced women can afford to remain
at home. Lawyers at regional meetings and hearing witnesses de-
scribed the phenomenon of women who had been full-time home-
makers prior to divorce who take paying jobs at divorce in order
to support themselves and their children and subsequently lose cus-
tody to the remarried father in modification proceedings. A survey
respondent commented:
[I]n the custody area it is becoming vogue to award custody to
the father because he has remarried and the former wife must
work.
Thirty-year-old rural female 1 2
Among respondents to the Attorneys' Survey, thirty-eight percent
of women and twenty-two percent of men reported that a change of
custody is "sometimes" or "often" granted to fathers because of
mothers working outside the home and the presence of "stay at home"
stepmothers." 3 This detriment to working mothers persists despite the
record indicates that it was the subject of less than four pages of an approximately
800 page record. Id. at 704, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 690 (describing this language as "out-
worn and archaic terminology").
309. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 38 (Survey Respondent No.
0940F).
310. A survey respondent described a case in which the judge:
[D]emeaned and vilified the wife in a matrimonial action placing on her
the entire burden to "make the marriage work" ...... [Bloth parties
work[ed] but the judge condemned the wife for working and leaving the
children while lauding the husband for supporting them.
Fifty-seven-year-old suburban female
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 53 (Survey Respondent No. 1244F ).
311. See supra notes 199-219, 228-77 and accompanying text.
312. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 36 (Survey Respondent No.
0893F).
313. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that a change of
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fact that in 1985 sixty-two percent of women with pre-school or school-
age children were in the paid workforce, almost three-quarters of them
working full time.3"
The judicial attitude appears to be that the woman working full
time outside of her home is less of a mother than the stepmother
who, by virtue of being in a two-parent family, can afford to be
at home, and that a traditional nuclear family must be better than
mother and children together without a father present. This pref-
erence has a disparate impact on divorced women who, between the
ages of thirty and forty-four, remarry half as often as divorced
m en .
5
(b) Economic Barriers
New York has an extremely strict "exceptional circumstances"
standard respecting removal of a child from the state when the other
parent has visitation rights. 316 Although the courts expect women to
support themselves and contribute substantially to the support of
their children after divorce, they make it extremely difficult for a
woman to move to advance her career. In Kozak v. Kozak," ' the
custodial mother was offered an advancement and salary increase
by her employer, IBM, if she moved from New York to Kentucky.
The court refused to hold the promotion and advancement an "ex-
ceptional circumstance." Professor Henry Foster wrote of this case:
custody is granted to fathers because of mothers working outside the home and
the presence of "stay at home" stepmothers:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
10/1 28/21 38/48 13/24 12/6
Id., app. A, at 54. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
Karen Huneke of West Fulton, New York (Schoharie County), provided the Task
Force with the decision in her own custody litigation in which she lost custody of
her son to her former husband. The judge wrote "[tihe only material change of
circumstances ... is that petitioner father has remarried-a factor which does
enhance his prospects for custody." Huneke v. Huneke, No. V-37-78, slip op. at
14-15 (Family Ct. Schoharie County 1982).
314. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, No. 85-381, LABOR
FORCE ACTIVITY OF MOTHERS OF YOUNG CHILDREN CONTINUES AT RECORD PACE
(1985); See Noble, 48% of Mothers of Infants Are Found to Hold Jobs, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 16, 1986, at 25, col 1.
315. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL CENTER FOR
HEALTH STATISTICS, 34 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REP. Table 5, at 11 (No. 3 Supp.
1985).
316. Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d 377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d
862, 865 (1981).
317. 111 A.D.2d 842, 490 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1985).
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"Since the mother was in good faith and commendably was advancing
her career, the result is highly questionable and too rigid an inter-
pretation of 'exceptional.' There should be more flexibility and
the career interests of the mother deserved greater consideration than
was given in this decision. 3 s18 A survey respondent wrote:
I am distressed to see the Appellate Division, Second Department,
not allowing [the] ex-wife as custodial parent to move to a distant
locality for business reasons, yet allowing husband[s] as cus-
todial parents to do so. I have often heard women executives
called "corporate gypsies" by male counsel over my objection
yet the same type [of] pejorative names are not applied to male
executives.
Thirty-three-year-old suburban female3 9
The irony of courts' expecting women to be economically self-
sufficient but denying them the opportunity fully to achieve this
status is further compounded by some courts' use of an economic
standard to determine custody. More than one-third of women (thirty-
seven percent) and one-quarter of the men (twenty-seven percent)
responding to the Attorneys' Survey reported that custody is "some-
times" or "often" awarded to the parent in a stronger financial
position rather than ordering child support payments to the primary
caretaker.3 20 Phyllis Korn of Alternatives for Battered Women, a
Rochester shelter and hotline program, testified:
Permanent custody determinations seem to reflect a recent and
disquieting shift which enhances special privileges for' the more
affluent and more powerful male. When the father has more
money and a nicer home, the courts may decide he is thereby
the more "fit" parent, and grant custody to the parent with the
greater assets.12'
318. Foster, Zen and the Art of Child Custody, 5 FAmS HARE 10, 11 (Aug. 1985).
319. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 16 (Survey Respondent No.
0477F).
320. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that custody is
awarded to the parent in a stronger financial position rather than ordering child
support payments to the primary caretakers.
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
7/2 30/25 46/55 9/14 7/4
Id., app. A, at 50. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
321. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 90 (testimony of Phyllis Korn). Unequal
financial status between men and women is a factor throughout custody litigation,
and men seem to frequently use the threat of a custody fight to force women to
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Although reference to parents' ability to provide for a child finan-
cially may appear to be sex neutral, an economic standard dispro-
portionately disadvantages women because of workplace realities.
Full-time, year-round employed women earn sixty-four cents for every
dollar earned by full-time, year-round employed men. Median earn-
ings in 1984 for full-time, year-round workers were $20,012 for men
and $12,180 for women.322 Occupational segregation, with the ma-
jority of women concentrated in low-paying service occupations,
continues to be the norm.3 2 Even when women and men are in the
same occupational category, men earn more.3 24 In sum, determining
custody on the basis of which parent is more financially able ef-
fectively constitutes a paternal preference.
(c) Domestic Violence
Some judges' lack of understanding of the consequences to children
of violence against their mothers is leading to decisions in which
there is an award of joint custody or custody to the father. Fifty-
four percent of women respondents to the Attorneys' Survey and
thirty-one percent of men respondents reported that custody awards
"often" or "sometimes" disregard a father's violence against the
mother.
3 25
accept inadequate or unfair financial settlements. See Perles, Why Mediation is the
Wrong Approach to the Custody Dilemma, 5 FAIRSHARE 11, 12 (Aug. 1985). Julia
Perles has written, "[clustody questions are all too often raised for leverage and not
because one party or the other really wants custody." Id. at 12. Ms. Perles describes
how attorneys manipulated the pre-1973 New York State Conciliation Bureau to
achieve delay when it was to their advantage, see id., and argues that the pending
legislative proposal for mandatory child-custody mediation would be similarly sub-
verted. See id.
322. See MONEY INCOME, supra note 228, Table 11, at 17.
323. In 1984, 32% of women in the New York State paid labor force were in
the federal occupational category called "administrative support, including clerical."
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN 2234, 1984 GEOGRAPHIC
PROFILE OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 59-60, Table 15 (1985). Eighteen
percent of women were in "service occupations." Id. The 16% of women in
"professional specialty" included those in such female dominated relatively low-
paying fields as nursing and teaching. 1d.
324. For example, the average weekly earning in 1984 for full time workers in
service occupations was $180 for women and $259 for men. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USUAL WEEKLY EARNINGS OF EMPLOYED WAGE-
SALARY WORKERS WHO USUALLY WORK FULL-TIME BY DETAILED (THREE DIGIT
CENSUS CODE) OCCUPATION AND SEX, UNPUBLISHED TABULATIONS FROM THE CURRENT
POPULATION SURVEY, 1984 ANNUAL AVERAGES Table A26, at 24, 40. In the ad-
ministrative support including the clerical category, the average weekly earning was
$257 for women and $380 for men. See id. at 22,. 38.
325. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that custody awards
disregard the father's violence against the mother:
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A prime example is some judges' response to the fact that many
of these women often change their residences.
[B]attered women are penalized by courts for a lifestyle which is
a direct result of the physical abuse. Many battered women may
have to move frequently in an attempt to escape the batterer.
They may try [to] keep their home address or phone number
unknown, and ... [as a result, are] accused of limiting access
between the father and the children. The courts are likely to view
this as evidence of instability.3 26
The best interests of the child and society are disserved because,
as many studies show, children raised in violent homes learn to use
violence as an outlet for their own anger and as the way to resolve
conflicts 327
Messages implicit in the batterer's behavior encourage children to
develop characteristics that perpetuate the very roles and rela-
tionships that fuel family violence. The batterer as a negative role
model for children should be considered in conjunction with the
array of other negative effects suffered by children from exposure
to domestic violence.
328
SUMMAR Y OF FINDINGS
1. Determinations of child custody are among the most perplexing
and difficult aspects of the judicial function.
2. Guided only by the vague standard of "the best interests of the
child," judges are given virtually unbridled discretion to determine
what factors should be considered when making custody decisions.
3. Some judges appear to give weight to gender-based stereotypes
about mothers and fathers that may have little bearing on the
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
6/* 24/9 30/22 21/38 9/22 10/8
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 55. The asterisk (*) means less than
half of one percent. See id.
326. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 17-18 (testimony of Stephen Hassett).
327. E.g., Pagelow, Children in Violent Families: Direct and Indirect Victims,
in YOUNG CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 64-66 (Hill & Barnes eds. 1982).
328. Keenan, Domestic Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory
Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 407, 421 (1985). Other negative effects suffered by
children who witness violence against their mothers include shock, fear, guilt,
impairment of self-esteem and impairment of development and socialization abilities.
See id. at 419; e.g., Hilberman, Overview: The Wife Beater's Wife Reconsidered,
137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1336, 1340-41 (1980).
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child's best interests and that unfairly discriminate against men
and women.
4. Stereotypes that influence some judges and that disadvantage
fathers include:
a. Mothers are presumtively preferred as custodial parents, which
presumption is reinforced by some counsel's advice to fathers
not to litigate custody because they have little chance of
winning.
b. Some judges do not realize that some fathers genuinely are,
and desire to continue to be, actively involved in parenting.
5. Stereotypes that influence some judges and that disadvantage
mothers include:
a. Fathers who exhibit any involvement in parenting should be
rewarded with custody despite years of primary caretaking
by mothers.
b. Women who place great emphasis on careers, whether because
of ambition or economic necessity,, are sometimes considered
less fit to be awarded custody than men who place a similar
emphasis on their careers.
c. Women's extra-marital and post-divorce social relationships
are sometimes judged by a stricter standard than are men's.
d. When judges look to financial status or the presence of a
stay-home mother to determine custody, the lower post-di-
vorce economic status of women-caused in part by ine-
quitable maintenance, property and child support awards-
disadvantages the mother seeking custody.
e. Women who respond to domestic violence by leaving the
home may be viewed as unstable and less fit to receive
custody.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
Take steps necessary to assure that judges are familiar with:
1. How sex-based stereotypes about both women and men affect
decision-making in custody cases.
2. The psychological impact of divorce on children.
3. The effects of spousal abuse on children.
FOR THE LEGISLATURE:
Enact legislation that:
1. Clearly articulates the factors and standards that constitute the
"best interests of the child," and requires judges to state in
writing the factors considered in making their decision and to
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set forth their reasons for disregarding any of the articulated
factors.
2. Provides that abuse of one's spouse is evidence of parental
unfitness for custody and a basis for termination of visitation
or a requirement for supervised visitation.
3. Recognizes the need, in cases of domestic violence, to order
supervised visitation to protect the custodial mother.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
Continue to support committees engaged in the analysis of prob-
lems in the law of custody with a view toward eliminating the
problems rooted in gender bias described in this Report.
FOR LAW SCHOOLS:
Include information in family law courses about the psychological
consequences of divorce for children, the impact of spousal abuse
on children and the way in which gender bias against both women
and men influences custody decisions.
D. The Courtroom Environment
For most people, the courtroom is a foreign environment; it can
be intimidating, indeed, frightening. Courtroom procedures are mys-
terious and the language of its participants incomprehensible. Anxiety
is compounded because the courts often play a decisive role in
determining the social, economic and physical welfare of our citi-
zenry. In times of personal trauma, people give the judiciary un-
paralleled power over the core of their lives and expect the judiciary
to execute its duties scrupulously, with fairness, dispatch and com-
passion. Ready access to the courts and the presence or absence of
decorum and professionalism influence litigants' confidence in and
respect for the court.
For these reasons, examination of the courtroom environment-
the general manner of conduct, attitude and receptiveness of judges,
lawyers and court personnel to litigants as well as the courts' physical
accessibility-was considered by the Task Force to be an important
measure of the status of women litigants.
1. CREDIBILITY OF WOMEN LITIGANTS
The Task Force defined credibility in its fullest sense: whether a
person is "believable, capable, convincing, someone to be taken
seriously. 3 29 Perhaps the most insidious manifestation of gender
329. There is a substantial body of social science research showing that in a
variety of contexts, both women and men perceive women as being less credible
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bias against women-one that pervades every issue respecting the
status of women litigants-is the tendency of some judges and
attorneys to accord less credibility to the claims and testimony of
women because they are women.
Witnesses' testimony is the principal ingredient of the fact-finding
process. To be credited, the witness must be credible. Credibility,
in turn, may not always depend on the witness's objective candor
and reliability for, as Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo once observed:
"The forces of which Judges . . . avail to shape the form and the
content of their judgments" include "the likes and dislikes, the
predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emo-
tions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he
be litigant or judge.' '330
than men in all of the senses of the term as defined here, and that recent years
have by no means eliminated these attitudes despite the many other advances
towards equality of the sexes. See, e.g., Schafran, Eve, Mary, Superwoman: How
Stereotypes About Women Influence Judges, 24 JUDGES J. 12, 16 (1985). A Kent
State University professor in 1985 replicated and extended a 1968 experiment in
which 150 male and 150 female subjects were randomly assigned to read an essay
with the author's name indicated as either John T. McKay, J.T. McKay or Joan
T. McKay and asked to rate it on such qualities as persuasiveness, intellectual
depth and style. Although the essays were identical, those believed to have been
written by "Joan" consistently received lower ratings from male and female readers
than those believed to have been written by "John" or "J.T.". See Paludi &
Strayer, What's in an Author's Name? Differential Evaluations of Performance as
a Function of Author's Name, 12 SEX ROLES 353 (1985). Another study found that
in managerial jobs or jobs thought to require male characteristics, good looks are
an advantage for men and a disadvantage for women. See Heilmen & Stopeck,
Attractiveness and Corporate Success: Different Causal Attribution for Males and
Females, 70 J. APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 379 (1985). Attractive men were perceived
as having gained success on the basis of their hard work and ability. See id. at
386. Attractive women were presumed to have succeeded for reasons other than
their skill and/or talent, and to be less capable and credible and to have less
integrity. See id.; see also Heilman and Stopeck, Being Attractive, Advantage or
Disadvantage? Performance Based Evaluations and Recommended Personnel Actions
as a Function of Appearance, Sex, and Job Type, 35 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR
& HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 202 (1985). Among several Attorneys' Survey
respondents who commented on this phenomenon in court settings, one wrote about
his experience as a law clerk in appellate court:
Attractive female attorneys ... clearly face greater difficulty in being
treated seriously and occasionally I have seen this manifested by what
seem to be offhanded or innocuous comments [by judges] which subtly
undermine credibility.
Thirty-year-old New York City male
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 4 (Survey Respondent No. 0104M).
330. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167 (1921). Judge
Jerome Frank stated that "trial-court fact-finding is the toughest part of the judicial
function. It is there that court-house government is least satisfactory. It is there
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Women have long been sterotyped by society as impulsive, emo-
tional, irrational and unpredictable. 33 ' In a courtroom setting, this
stereotyping may translate into women being presumptively viewed
as incredible witnesses. Indeed, two notable trial practitioners advised
their colleagues in a practice guide that:
Women, like children, are prone to exaggeration; they generally
have poor memories as to previous fabrications and exaggerations.
They are also stubborn. You will have difficulty trying to induce
them to qualify their testimony. Rather, it might be easier to
induce them to exaggerate and cause their testimony to appear
incredible. An intelligent woman will very often be evasive. She
will avoid making a direct answer to a damaging question. Keep
after her until you get a direct answer-but always be the gentle-
man.
332
The Task Force heard compelling testimony at the public hearings
from lawyers, legislators, lay advocates and scholars that women
litigants' claims are subject to undue skepticism in New York's
courts. Domestic-violence victims are asked why they have no visible
injuries and what they have done to provoke their attacks. A woman
seeking an order of protection during the course of a matrimonial
action may be presumed to be engaging in "tactics" in the divorce
case .333
It is not unusual for women seeking maintenance and child support
enforcement to be pressed to account for every dollar they request
and defend their expenditures, while men's oral representations as
to income and expenses are accepted without proof. 34 Rape victims'
credibility is uniquely suspect and women who decide to prosecute
must be prepared to endure a kind of scrutiny of their lifestyles,
appearances and demeanor unknown to victims of non-sexual as-
sault. 35
A family court judge responding to the Attorneys' Survey expressed
particular concern about the impact of sexual behavior on credibility
in paternity cases:
that most of the very considerable amount of judicial injustice occurs. It is there
that reform is most needed." J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY
IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 4 (1949).
331. See Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 177 (testimony of Virginia Burns).
332. F. L. BAILEY & H. B. ROTHBLATT, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL
TRIALS § 205, at 190-91 (1st ed. 1971). This text was not deleted until the 1985
edition. See id. (2d ed. 1985).
333. See supra notes 54, 81 and accompanying text.
334. See supra notes 209, 239 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 119-33 and accompanying text.
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In [flamily [c]ourt, women are often petitioners, who have the
burden of proof, which varies (support, paternity, family offenses).
Bias could be present but extremely subtle. I am concerned about
attempts to discredit the credibility of women, particularly in
paternity cases, based on sexual promiscuity.
Thirty-nine-year-old rural male family court judge33 6
Assemblywoman May Newburger described the stereotypes about
women's credibility that made reform of New York's sexual assault
laws so difficult to accomplish:
[Wiomen and child victims of sexual offenses have historically
not been perceived as people whose testimony is reliable or credible
and worthy of belief .... It has been assumed . . . that children
will lie about incest at the urging of mothers seeking to gain
advantage in matrimonial action. It has been assumed that women
and children have a tendency to fantasize about sexual contact
337
One survey respondent discussed some judges' and law enforcement
officers' attitudes toward the credibility of women who allege child
sexual abuse:
Mothers who suspect child sexual abuse and leave their husbands
are often accused of "manufacturing" the issue to "get at" their
husbands. I've seen judges (mostly in Steuben and Schuyler Coun-
ties, but also elsewhere) buy this argument because the wom[a]n-
in a state of extreme agitation because of her fears-is a "bitch"
or a "piece of work." . . . The same labeling happens to women
who go to the police after being beaten and/or seriously threatened.
Because she's not "cool, calm, and rational," the police often
won't even take her complaint. This is a terrible problem in
Chemung County. Many of my female clients refuse altogether
336. R.L. ASSOCIATEs, supra note 23, app. B, at 41 (Survey Respondent No.
0978M). New York City attorney Claire Hogenauer provided the Task Force with
a decision in a 1985 paternity case in which a judge rejected the objective scientific
evidence (HLA testing) of 99.7o probability of paternity and in his opinion used
such phrases as "[a] partial list of sex partners for this limited period [six men
over two years] includes the following impressive array .... ." Angela B. v. Glenn
D., 126 Misc. 2d 646, 648, 482 N.Y.S.2d 971, 973 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
Ms. Hogenauer asked, "Wouldn't an unmarried man in New York City be con-
sidered . . . at least sexually inactive if he had been with three women on average
a year? Would not his credibility be affected not one iota by this evidence?" New
York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 221-22 (testimony of Claire Hogenauer).
337. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 60 (testimony of May Newburger).
District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman testified about a Brooklyn judge who asked
an eleven-year-old sexual abuse victim whether she had sexual fantasies. See New
York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 39 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman).
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to report incidents to the police because they're put through the
third degree.
Twenty-nine-year-old rural female33
In the Attorneys' Survey, the Task Force sought the perceptions
of attorneys statewide regarding whether and how gender affects
credibility in the courts. Respondents were asked: (1) whether male
and female judges appeared to impose a greater burden of proof
on female witnesses than on male witnesses;33 9 and (2) whether male
and female judges appeared to give less credibility to female expert
witnesses than to male experts based on gender rather than on the
substance of the expert's testimony.3 40
338. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 11-12 (Survey Respondent No.
0326F). The lack of credibility of women who allege child sexual abuse against
their husbands in matrimonial cases has been the subject of extensive recent comment.
Dr. Suzanne Sgroi, co-director of the St. Joseph College Institute for the Treatment
and Control of Child Sexual Abuse in West Hartford, Connecticut, has pointed
out that when a mother attempts to protect her child by getting a divorce, her
credibility is undermined. See Armstrong, Daddy Dearest, CONNECTICUT MAG., Jan.
1984, at 54. Dr. Roland Summit, a psychiatrist at the University of California
specializing in the treatment of sexually abused children has stated: "If a woman
allows sexual abuse to occur under her roof, she is accused of setting up the abuse.
If she separates with her children, she is accused of inventing prejudicial stories
to block her husband's legitimate access to his children." Id. at 127. In a California
case, the entire court system refused to believe the mother until the physical evidence
was overwhelming and the child had become voluntarily mute. See Lindslay, A
Mute Girl's Story: Child Abuse and the System, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1984, at
45, col. 1. Dr. Summit stated that "[tihe bias against mothers who complain is so
bad that a woman who is aware of it is often told that she may do well not to
bring it up because it will only bring trouble on herself." Id.
339. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
MALE
JUDGES 1/* 12/2 29/6 23/15 21/73 15/4
FEMALE
JUDGES 3/* 16/5 32/16 23/65 25/13
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 22. The asterisk (*) means less than
half of one percent. See id. The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
340. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
MALE
JUDGES 1/* 7/1 21/5 22/14 17/62 32/18
FEMALE
JUDGES 1/- 2/* 11/4 29/14 19/58 38/23
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Men and women have different perceptions of how gender affects
witnesses' credibility. Women attorneys were much more likely to
indicate that women witnesses are held to a higher standard than
men. With respect to the burden of proof imposed on witnesses,
thirty-six percent of women compared with eight percent of men
said that male judges "sometimes" or "often" impose a greater
burden of proof on female witnesses than on male witnesses. About
one fifth (nineteen percent) of women respondents compared with
five percent of men indicated that female judges "sometimes" or
"often" act similarly.
Treatment of expert witnesses is also seen differently by men and
women. While sixty-two percent of men have "never" seen male
judges give less credence to female than to male experts because of
gender rather than substance, only seventeen percent of women
responded in the same way. Similarly, a higher proportion of men
(fifty-eight percent) than women (nineteen percent) said female judges
"never" give less credibility to female than to male expert witnesses."'
(a) Inappropriate and Demeaning Conduct
Lack of credibility is manifested by the unacceptable frequency
with which women litigants and witnesses are subjected to sexist
remarks and conduct by judges, lawyers and court personnel. The
immediate effect of such conduct may be humiliation. The more
enduring consequence is that this conduct distorts the judicial process
and indicates a lack of respect for the litigant that may, in turn,
ultimately and more subtly manifest itself in denial of the litigant's
substantive rights.342 Attorney General Robert Abrams testified that:
Id., app. A, at 23. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
341. One survey respondent observed:
The reaction depends on the area of expertise, i.e., whether the male
judge thinks it is an area in which a female might be an expert, say in
social work as opposed to auto mechanics.
Thirty-five-year-old New York City female
Id., app. B, at 52 (Survey Respondent No. 1223F).
342. Attitudes are unconscious usually, and when they cause injustice, they-
can be likened to malignancies, because if they go undetected and un-
treated, they are fatal to the impartiality of the judge and[,] consequently[,]
to the judicial process. And no matter how dispassionate a judge believes
he is, nevertheless, ever so subtly, and ever, ever so imperceptibly, these
attitudes infect and mar the decision-making process and the lives of
litigants as well as those who become the victims of these errors of
judgment.
New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 119 (testimony of Richard Huttner).
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Women continue to call our Civil Rights Bureau, complaining of
sexist treatment by judges and court personnel. In many of these
instances, the women are in contact with the court system as a
result of a domestic crisis, and inequitable treatment by the judicial
system serves not only to demean the women but also to aggravate
an already emotionally-charged situation."'
In the survey questionnaire, attorneys throughout the state were
informed that the Task Force "received testimony from judges and
attorneys about the ways in which seemingly trivial negative conduct
toward women in courtrooms and in chambers interferes with the
administration of justice."' 44 Respondents were asked a series of
questions about the perceived frequency of the inappropriate and
demeaning conduct most commonly cited: (1) whether judges and
counsel address women litigants or witnesses by first names or terms
of endearment when men are addressed by surnames or titles;3 41 (2)
whether judges, counsel and court personnel make inappropriate
comments about the personal appearance of women litigants or
witnesses when no such comments are made about men;3 46 (3) whether
judges, counsel, and court personnel subject women litigants or
343. Albany Hearings supra, note 57, at 12 (testimony of Robert Abrams). For
instance, in a divorce proceeding involving a physically abusive husband, a judge
in the southern tier shouted at the woman that she was making a cause celebre
out of the situation and said: "[Ylou must consult on matters regarding the children's
schedule. I don't mean you have to sleep together, ha ha ha." Id. at 12-13.
344. See infra Appendix F.
345. Female and male survey respondents (FO70/M°70) reported this conduct. is
engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES 1/- 13/2 29/9 33/27 16/59 8/3
COUNSEL .2/* 31/4 32/18 18/29 7/44 10/4
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 11. The asterisk (*) means less than half
of one percent. See id. The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
346. Female and male survey respondents (FOTo/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES 1/* 12/3 25/11 31/22 22/61 9/4
COUNSEL 3/* 22/5 32/17 20/24 13/50 10/5
COURT
PERSONNEL 2/* 15/5 29/13 25/23 19/52 11/6
Id., app. A, at 13-14. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See
id.
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witnesses to verbal or physical sexual advances;3 47 (4) whether judges,
counsel and court personnel make sexist remarks or jokes in court
or in chambers that demean women.3 48
The responses of male and female attorneys to these questions
differed markedly. For example, most women respondents (sixty-
seven percent) indicated that sexist remarks or jokes are "sometimes"
or "often" made by counsel. Conversely, seventy percent of men
said such incidents "rarely" or "never" occurred. The responses to
each of the remaining questions and categories followed a similar
pattern.
Attorneys responding to the survey commented on both the ex-
istence of this kind of behavior toward women litigants and its
consequences:
On several occasions, a hostile reaction from .. my female client
to a remark, joke, advance, etc.[,] has caused a judge, or, more
often, counsel and court personnel, to treat our case lightly, or
with less concern or courtesy than they extend to male ... clients.
Thirty-five-year-old New York City female3 49
[Flemale witnesses/litigants . . . subjected to either condescending
or inappropriate or sexist comments have become embarrassed or
347. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES */* 1/* 8/2 30/11 49/83 12/4
COUNSEL 1/- 5/1 18/6 30/16 33/73 13/5
COURT
PERSONNEL */- 2/1 12/4 29/12 43/78 14/6
Id., app. A, at 16-17. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See
id. The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
348. Male and female respondents (F70/Mo) reported this conduct to be engaged
in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES 1/* 14/3 36/12 25/25 22/56 3/3
COUNSEL 3/* 27/6 40/20 15/29 11/41 4/4
COURT
PERSONNEL 1/1 13/4 29/17 29/24 21/50 7/5
Id., app. A, at 15-16. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See
id.
349. Id., app. B, at 52 (Survey Respondent No. 1223F).
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flustered .... [T]his has the effect of making them appear less
credible.
Thirty-two-year-old urban female350
One opposing attorney flustered my female client by making lewd
remarks.
(No age given) New York City male35'
I have seen and heard reports of a clerk sexually harassing pro
se litigants; the clerk was in a position of taking orders to judges
to be signed. I assisted in bringing the matter to the attention
of the local adminstrative judge. Problem was temporarily abated,
but [the] clerk returned in other similar positions where he would
harrass female litigants and I continued to hear stories to this
effect.
Thirty-six-year-old New York City male352
(b) Race and Economic Status as Affecting Credibility
Attorneys attending a New York City regional meeting reported
their concern that gender bias in the courts is particularly a problem
for poor and minority-group women. Similarly, Marcia Sikowitz,
Esq., testifying for the Women's Committee of the New York Chap-
ter of the National Lawyer's Guild, stated:
Our members have observed that sexism is often compounded by
racism and classism so that poor women and minority women,
both litigants and attorneys, are subjected to discrimination even
more frequently than white middle class women. 3
350. Id., app. B, at 80-81 (Survey Respondent No. 1759F).
351. Id., app. B, at 3 (Survey Respondent No. 0048M).
352. Id., app. B, at 22 (Survey Respondent No. 0578M). One survey respondent
noted:
[C]ourtroom behavior often carries over into written opinions where, for
no good reason, adult women are referred to by their given names, rather
than by last names or status in the litigation.
Sixty-year-old suburban female
Id., app. B, at 51 (Survey Respondent No. 1197F). Compare Hotel Prince George
Affiliates v. Maroulis, 62 N.Y.2d 1005, 1008-009, 468 N.E.2d 671, 672-73, 479
N.Y.S.2d 489, 490-91 (1984) (female partners in action for accounting referred to
in opinion as "Rose" and "Norah") with Nishman v. DeMarco, 62 N.Y.2d 926,
929, 468 N.E.2d 23, 24, 479 N.Y.S.2d 185, 186 (1984) (male law partner in action
for division of fees referred to in opinion as "defendant DeMarco").
353. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 6-7 (testimony of Marcia
Sikowitz). Ms. Sikowitz also stated that "[member attorneys practicing ir Family
Court witness an enormous amount of paternalism expressed toward female liti-
gants." Id. at 6.
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These comments led the Task Force to inquire in its survey about
the interrelationship of sex and race and sex and economic status.
Attorneys responding to the Task Force's survey commented:
As a legal services attorney from 1976 to 1985, I have had occasion
to observe the conduct of the courts in relation to the problems
of poor people. In general, I have found the courts to be un-
responsive to the special problems of poor people and especially
poor women. In both [flamily [clourt and [1]andlord/[t]enant
[clourt, where I have practiced on a fairly regular basis, most-
though decidedly not all-judges have shown a lack of under-
standing of[:] (1) the limited resources [with which] poor families
and especially single mothers have to bring up their children,
provide necessities and pay their rent and other bills; [and] (2)
the fear and lack of understanding that poor people, particularly
women, have about the way that the courts function and their
rights ....
Forty-year-old New York City female 354
Most of my clients are Black and Hispanic welfare recipients,
often single mothers. It is clear to me that judges and court
personnel have a profound lack of respect for these clients. Whether
this influences their decisions, I could not state for sure, but the
lack of respect is manifested by rude comments, clear expressions
of dislike, etc., both from the bench and from court personnel.
[At] the very least, it convinces my clients that they cannot expect
to find justice in such a courtroom.
Twenty-eight-year-old urban male355
The court system itself seems to be biased against low-income
minorities. Specifically, the family courts and landlord/tenant
courts are dirty, crowded, and staffed with personnel who do not
respect the litigants. Here especially sexist comments are prevalent
and the judges condone same.
Twenty-nine-year-old New York City female35 6
As a Legal Services attorney, all my clients are poor and almost
all are women .... In court, and by other attorneys, my clients
are never afforded the same respect as a typical litigant is. When
a client is on welfare, other attorneys seem to feel freer to attack
a woman's personal choices (e~g., to have children, to have multiple
354. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 52 (Survey Respondent No.
1221 F).
355. Id., app. B, at 23 (Survey Respondent No. 0604M).
356. Id., app. B, at 35 (Survey Respondent No. 0864F).
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sexual partners, to not be married) as a way to attack credibility
and denigrate the client.
Twenty-seven-year-old rural female3"
Non-English speaking people-particularly those who have recently
emigrated-face the special problem of language barriers. One at-
torney responding to the survey commented:
It is especially difficult for women with language problems and/
or disadvantages based on economics to feel confident as witnesses
and litigants .... Certainly, opposing counsel takes full advan-
tage of the situation and often the judge does not place any limits
on the scope of the situation.
Twenty-nine-year-old rural female35
2. ADEQUACY OF COURT FACILITIES
The adequacy of physical facilities affects the integrity of the
judicial process. The courthouse's classical architecture, the raised
bench and the judicial garb are unmistakable symbols intended to
apprise all of the importance and seriousness of the courts' re-
sponsibility. Conversely, inadequate facilities denigrate and com-
municate indifference to the judicial process.
It is no secret that court facilities in New York359 are in disrepair.
The New York State Court Facilities Task Force determined in its
July 1982 Report that "[flully 58.5% of the total space occupied
by the courts throughout the state is in buildings found . ..to have
major inadequacies. When analyzed by building units rather than
square footage, 110 of the 299 buildings were found to have major
inadequacies. ''60 Although major efforts have been undertaken to
357. Id., app. B, at 8 (Survey Respondent No. 0192F) (emphasis in original).
One respondent disagreed, and noted:
I have represented many minority men and women who are each eco-
nomically disadvantaged. In my experience each has been treated fairly
and without bias.
Forty-four-year-old suburban male
Id., app. B, at 65 (Survey Respondent No. 1506M).
358. Id., app. B, at 57 (Survey Respondent No. 1335F).
359. New York's court facilities are located in 299 buildings throughout the state
and occupy a total amount of space equivalent to both towers of the World Trade
Center (8,269,591 gross square feet). See NEw YORK STATE COURT FACILITIES TASK
FORCE, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (July 1982) [hereinafter COURT FACuILTIES
REPORT].
360. Id.
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fund the rehabilitation of these facilities,36 ' the legislature and lo-
calities have failed to provide necessary funds.
Ill-maintained facilities negatively affect all citizens, regardless of
gender. There are, however, features of inadequacy causing special
hardship to women. They bear mentioning because they have the
practical effect of limiting women's access to the courts.
Several witnesses noted that facilities often do not account for
the needs of women who must bring their children with them to
court. Carolyn Kubitshek, Esq., of New York City, an attorney
with Movement For Youth (MFY) Legal Services testifying for the
Women's Committee of the New York City Chapter of the National
Lawyers' Guild, reported:
Housing court is filled primarily with poor women and their
children. Some judges do not allow children in courtrooms at all,
while others will order a mother and child to leave the courtroom
if the child begins to fidget. Mothers are then put in an untenable
position of leaving their children alone in waiting areas or losing
cases by default. Moreover, it can take the entire day for a woman
to get an order to show cause signed, and since the court has
no facilities for children, they too must wait the entire day.362
Lois Davis, past president of the Rochester Judicial Process Com-
mittee, a court-watching organization that observes the Monroe County
and Rochester courts, testified:
When mothers of small children must come to court as victims,
witnesses, defendants, or family of defendants, there is no pro-
vision made by the court for child care, and some judges will
not allow small children in the courtroom.3 63
Laura Blackburne, Esq., counsel to the New York NAACP, Pres-
ident of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution, and
Professor of Law at St. John's University, observed that not only
is there no appropriate waiting space for children, there is a dearth
of facilities that even provide an area where a parent can change
a child's diaper. 364
361. Chief Judge Sol Wachtler recently referred to the need to improve court
facilities as one of the three "cornerstones" of future court reform. Wachtler Urges
Drive to Rebuild Decaying Courts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1985, at 1, col. 1.
362. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 160-61 (testimony of Carolyn
Kubitshek).
363. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 222 (testimony of Lois Davis). The
New York State Association of Women Judges also raised the issue of lack of
child care facilities in courts, pointing out that mothers rightly fear that it is
dangerous to leave children alone in court corridors.
364. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 265-66 (testimony of
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These are not petty concerns. As with the disabled person whose
very access to the courts may depend on the presence of ramps,
hand rails or elevators, a mother unable to obtain child care may
be effectively precluded from attending court proceedings central to
her welfare.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. The Task Force defined credibility as whether a person is "be-
lievable, capable, convincing, someone to be taken seriously."
2. When judges and attorneys deny a person credibility based on
gender, professionalism is breached and substantive rights can
be undermined. The presence or absence of decorum and profes-
sionalism in the courtroom environment influences litigants' con-
fidence in and' respect for the courts.
3. Perhaps the most insidious manifestation of gender bias against
women-one that pervades every issue respecting the status of
women litigants-is the tendency of some judges and attorneys
to accord less credibility to the claims of women because they
are women.
4. Many women who seek relief in court for matters such as domestic
violence, rape, child support, paternity and divorce are subject
to undue skepticism.
5. Lack of credibility is also manifest in the unacceptable frequency
with which women litigants and witnesses are subjected to sexist
remarks and conduct by judges, lawyers and court personnel.
6. Poor and minority women appear to face even greater problems
of credibility.
7. The adequacy of physical facilities affects the integrity of the
judicial process. One aspect of this inadequacy-the dearth of
space available for children whom mothers must bring to court-
effectively precludes many women from appearing in court.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
1. Issue a declaration of policy condemning sexist conduct by judges,
lawyers and court personnel directed against women litigants and
Laura Blackburne). This observation is confirmed by the Court Facilities Task
Force finding of inadequate public waiting room facilities "particularly for [flamily
[c]ourts." COURT FACILITIES REPORT, supra note 359, at 2-3. Family court is a court
that experience has shown to be a "woman's" court. See generally TRIAL OF FAMILY
OFFENSES, supra note 42, at 8-10 (showing that women filed family court petitions
in overwhelming numbers).
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announce that all appropriate administrative action will be taken
to eradicate it.
2. Establish an internal unit and publicize a procedure for dealing
with complaints.
"3. Develop and conduct regular training for sitting and newly elected
and appointed judges and court employees designed to make
them aware of the subtle and overt manifestations of gender
bias directed against women litigants and its due process con-
sequences.
4. Review all forms, manuals and pattern jury instructions to ensure
that they employ gender-neutral language.
5. When undertaking improvements to physical court facilities in
the Unified Court System, take into account the special needs
of parents by providing for a supervised area where children
may wait with their parents and may stay while their parents
attend proceedings.
FOR JUDGES:
1. Monitor behavior in courtrooms and chambers and swiftly in-
tervene to correct lawyers, witnesses and court personnel who
engage in gender-biased conduct.
2. Ensure that official court correspondence, decisions and oral
communications employ gender-neutral language and are no less
formal when referring to women litigants than to men litigants.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
Develop and conduct an informational campaign designed to make
members aware of the incidence and consequences of gender-biased
conduct toward women litigants on the part of lawyers, judges and
court personnel.
FOR LAW SCHOOLS:
Include information and material in professional responsibility
courses to make students aware of the subtle and overt manifestations
of gender bias directed against women litigants and its due process
consequences.
FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEES:
Make available to all members information concerning the inci-
dence and consequences of gender-biased conduct towards women
litigants.
VI. STATUS OF WOMEN ATTORNEYS
In an adversarial system of justice, litigants must depend on their
chosen advocates. It is essential that the training, experience and
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performance of those advocates not be adversely affected by bias
on the part of courtroom participants, whether they be judges,
attorneys or nonjudicial court employees.
With women entering the legal profession and reaching professional
maturity in greater numbers, they are increasingly represented in all
facets of New York's legal system: government;3 65 private practice;3 66
the judiciary;3 67 and professional organizations.161 Several survey re-
spondents reported that, in recent years, there has been a significant
improvement in the way women attorneys are treated in the courts,
365. New York State Attorney General Robert Abrams testified that during
his six years in office, 4407o (207) of the lawyers hired by the New York State
Department of Law were women, and that women now constitute 35 percent of
the assistant attorneys general in the department. See Albany Hearings, supra
note 57, at 5-6 (testimony of Robert Abrams). Kings County District Attorney
Elizabeth Holtzman testified that when she came into office in January of 1982, no
women held executive legal positions in that office. See New York City Hearings I,
supra note 27, at 50 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman). As of November, 1984,
five of eleven bureau chiefs (45%) and six of eighteen deputy chiefs (33.3%) were
women. See id. Justice Betty Ellerin, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge for the
Courts within the City of New York testified that approximately one-third of the
assistant district attorneys in New York County are women, and that women
represented 50% of the 1983 entering class. See id. at 281 (testimony of Betty Ellerin).
366. See Flaherty, Women & Minorities: The Gains, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 20, 1982,
reprinted in THE WOMEN LAWYER WITHIN THE FIRM: EXPECTATION & FULFILLMENT
91 (undated).
367. See infra notes 454-57 and accompanying text.
368. Henry Miller, Esq., President of the New York State Bar Association(NYSBA), testified about the efforts of the NYSBA to bring women into its activities
and leadership. See New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 54-55 (testimony
of Henry Miller). He noted that almost none of the NYSBA's committees are all
male, see id. at 55, that 17% of committees and sections are chaired by women,
see id. at 54, that 10% of the house of delegates is women, see id. at 55, and that
the by-laws have been revised to employ gender-neutral language. See id. at 57. Mr.
Miller also described NYSBA's decision to stop holding meetings at the all-male Fort
Orange Club in Albany and Century Club in New York, and to adopt a policy bar-
ring the conduct of official business at any place which discriminates against women.
See id. at 55-56. In November 1980, Chief Judge Lawrence H. Cooke promulgated
a similar rule prohibiting the transaction of any official business of the Unified Court
System at facilities which discriminate on the basis of sex, race, color, ethnic origin,
religion or creed. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 20.1 (1980). Since
Mr. Miller testified, the first woman president-designate of the NYSBA, Maryann
Freedman, Esq. of Buffalo, was elected. See First, Woman to Head State Bar in
Association's 110 Years, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 17, 1986, at 1, col. 3.
Robert McKay, Esq., President of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, testified that several members of the Association's executive committee
are women, that at least twenty of the standing and special committees are chaired
by women, and that the number of women active as committee members exceeds
their proportion of the total membership of the Association. See New York City
Hearings I, supra note 27, at 217 (testimony of Robert McKay).
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particularly by judges, and that some judges are exemplary in their
equal treatment of male and female counsel. Professional acceptance
of women attorneys has not, however, been uniform. Irene A.
Sullivan, President of the Women's Bar Association of the State of
New York, testified:
Too many women attorneys practicing law in our state describe
their contact with the court system in negative terms. The comment
of one lawyer that: "[W]e are too often either treated disre-
spectfully or simply ignored," was echoed by many others with
whom I spoke.1
69
The experiences of women Assistant Attorneys General led Robert
Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, to conclude
that "some judges and lawyers do not treat women attorneys with
the same dignity, the same respect with which they treat male
attorneys. Male attorneys do not have their gender or their lives
brought gratuitously into the courtroom. 3 70 Elizabeth Holtzman,
District Attorney of Kings County, reported that "discrimination
against women exists in our courts and manifests itself in many
forms: disrespectful and demeaning comments and behavior in the
courtroom by male judges, court personnel and opposing counsel
9 9371
The failure of acceptance-the unwillingness of some judges, at-
torneys and court employees to treat male and female attorneys
with equal respect-manifests itself in the courtroom environment
and in professional opportunities. In the courtroom environment,
women attorneys are frequently subject to demeaning or dismissive
conduct. Some judges and attorneys-consciously or unconsciously-
appear to view women attorneys not as equals but as subordinates.
Women attorneys have adapted to the challenges they face in our
courts. When confronted by discriminatory treatment, they doggedly
and successfully pursue their clients' best interests. Nevertheless, the
added pressures engendered by a climate of disrespect or hostility
distract the attention of the judge, jury and attorneys from the
merits of the particular proceeding and thereby reduce the quality
of justice received by all. Until the "lingering residue of bias in the
legal profession. . . . is fully rooted out, women will not be able to
369. Id. at 98-99 (testimony of Irene Sullivan).
370. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 9 (testimony of Robert Abrams).
371. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 37 (testimony of Elizabeth
Holtzman).
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take their rightful place as full equals with their male counterparts
in strengthening the administration of justice, whether in courts, in
law offices, in government, or in legal education. 3 72
Questions about women attorneys' professional opportunities in
the courts focus on whether they receive their fair share of judgeships
and judicial appointments to lucrative and challenging guardianships,
felony cases or other desirable assigned-counsel positions. Leaders
of the women's organized bar believe that their constituents are not
treated with the same favor as are male attorneys in judicial as-
signments to fee-generation positions. Women's representation on
the state's bench has significantly increased, but most women judges
sit in New York City courts or on courts of limited jurisdiction;
few occupy the state's most powerful and prestigious judgeships.
A. Professional Acceptance
Professional acceptance of women attorneys-the manner in which
women attorneys are treated and perceived by judges, attorneys and
court personnel-is critical to determining their status in New York's
courts. The question of whether judges, counsel and court personnel
professionally accept women attorneys is important from the stand-
point of dignity and decency and because it has genuine consequences
for the administration of justice and due process.
Irene Sullivan, Esq., testified that:
[C]omments by judges and court officers directed not to the matter
before the court but to .. .the sex of the attorney appearing in
the courtroom, are distracting and frustrating, and too often
negatively impact on the ability of the attorney to perform at
her highest level of competence and to provide to her clients the
type of representation to which they are surely entitled. 371
It has been the experience of Barbara Billauer, President of the
Metropolitan Women's Bar Association, that "the attitudes of [j]udges
and of court personnel ... have an insidious effect on jurors. ' ' 314
372. Id. at 219 (testimony of Robert McKay).
373. Id. at 100 (testimony of Irene Sullivan).
374. Id. at 259 (testimony of Barbara Billauer). At a New York City regional
meeting, a young male lawyer, after listening to women lawyers discuss these types
of behavior, defended such conduct saying: "It's a game. It's tactics to throw you
off .... It's permissible for me to do that to prey on the jurors' sociological
bias." N. FLAHERTY, NEW YoRK TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS, REGIONAL
MEETING, METROPOLITAN NEW YoRK 6 (1985).
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Attorneys responding to the survey expressed similar views:
It is very difficult to trace the consequences of being addressed
as "dearie" or by other inappropriate terms directly to the outcome
of the case. It appears obvious that whatever the outcome of the
case, such trivializing discriminatory remarks pose an additional
burden upon a woman attorney, requiring her to overcome needless
obstacles and irritants not encountered by the men.
Fifty-year-old New York City female375
On occasion, female ... attorneys subjected to either conde-
scending or inappropiate or sexist comments have become em-
barrassed or flustered .... [Ilt impedes their ability to effectively
communicate their position and, as a corollary, represent their
clients effectively. Thirty-two-year-old urban female376
I believe that the failure of some women attorneys to respond
positively to some judges' advances [has] had a detrimental effect
on the clients.
Thirty-seven-year-old downstate male377
It undermined the attorney's confidence-or client's confidence
in the attorney or proceeding.
Thirty-eight-year-old rural female3 71
Judge repeatedly refers to female attorneys as "dear" and "young
lady" while males are referred to as "Mr. . . ." This is done in
open court and obviously affects witness response to the attorney
on cross examination as well as client confidence. I've heard male
attorneys make such overtly sexist comments as: "Fix your Slip,
you're giving me a hard-on[,]" and "You pain in the ass women
should be home where you belong-in bed." This was said in
open court, again with no chastisement by the court and, at the
least, affects the attitude of opposing counsel and the client's
confidence.
Twenty-nine-year-old urban female379
[Ilt is extremely tiresome and detracts from the time I would
otherwise spend representing my clients to continually respond to
all the sexist comments and inappropiate statements about the
physical appearance of women (but not men) in the courthouse.
Thirty-three-year-old New York City female38 0
375. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 71 (Survey Respondent No.
1634F).
376. Id., app. B, at 80-81 (Survey Respondent No. 1759F).
377. Id., app. B, at 26 (Survey Respondent No. 0684M).
378. Id., app. B, at 46 (Survey Respondent No. 1077F).
379. Id., app. B, at 23 (Survey Respondent No. 0605F).
380. Id., app. B, at 9 (Survey Respondent No. 0253F).
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Also to be considered is the effect such conduct may have on
litigants' overall view of the court system. Irene Sullivan, Esq.,
questioned:
If highly-educated professionals perceive that the treatment that
they receive from judges, court personnel, and other members of
the profession is too often inequitable and at its worst demeaning,
how must litigants similarly situated by virtue of their gender
perceive the process by which justice is administered in our courts?3"'
Notwithstanding these effects and that judges and attorneys who
engage in sexist conduct are subject to professional disciplines,3 2
the Task Force found such professional conduct to occur with
unacceptable frequency in New York's court system.
1. IMPROPER FORMS OF ADDRESS AND SEXIST
REMARKS
With unacceptable frequency, judges, attorneys and court personnel
address female attorneys in a manner ranging from the falsely en-
dearing to the unambiguously sexist and disrespectful. Irene A.
Sullivan, Esq., testified that: "[W]omen attorneys still complain
about tasteless and unprofessional comments routinely made by cer-
tain judges to women attorneys appearing before them. These com-
ments range from blatant sexual innuendo to more subtle and perhaps
381. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 96-97 (testimony of Irene
Sullivan).
382. The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct recently disciplined
two Supreme Court judges because of sexist comments. See In re Doolittle, De-
termination of New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct (June 13, 1985);
In re Jordan, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 2, 1983, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1983);
In 1983, Brooklyn Supreme Court Justice Anthony Jordan was publicly censured
for calling a woman attorney "little girl," and, at the close of argument, saying
to her "I will tell you what, little girl, you lose." See id. The Commission characterized
his conduct as "insulting, belittling, and inappropriate in an exchange between judge
and lawyer." Id. Justice Jordan, who was represented by a former judge, urged
that calling a woman attorney "little girl" was no different than calling "sweetheart"
or "darling," thus implying that the latter are not inappropriate. See id.
In 1985, Nassau County Supreme Court Justice William Doolittle was admonished
after he, over a period of years (1) referred to female attorneys as "kitten,"
"bitch" and "Jewish-American Princess"; (2) commented on their physical attributes
such as a "well-endowed" chest and "great legs"; and (3) remarked that an attractive
woman attorney could have everything she asked for. See Agreed Statement of
Facts at 2-5, In re Doolittle, Determination of New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct (June 13, 1985).
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subconscious remarks." ' Sexist comments leveled at women attor-
neys practicing in the Attorney General's office were cited by Robert
Abrams. He said: "In addition to being addressed with such familiar
and degrading terms, women attorneys continue to receive unsolicited
comments on and questions about their appearance and their personal
lives." 3 4
John E. H. Stackhouse, Judge of the Civil Court of the City of
New York, stated that he has witnessed:
[Innumerable incidents involving ... gender bias, particularly
directed against female attorneys. I have seen them humiliated,
I have seen them disparaged sometimes to their face, sometimes
behind their backs, I have heard judges make offensive remarks
to other court personnel, to stenographers, to court officers ...
[and to] male attorneys appearing before them concerning the
physical attributes and sexual attributes of the female defense
attorneys in the criminal term .... 385
District Attorney Elizabeth Holtzman offered several examples:
On a very hot summer day, after a male defense counsel was
given permission to remove his jacket, an assistant district attorney
383. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 99 (testimony of Irene Sullivan).
Even when comments are unconscious, inadvertent or intended as a compliment,
they can still be damaging. One survey respondent wrote:
Although there are judges who have a real problem in this area, most
of the problems are caused by those who do it inadvertently and/or
non-maliciously, making it extremely difficult to confront this issue with-
out aggravating the situation or making it into a trial issue that could
affect clients' interests.
Thirty-four-year-old New York City female
R.L. AssociATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 75 (Survey Respondent No. 1718).
384. Albany Hearings, supra note 51, at 8 (testimony of Robert Abrams). Al-
though a substantial majority of women attorneys who testified at the public hearings
and responded to the attorneys' survey noted the incidence of improper forms of
address and sexist remarks, this was not a universal phenomenon. Marion Silber,
Esq., testified that she could not recall one instance in which she had been subjected
to the kind of humiliating experiences described by other witnesses. Id. at 94-97
(testimony of Marion Silber).
385. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 294-95 (testimony of John
D.H. Stackhouse). Judge Stackhouse added that, while "this bias is not as prevalent
as it was" when he first started practicing law, "it is still a present reality." See
id. Stanley L. Sklar, an acting justice of the New York Supreme Court, characterized
gender bias against women attorneys as "an important and a pervasive problem
both in terms of courtroom interaction and the substantive application of the law."
New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 16 (testimony of Stanley Sklar).
During his tenure he has witnessed "many male attorneys referring to female
adversaries, witnesses, [and] court personnel in an unprofessional manner." Id. at
21.
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in my office asked the male judge in open court if she too could
remove her jacket. The judge replied: "Don't remove your jacket
unless you intend to remove all of your clothes!"
During a plea conference, another male judge told a buxom
Brooklyn prosecutor, "My clerk and I have a bet on whether
you have to wear weights on your ankles to keep you from tipping
over."
A woman prosecutor in my office who disagreed strongly with
a male judge over a legal point was told, "I will put you over
my knee and spank you."
386
Marcia Sikowitz, Esq., testifying for the Women's Committee of
the New York Chapter of the National Lawyers' Guild, offered
similar examples:
Member attorneys have witnessed numerous comments from judges
and other court personnel regarding the physical appearance of
a woman attorney. Examples of such remarks include comments
such as "It's nice finally to have someone pretty around here." ...
[oir "[sihe can go first. She has nicer legs than you do." '387
She cited a judge who said to two attorneys appearing before him:
" 'Why don't we dispense with these motions and you just take her
out to lunch? She's so pretty.' "38s
Attorneys statewide were asked a series of survey questions as to
the perceived frequency of inappropriate and demeaning conduct
most commonly cited at the public hearings and regional attorneys
meetings: (1) whether women are asked if they are attorneys when
men are not asked;3"9 (2) whether judges, counsel and court personnel
address women attorneys by first names or terms of endearment
when men attorneys are addressed by surnames or titles;3 90 (3) whether
judges, counsel and court personnel make inappropriate comments
about women attorneys' personal appearance when no such comments
386. Id. at 36-37 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman).
387. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 5 (testimony of Marcia
Sikowitz).
388. Id.
389. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
4/1 48/7. 31/22 10/32 6/37 2/2
R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 9.
390. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
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are made about men; 9' and (4) whether judges, counsel and court
personnel subject women attorneys to verbal or physical sexual
advances 392
As with the treatment of women litigants, men and women have
very different perceptions of the frequency of inappropriate conduct
directed against women attorneys. 93 While seventy-nine percent of
women said that women attorneys are "sometimes" or "often"
asked if they are lawyers when men are not (forty-eight percent
reporting "often"), sixty-nine percent of men reported that this kind
of questioning "rarely" or "never" occurs. The majority of men
(fifty-five percent), compared with eighteen percent of women re-
ported that judges "never" address women attorneys by first names
or terms of endearment when men are addressed by surnames or
titles. Among women attorneys, forty-nine percent said it happened
"sometimes" or "often. 3 94 Sixty-four percent of men, compared
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES */- 15/3 34/10 30/30 18/55 2/2
COUNSEL 3/* 39/6 35/22 13/30 6/37 4/4
COURT
PERSONNEL 3/* 30/4 28/13 24/29 11/49 4/5
Id., app. A, at 9-10. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
391. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES 1/* 14/2 26/10 27/22 26/64 4/2
COUNSEL 3/* 26/5 33/14 18/25 15/52 5/4
COURT
PERSONNEL 2/* 17/3 24/12 27/23 24/56 6/5
Id., app. A, at 12-13. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See
id.
392. Female and male survey respondents (F0o/M%) reported this conduct to
be engaged in by:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
JUDGES */- 3/* 13/3 31/10 47/82 6/4
COUNSEL 2/- 9/1 27/6 27/17 29/72 6/5
COURT
PERSONNEL 1/- 3/1 15/3 30/12 44/78 8/6
Id., app. A, at 18-19. The asterisk (*) means -less than half of one percent. See
id. The hyphen (-) means no responses. See id.
393. See supra notes 345-48 and accompanying text.
394. Even an issue that women see as posing an infrequent problem, men see
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with twenty-six percent of women, responded that judges "never"
make inappropriate comments about women attorneys' personal ap-
pearance. Forty percent of women reported this to occur "some-
times" or "often." Women attorneys responding to the survey
provided numerous examples of inappropriate behaviors:
It is the judges' and court personnel's treatment of female attorneys
both in chambers and in the courtroom that really grates. I am
called by my first name or 'dear' when opposing counsel is called
'Mr. X' or 'Sir'-my clients notice.
Thirty-five-year-old urban female3 9
[U]pon learning that I was a grandmother [the judge] proceeded
to call me 'grandma' in front of court personnel and my opponent.
Forty-nine-year-old New York City femalea96
I thought that the responses of my male colleagues . .. to your
survey was interesting. Many "filed" it (i.e., they threw it away)
and considered it a joke, without value. I heard these comments
made after a chambers conference wherein a female defendant was
joked about in a sexual context, [and] a female attorney was
described by her manner of dress and physical attributes.
Thirty-year-old rural female3 97
On one occasion when I was personally going through a divorce,
a [s]upreme [c]ourt [j]ustice made inappropriate advances to me in
chambers during a pre-trial conference while the other attorney
spoke with her client. Thirty-two-year-old rural female3 9
Other survey respondents commented:
As a woman making frequent court appearances, I am disturbed
by the number of attorneys, court personnel, and judges who
greet me by asking if I am an attorney-it happens four out of
five times!! My age ([thirty]) [may] be a factor, but it still kills
me!
Thirty-year-old suburban female3 99
as "never" happening. See supra note 392 and accompanying text. Substantially
more men (82%) than women (47%) reported that sexual advances by judges never
occurred. See id. An additional 31% of women compared with 10% of men said
such behavior "rarely" occurred. See id.
395. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 29 (Survey Respondent No.
0740F) (emphasis in original).
396. Id., app. B, at 69 (Survey Respondent No. 1595F).
397. Id., app. B, at 52 (Survey Respondent No. 121F).
398. Id., app. B, at I (Survey Respondent No. 0009F).
399. Id., app. B, at 79 (Survey Respondent No. 1750F).
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Several judges have inquired whether I am an attorney but I have
not observed the same question being asked of male attorneys
approaching the bench.
Fifty-seven-year-old suburban female400
I find it disconcerting and a distraction when I have prepared as
a professional to begin a pre-trial conference, motion, etc., and
a reference, however well intentioned, is made about my looks.
Often it's a remark between the male judge and my male adversary.
Forty-four-year-old urban female40 1
I have personally been invited to sit on the lap of a landlord/
tenant judge while arguing a motion before the judge.
Thirty-five-year-old female (no region given)402
Women trial lawyers are schooled by experience to overlook the
demeaning remarks from some trial judges. It is an insult they
become accustomed to accepting so that they may try the true
issue of the case.
Sixty-year-old suburban female 4 3
Male counsel were repeatedly cited by female survey respondents
and, to some extent, by male survey respondents, as more frequently
displaying objectionable behavior than either judges or court per-
sonnel.
When asked whether judges, counsel and court personnel make
sexist remarks and jokes that demean women, sixty-seven percent
of women attorneys and twenty-six percent of men attorneys reported
such conduct as occurring "often" or "sometimes" on the part of
counsel, compared to fifty percent of women and fifteen percent
of men who reported it occurring "often" or "sometimes" on the
part of judges. Forty-two percent of women and twenty-one percent
of men reported that court personnel "often" or "sometimes" engage
in this conduct. 4
Attorneys responding to the survey commented:
While I have rarely had inappropriate comments made to me by
judges and court personnel, sexual comments, advances, and in-
nuendo [are] frequently "dished out" by male counsel. It is very
disappointing and disheartening to be treated with disrespeci even
if I conduct myself in a professional manner and I am dressed
in a conservative, appropriate manner. (Example, "I don't know
if you're smart but you sure have great legs.") You do not have
400. Id., app. B, at 53 (Survey Respondent No. 1244F).
401. Id., app. B, at 47 (Survey Respondent No. 1108F).
402. Id., app. B, at 79 (Survey Respondent No. 1748F).
403. Id., app. B, at 34 (Survey Respondent No. 0843F) (emphasis in original).
404. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
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to be "sensitive" to develop this feeling-it is just a "fact of
life" in practice. Thirty-year-old suburban female405
I have a young female associate who is often accorded less respect
from counsel and the court than she would have received if she
was a man. Male attorneys, quite often, must assert themselves
when opposing counsel is a female.
Fifty-eight-year-old New York City male 416
The problems arise when I deal with middle-aged male attorneys;
some of them cannot get used to, indeed, cannot stomach, the
idea of female attorneys. They must be educated and they must
accept the fact that female attorneys are as dedicated and hard-
working as male attorneys.
. Thirty-one-year-old New York City female 47
I have found that male attorneys (my adversaries) (young attorneys)
are the ones who question whether I'm an attorney, make com-
ments about my appearance and some have made verbal advances
in the courtroom when the judges were not present which I felt
were inappropriate, unprofessional and embarrassing.
Twenty-eight-year-old suburban female08
It appears to me that the major problem of sexism comes from
other attorneys who, under the guise of strong advocacy, attack
female counsel in ways different than male opponents. The judges
seem to take their cue from counsel as to what constitutes ac-
ceptable behavior in this regard. Thus, my opinion is that the
major problem is of attorneys and that the solution must be
directed at attorneys. Thirty-seven-year-old urban male40 9
It is critical for judges not only to refrain from biased behavior
themselves but to intervene when it occurs. Survey respondents were
asked whether they had ever seen a judge intervene to correct such
behavior on the part of lawyers and court personnel. They reported,
however, that few judges take firm steps to eliminate such behavior. 410
Those who had witnessed such interventions described their salutary
effects.
405. R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 79 (Survey Respondent No.
1750F).
406. Id., app. B, at 19 (Survey Respondent No. 0515M).
407. Id., app. B, at 39 (Survey Respondent No. 0945F).
408. Id., app. B, at 55 (Survey Respondent No. 1270F).
409. Id., app. B, at 48 (Survey Respondent No. 1 125M).
410. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that judges or
counsel intervened to correct any of the situations described supra notes 345-48,
389-92:
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Judges admonished opposing counsel for referring to my co-
counsel as a "girl attorney." The bench instructed opposing coun-
sel (male) never to repeat such a phrase in court, chambers, or
elsewhere and informed counsel that his conduct was highly un-
professional. Thirty-year-old New York City male411
On one occasion I was interrupted and referred to as "honey"
by a male opposing attorney during the argument of a motion
in chambers. The judge (male) berated the attorney and demanded
that he show respect in his chambers.
Twenty-eight-year-old urban female412
During one session of a trial of a matrimonial action two court
officers made remarks regarding a female attorney and her female
client. At recess the presiding justice called the officers in chambers
and instructed that if such conduct continued he would file com-
plaints with the appropriate authority requesting disciplinary ac-
tion.
Twenty-eight-year-old New York City male
413
Judge intervened to correct court personnel's reference to female
attorney as "our mascot." Thirty-nine-year-old urban male414
I believe that when women attorneys are treated as less serious
professionals than men, such as when addressed by first names
or terms of endearment .... their position in litigated controversies
is seen as less serious or less important -as well. Yes, women
judges have intervened to correct such situations.
Thirty-two-year-old New York City female4 15
Most instances of sexism that I have witnessed in the courtroom
have been redressed by female judges.
Thirty-three-year-old New York City male416
One survey respondent noted an instance in which a judge had been
immediately responsive to her request for intervention:
YES No No ANSWER
12/7 67/61 20/32
Id., app. A, at 19.
411. Id., app. B, at 22 (Survey Respondent No. 0577M).
412. Id., app. B, at 54 (Survey Respondent No. 1257M).
413. Id., app. B, at 20 (Survey Respondent No. 0542M).
414. Id., app. B, at 55 (Survey Respondent No. 1276M).
415. Id., app. B, at 32 (Survey Respondent No. 0809F) (emphasis in original).
416. Id., app. B, at 72 (Survey Respondent No. 1654M).
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One attorney persisted in calling me "honey[,"] "baby," and
"sweetheart" in a pre-trial conference in chambers. The judge
granted a verbal order to terminate his use of those words.
Thirty-eight-year-old rural female41 7
Another respondent, however, noted that problems can arise when
the judge must be asked to intervene rather than doing it sua sponte:
When sexist remarks have been objected to by women, judges
have "tapped the hands" of the offender verbally, but manage
to convey the impression that the only reason is because the
woman appears to be irritated by the remarks, thereby placing
the burden of the court's intervention on the woman as to both
cause and effect.
Forty-four-year-old New York City female4 1 8
At the meeting with the New York State Association of Women
Judges, members reported incidents in which male counsel interrupted
women lawyers, attempted to make their arguments for them, com-
mented on their appearance during argument and made sexist jokes.
They also described similar incidents related to them by attorneys
and court personnel about male judges who not only do not curb
this kind of behavior but engage in it themselves. The women judges
expressed concern that some of their male colleagues are insufficiently
sensitive to the due process aspects of such biased behavior. They
emphasized the difficulty a female attorney faces when she must
decide whether making an issue of such behavior on the part of a
judge or adversary will prejudice her client's case.419
2. DISMISSIVE AND INTOLERANT CONDUCT AND THEIR
EFFECT ON CREDIBILITY
The Task Force found that some judges routinely treat women
attorneys dismissively and with less tolerance than their male coun-
terparts .420
417. Id., app. B, at 71 (Survey Respondent No. 1633F).
418. Id., app. B, at 24 (Survey Respondent No. 0627F) (emphasis in original).
419. These judges also noted that disrespectful conduct by counsel extends to
include remarks made to female judges. See Notes by Lynn Schafran, Meeting
with New York Association of Women Judges (Nov. 10, 1985) (available at Fordham
Urban Law Journal office). For example, a civil court judge described an incident
in which she declined to accept a stipulation between an attorney and a pro se
adversary on the ground that it was onerous. The attorney responded: "Listen,
honey, this is what we decided." Id. at 3.
420. At least one female survey respondent, concurring with the views of several
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Women lawyers, especially those newly admitted to practice ...
report that there is a difference in the respect afforded them in
the courtroom in comparison with their male counterparts. In [the]
view of many of these women, judges too often adopt a patronizing
or tutorial tone when dealing with women attorneys that they do
not use with male attorneys of comparable experience and ability.
Along these lines, women attorneys note in general that judges
seem far more willing to accept nonconforming behavior from
male attorneys than from female attorneys. Aggressive behavior
is rewarded or tolerated from men, and viewed as out of place
or even unacceptable from women.
4 21
Karen Burstein, Esq., President of the New York Civil Service
Commission and the Co-Chair of the Governor's Commission on
Domestic Violence, described this phenomenon:
Some of the things that I experienced remain a reality for women
in the courts-the dismissive language by which women attorneys
are addressed, the inability to include them in conference easily,
the discomfort about being honest in regard to their performance
in the ways that judges will take a young male attorney under
their wing.4 22
Eileen Millet, Member of the Board of the Association of Black
Women Attorneys, also commented on performance appraisal:
Lack of feedback is . . . devastating .... How many times have
I heard judges ask a male practitioner to come into his chambers
and later been informed that he was chewed out for some gross
male survey respondents, and said that she felt that she had been treated with particular
courtesy and patience because she was a woman. See R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note
23, app. B, at 46 (Survey Respondent No. 1094F). Even what appears to be extra
kindness may, however, be misguided chivalry that ultimately works against the
attorney's interests. One survey respondent, a law clerk in an appellate court, wrote:
Treating female attorneys [paternalistically] appeared to me to have a
negative effect on their effectiveness in that the attorney is not pressed
to focus on difficulties in the argument or given an opportunity to
identify the judge's concerns with their positions. It also gives the ap-
pearance that the panel is not giving complete credence or serious con-
sideration to that attorney's comments.
Thirty-five-year-old New York City male
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 4 (Survey Respondent No. 0104M).
421. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 100-01 (testimony of Irene
Sullivan). Commenting on how male counsel respond to women attorneys' ag-
gressiveness, a survey respondent wrote:
Only by being terribly aggressive and by winning can women earn the
respect of those males who then, of course, complain about their lack
of femininity and good grace.
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 56-57 (Survey Respondent No. 1311M).
422. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 85 (testimony of Karen Burstein).
[Vol. XV
TASK FORCE REPORT
inadequacy? How many fewer occasions, if at all, did I witness
the same approach with a woman?423
Male and female survey respondents reported similar perceptions
of dismissive conduct and comparative intolerance and exclusion
from the "old boys network," and noted the critical bearing that
these attitudes have on women attorneys' credibility:
It is difficult to determine if the public jokes and comments made
by judges affect their fairness at decision making time. However,
it is very clear to me that judges do not give female attorneys
the same courtesy, respect, and credibility they do male attorneys.
Since credibility is vital in dealing with judges, women are fre-
quently at a general disadvantage.
Thirty-year-old urban male424
It is plainly obvious to any frequent observer that women [at-
torneys] are the object of extreme discrimination in the courtroom
.... In chambers it seems to be worse as judges rarely seem to
give female attorneys the time of day much less the opportunity
to adequately respond to questions.
Thirty-year-old New York City male
425
Male judges especially seem to listen less to me than to my male
counterparts. I am often treated as though I were a "little girl"
by both judges and fellow attorneys. I don't feel they listen to
my positions and that they do not see me as a competent, credible
attorney. There is also an atmosphere of an "old boys' club"
outside the courtroom. Women are clearly excluded from this
interaction most of the time. When I have been included, it's to
receive some comment like "who's the hiring partner where you
work, Billy Rose? Each one of you is prettier than the next."
As a competent attorney, I resent this behavior. It is demeaning
to me, to women, and to the profession.
Thirty-year-old New York City female426
[S]ometimes both male and female judges and male attorneys (no
age difference with judges, but especially older male attorneys)
423. Id. at 77 (testimony of Eileen Millet). Ms. Millet observed that:
In what is still primarily a male domain, [male judges and attorneys]
are looking for someone who fits, someone who gets along, someone
one trusts. This is very subtle territory. How does a group formerly
exclusively male feel that a woman is going to fit? That is no easy task.
Id. at 76.
424. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 55 (Survey Respondent No.
1272M).
425. Id., app. B, at 34 (Survey Respondent No. 0834M).
426. Id., app. B, at 75 (Survey Respondent No. 1714F).
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have expressed greater annoyance and less tolerance if a female
attorney makes a poor argument or presentation than if a male
attorney made the same argument or presentation.
Thirty-eight-year-old New York City male427
In matrimonial law, women attorneys are frequently viewed by
judges as being over-emotional, too-involved, non-objective ad-
vocates-"hysterical." With rare exceptions, they tend to have
"less weight" with the judges .... I have heard judges make
"off the record" remarks in chambers to male attorneys about
certain women attorneys as being "a bitch" and similar remarks.
Thirty-eight-year-old rural male428
I have personally either been ignored or been made to feel in-
significant during bench conferences while my adversary and the
judge "horsed around." Of course, a judge's failure to listen to
or credit my position adversely affected my effectiveness.
Thirty-seven-year-old suburban female429
It's very frustrating to arrive in court well-prepared, and to do
everything possible to represent a client in a dignified, professional
and ethical manner, only to find that you're dealing with men
who resent your presence, and disregard or discount what you
have to say.
Thirty-three-year-old New York City female430
Similarly, Marcia Sikowitz, Esq., testified:
Women attorneys are frequently assumed to be litigants and told
to wait outside of the courtroom or warned not to approach the
bar. This attitude occurs with greater frequency towards minority
women. For example, a black woman attorney in a business suit
carrying a briefcase was told upon trying to enter a [flamily
[clourt courtroom: "Only the attorneys, please. Mothers wait
outside."
[W]e have all endured the attitude by judges and/or our adver-
saries, of assumed incompetence. The general belief is that we
cannot know what we are doing or talking about.4 ' We have
427. Id., app. B, at 29 (Survey Respondent No. 0745M).
428. Id., app. B, at 45-46 (Survey Respondent No. 1062M).
429. Id., app. B, at 61 (Survey Respondent No. 1420F).
430. Id., app. B, at 82 (Survey Respondent No. 1760F).
431. Professor Judy Long, Chairperson of the Department of Sociology at
Syracuse University, presented extensive testimony on this point:
One of the characteristics of sex stereotyping in our society that has
been well-documented is the equation of competence with masculinity.
Activities that are considered masculine are more highly evaluated than
activities considered feminine. People who succeed at masculine tasks are
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also seen that our black and Latina sisters are presumed even
more frequently to be incompetent.
4 3 2
Eileen Millet, Esq., commented on the combination of sex and
race bias in the problems encountered by black women attorneys:
If it is true that a woman may feel alien in the courtroom
surrounded by male court officers, male court clerks, and an
opponent who's more often than not male and, of course, a male
judge, she's even more out of place if she happens to be black.
The indignity of being referred to as "Dear" or "Dearie" or [of]
being called "[t]his girl here" when given a particular tone or
inflection gives cause to wonder as to whether or not one is being
addressed in this manner because one is a woman or because one
is black.433
Irene Sullivan's statement that "[aggressive behavior is rewarded
or tolerated from men, and viewed as out of place or even unac-
ceptable from women ' 43 4 was echoed by many comments, particularly
from survey respondents. Professor Judy Long testified that "there
is . . . substantial research that shows that females who violate sex
role expectations are . . . negatively judged. '435 Female survey re-
spondents noted the consequences of this attitude, particularly with
respect to cross-examination.
In Suffolk County ... [i]f a male attorney objects repeatedly
during trial he is "going all out for his client" and is "a real
fighter." If a female attorney objects similarly, she is a "bitch"
attributed more ability and given higher rewards than people who succeed
in feminine tasks.
I would like you to think about the implications of the enormous
threat posed by seeing women doing effectively activities which have been
associated not just with masculinity in the abstract, but with particular
men's sense of competence and masculinity, which are joined in the
culture.
Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 229-31 (testimony of Judy Long).
432. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 6-7 (testimony of Marcia
Sikowitz).
433. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 75 (testimony of Eileen Millet). One
survey respondent commented:
When the judge or defense counsel begins to act condescendingly towards
me as a [bilack woman, I believe that it affects the case. If a jury sees
that the judge is treating me differently, they recognize it and have less
confidence in me.
Twenty-seven-year-old New York City female
R.L. AssocIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 61 (Survey Respondent No. 1409F).
434. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 101 (testimony of Irene
Sullivan).
435. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 231-32 (testimony of Judy Long).
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or a "tough broad." Do you know one attorney actually came
over and tried to kiss me to seal his victory after a hard fought
trial?!
Thirty-seven-year-old suburban female43 6
Judges, counsel, and court personnel will act more favorable
towards women who fit their perceptions of a "good" woman,
good meaning one who acts "appropriately," e.g., feminine, help-
less, who defer to the "better judgement" of men.
Thirty-three-year-old rural female43 7
Problems arise when opposing counsel or judge truly just hate
women and any softness or emotion is not tolerated. Men can
yell, scream, be abrupt, impolite-women cannot in any way
exhibit anger-it is strongly remembered and taken out in a future
case against her.
Forty-three-year-old New York City female438
If an attorney represents her clients aggressively, she develops a
reputation as a "bitch" where aggression on the part of male
attorneys is admired. I have often had to play the game of not
being offended by comments on my attire and appearance or by
being called by my first name or a term of endearment to avoid
antagonizing judges and court personnel, placing my client's in-
terests above my own instincts and sensibilities.
Thirty-two-year-pld urban female43 9
I believe that judges permit a greater latitude of vigorous cross-.
examination of male witnesses by male lawyers. Judges often seem
to resent women lawyers who aggressively cross examine or exhibit
any sarcastic tones toward male witnesses, while permitting the
men to employ the same tactics as standard operating procedure.
Some years ago, a judge admonished me in front of a jury in
the middle of a cross examination for overstepping what he thought
were the proper bounds of a woman lawyer. He said, "Young
lady, you stop that. Would you ever speak to your husband that
way?" Of course this same judge would never require the men
to address every female witness as though they were addressing
loving wives; this is a perfect illustration of some judges' mentality
that all women, even women lawyers, must at all times be sub-
missive to all men, even if that man is a hostile witness.
Fifty-year-old New York City female"
436. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 67 (Survey Respondent No.
1580F).
437. Id., app. B, at 13-14 (Survey Respondent No. 0374F).
438. Id., app. B, at 80 (Survey Respondent No. 1758F) (emphasis in original).
439. Id., app. B, at 81 (Survey Respondent No. 1759F).
440. Id., app. B, at 71 (Survey Respondent No. 1634F).
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SUMMAR Y OF FINDINGS
1. The question whether judges, counsel and court personnel profes-
sionally accept women attorneys is important from the standpoint
of dignity and decency and because it has genuine consequences
for due process and the administration of justice.
2. With women entering the legal profession and reaching profes-
sional maturity in greater numbers, they are increasingly rep-
resented in all facets of New York's legal system: government;
private practice; the judiciary; and professional organizations.
3. Although in recent years there has been a significant improvement
in the way women are treated in the courts, particularly by
judges-with some judges being exemplary in their equal treat-
ment of men and women counsel-professional' acceptance of
women attorneys has not been uniform. There exists a widespread
perception that some judges, men attorneys and court personnel
do not treat women attorneys with the same dignity and respect
as men attorneys.
4. Among the most commonly-cited types of inappropriate and
demeaning conduct are:
a. Being addressed in familiar terms.
b. Being subject to comments about personal appearance.
c. Being subject to remarks and conduct that degrade women
and verbal or physical sexual advances.
5. Men attorneys are viewed as engaging in this conduct more
frequently than are judges and court personnel. Many judges
fail to intervene and remedy such conduct.
6. A more subtle obstacle to professional acceptance is women
attorneys being treated dismissively and with less tolerance than
are men attorneys. Examples of this problem include:
a. Aggressive behavior is rewarded or tolerated from men at-
torneys but viewed as out of place or even unacceptable from
women attorneys.
b. Women attorneys do not receive professional performance
appraisal from judges as often or as deeply as do men
attorneys.
7. Although women attorneys who confront gender-biased conduct
in the courts doggedly and successfully pursue their clients' best
interests, the attention of judge, jury and attorneys is distracted
from the merits of the case, thereby reducing the quality of
justice.
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RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
1. Issue a declaration of policy condemning sexist conduct by judges,
lawyers and court personnel directed against women attorneys
and announce that all appropriate administrative action will be
taken to eradicate it.
2. Develop and conduct regular training for sitting and newly elected
and appointed judges and court employees designed to make
them aware of the subtle and overt manifestations of gender
bias directed against women attorneys and its due process con-
sequences.
3. Direct that all forms and correspondence employ gender-neutral
language.
FOR JUDGES:
1. Monitor behavior in courtrooms and chambers and swiftly in-
tervene to correct lawyers, witnesses and court personnel who
engage in gender-biased conduct toward women attorneys.
2. Ensure that official court correspondence, decisions and oral
communications employ gender-neutral language and are no less
formal when referring to women attorneys than to men attorneys.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
1. Develop and conduct an informational campaign designed to
make members aware of the incidence and consequences of
gender-biased conduct toward women attorneys on the part of
lawyers, judges and court personnel.
2. Ensure that forms and correspondence employ gender-neutral
language.
FOR JUDICIAL SCREENING COMMITTEES:
Make available to all members information concerning the inci-
dence and consequences of gender-biased conduct toward women
attorneys.
B. Professional Opportunity
The Task Force's examination of women's professional oppor-
tunities in the courts focused on two areas: fee-generating appoint-
ments and election or appointment to judicial office. The question
whether women are receiving their fair share of these opportunities
is a complicated one. Its resolution requires consideration of: (1)
the relative number of men and women attorneys who seek and are
qualified to assume these opportunities; (2) the number of oppor-
tunities available; and (3) the relative number of opportunities re-
ceived by men and women. Limitations of time and resources precluded
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a full-scale examination of this type. Nevertheless, the Task Force
acquired sufficient information to gain a better understanding of
issues and perceptions respecting women attorneys' professional op-
portunities in the courts.
1. FEE-GENERATING APPOINTMENTS
Public hearing witnesses and survey respondents asserted that women
attorneys are disproportionately denied the most desirable and lu-
crative assigned-counsel positions, the appointments for which are
vested in the discretion of individual judges. Irene Sullivan, Esq.,
reported that:
An almost overwhelming impression exists that women attorneys
are not favored with the same number or the same quality of
assignments as their male counterparts. In some locations, women
attorneys have been regularly assigned to women clients and male
attorneys to male clients. This impression extends to appointments
to receiverships and foreclosures, as guardian ad litem, and as
assigned counsel in criminal cases. The perception is that the most
complex, interesting, and lucrative cases are assigned to male
attorneys, and the leftover cases go to women."'
Kings County District Attorney, Elizabeth Holtzman, also cited
fee-generating appointments as a problem area, noting that "the
Kings County list of lawyers eligible for court appointments in
[flamily, [s]urrogate and [c]riminal [c]ourt contains only forty-four
women out of a total of 515 people (8.5%)." 4 4 2
Bonnie Gail Levy, a criminal defense attorney and President of
the Central New York Women's Bar Association, concurred with
this view. She found that, with respect to assignment of criminal
cases, "the first type of clients [that women attorneys] generally
obtain are female."" 3 She added that, while women attorneys are
generally assigned petit larceny cases for which the fees are small,
they are rarely, if ever, assigned homicide or violent felony cases,
which are more challenging and carry a higher rate of remuneration." 4
At regional meetings, a Rochester woman attorney stated that
although women are one of every six Rochester attorneys, women
are appointed to only one of every twenty foreclosures. Women
441. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 102 (testimony of Irene
Sullivan).
442. Id. at 44 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman).
443. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 71 (testimony of Bonnie Gail Levy).
444. See id. at 72-75.
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attorneys attending the Albany regional meeting said that referee
and conservator appointments go to male attorneys in both large
and small firms, and that women receive fewer than their share of
guardian appointments, even if they are active in the controlling
political party.
Survey respondents reported similar concerns:
Women attorneys as a group, and I as an individual, do not get
a fair share of court referrals and they get few to none of the
lucrative court appointments.
Fifty-seven-year-old suburban female445
Big discrimination here . . . no receiverships-no opportunity for
business experience. Thirty-seven-year-old urban female446
Of particular concern is the failure of judges to assign women
felony cases, particularly cases likely to go to trial. This impairs
women's ability to gain trial skills and to qualify for homicide
assignments. Twenty-six-year-old urban female447
A survey respondent who is currently an assistant district attorney
described the importance of that experience in getting ahead in her
county and the "extreme" difficulty women have had in obtaining
positions in the District Attorney's office until the last three or four
years. She wrote:
It has come to my attention, as an Assistant District Attorney
and as a friend to many of the former prosecutors who were
involved in hiring decisions, [that decisions were made] not to
hire women because of a belief that they "would not get along
with the cops" or they would spoil the "camaraderie" of the all
male office. As a result, women in private practice today have
not made the contacts with judges and other attorneys which is
such a great benefit of a position in this office. This is particularly
reflected in the assignments given out by the local, [county] and
[s]upreme [c]ourt judges. I have also noted that there are few,
if any, women on the 18-B criminal panel. In fact, in the three
years since I have been an Assistant District Attorney in this coun-
ty . . . I have never seen or heard of a woman defense attorney
trying a felony case.
Thirty-one-year-old urban female448
445. R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. B, at 53 (Survey Respondent No.
1244F).
446. Id., app. B, at 33 (Survey Respondent No. 0825F).
447. Id., app. B, at 19 (Survey Respondent No. 0522F).
448. Id., app. B, at 58-59 (Survey Respondent No. 1358F) (emphasis in original).
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Attorneys were asked in the survey questionnaire a series of ques-
tions designed to elicit their perceptions about the quality and quan-
tity of fee-generating positions women attorneys receive: (1) whether
women attorneys on assigned counsel panels are assigned to represent
women, and men attorneys are assigned to represent men;4 4 9 (2)
whether women and men attorneys who are eligible for assigned-
counsel positions, and have made these interests known, have been
appointed to a fee-generating position within the past two years; 40
(3) whether women attorneys on assigned-counsel panels receive their
proportional share of violent felony cases; 41 (4) whether women
attorneys on assigned-counsel panels receive their proportional share
of rape cases; 45 2 and (5) whether women attorneys are awarded lower
counsel fees than are men attorneys for similar work.453
Although all attorneys were asked to answer these questions, vary-
ing numbers responded to each question. Of the 214 female attorneys
and 588 male attorneys who indicated they are eligible for fee-
generating positions and have made their interest known, seventy
percent of females compared to fifty percent of males responded
449. Female and male attorneys (F%/M%) reported that this occurred:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER
1/1 21/8 33/28 28/32 17/31
R.L. AssocIATEs, supra note 23, app. A, at 79.
450. Female and male attorneys (Fo/M%) responded:
YES No
70/50 30/50
Id., app. A, at 80.
451. Female and male attorneys (F%/M%) responded:
YES No
43/76 57/24
Id., app. A, at 81.
452. Female and male attorneys (F%/M%) responded:
YES No
41/80 59/20
Id.
453. Female and male attorneys (F%/M%) reported that this conduct occurred:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER
4/* 23/3 36/13 21/32 17/51
Id., app. A, at 79. The asterisk (*) means less than half of one percent. See id.
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that they had been appointed to such a position within the past
two years. Significantly more women (fifty-nine percent) than men
(sixteen percent) reported that female attorneys are "sometimes" or
"often" awarded lower counsel fees than are men attorneys for similar
work. Moreover, fifty-seven percent of responding women attorneys
report that women attorneys do not receive their proportional share
of rape cases.
The Task Force attempted to learn about the number and quality
of fee-generating positions women attorneys received from the sur-
rogate's court. Many surrogates from upstate counties thoughtfully
and thoroughly completed the Task Force's question-
naire. Insufficient information statewide was received, however, to
undertake any useful analysis. The Task Force did not receive the
level of cooperation from surrogates in urban counties for which
it had hoped. Some indicated that they were too busy to complete
the questionnaire; most did not respond at all, notwithstanding two
follow-up calls.
2. ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE
A court system can be fairly judged by the degree to which
opportunity is accorded to all qualified attorneys-regardless of
gender-who seek judicial office. Determining conclusively whether
women attorneys are achieving judicial office in numbers appropriate
to their percentage of the total qualified attorney population in New
York required an empirical analysis that the Task Force was not
equipped to undertake. The difficulty is compounded by the by-
zantine structure of New York's court system and the myriad of
mechanisms (appointive and elective) by which attorneys are elevated
to the bench. '54
The Fund for Modern Courts, Inc., in its recently released study
entitled, "The Success of Women and Minorities in Achieving Ju-
454. In New York, judges from the courts of record are selected by either an
elective or an appointive process, depending on the court and the nature of the
vacancy. See FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, INC., THE SUCCESS OF WOMEN AND
MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS 53 (1985).
Judges from the state's highest court, the court of appeals, are appointed by the
governor, from a list of names submitted by The New York State Commission on
Judicial Nomination and are subject to confirmation by the senate. See id.
Other appointed positions are: (1) judgeships in the court of claims (the court
.which adjudicates claims against the state), which are appointed by the governor
from names submitted by the state judicial screening committee, subject to con-
firmation by the senate; (2) judgeships in the New York City Family Court and
Criminal Court, which are appointed by the mayor from a list of three names
submitted by the Mayor's Committee on the Judiciary; and (3) judgeships in the
New York City Housing Court, which are appointed by the administrative judges
of the civil court. See id. at 53-54.
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dicial Office: The Selection Process," includes valuable statistics for
courts throughout the United States.455 The figures it compiled for
New York's courts, as well as information the Task Force received
from the Office of Court Administration indicated that women are
underrepresented in New York's highest judicial posts. Only one of
the seven judges of the court of appeals is female-the first in
the high court's history. None of the four presiding judges of the
appellate divisions is female-no woman has ever been appointed
to that position-and no women currently hold one of the top four
positions in the Office of Court Administration.
Women's representation in all of New York's principal courts
(excluding town and village justice courts) as of the fall of 1985
is set forth in the following table.
Court TOTAL TOTAL O70 WOMEN
JUDGES WOMEN
Court of Appeals 7 1 14.3
Appellate Division 44 5 13.6
Supreme Court 314 17 5.4
Court of Claims 30 2 6.7
County Level 216 16 7.4
NYC Family 39 14 35.9
NYC Criminal 102 10 9.8
NYC Civil 117 22 18.8
NYC Housing 30 6 20.0
District 49 1 2.0
City-upstate 143 8 5.6
1097 106 9.7456
Judgeships in the state supreme court (the trial court of general jurisdiction),
the county court, the surrogate's court, the New York City Civil Court, the family
court outside of New York City, the district court, and the city courts outside of
New York City, are elected in partisan primaries and general elections. See id. Intra-
term vacancies for all of these courts are filled by executive appointment. Id.
Judges of the appellate division of the supreme court-the state's intermediate
appellate court-are designated by the governor from among the elected justices
of the supreme court. See id. at 53.
455. The Fund concluded from its study:
If the courts of the United States are to reflect the population they
serve, then women and minority group members must come to the bench
in increasing numbers. And the evidence of this study is clear-women
and minorities have a better chance of attaining judgeships in state courts
through an appointive process, Executive Appointment or Merit Selection
than through any elective process, either partisan or nonpartisan.
Id. at 69.
456. See id. at 54. County courts include the county court, the surrogate's court,
and the family court outside of New York City. See id. at 53.
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Although women now constitute 9.7% of judges sitting in New
York State's courts of record, 49.1% of these women sit in New
York City's Family, Criminal, Civil, and Housing Courts. Women
hold only fifty-four of the remaining 809 judgeships (6.7%). The
New York Association of Women Judges informed the Task Force
that forty-three of New York's sixty-two counties have no women
sitting in their courts of record.
When representatives of the Judiciary or the Office of Court
Administration speak to the press or directly to the public, the
"face" of the court system is overwhelmingly male. When the
leadership of a system is unbalanced in this way, litigants and
attorneys perceive it to be unrepresentative of the commu-
nity. Cultural stereotypes that assume men are best qualified to
assume leadership positions are reinforced.
At regional meetings, several women judges and attorneys com-
mented on the importance of the ratings given by county bar as-
sociation judiciary committees in judicial elections and appointments.
They cited the composition of some committees and certain questions
some women candidates are asked as evidence of gender bias. For
example, a female New York City judge said that she was asked
how she could manage being a judge, wife and mother while her
husband, who appeared before the same panel, was not asked about
his ability to manage work and family life. Another woman refused
to answer the committee's question about her marital status and
number of children saying: "Would you ask these questions of a
man? ' ' 457 Two women judges who had been advocates in women's
rights cases, reported that they were asked whether they could be
fair to men.
The Task Force attempted to gain systematic data on this issue
by sending questionnaires to the Judicial Nominating Committee for
the Court of Appeals, the Governor's Judicial Screening Committees
and to every bar association that renders recommendations for ju-
dicial candidates to determine the composition of the panels, the
457. Dean Robert B. McKay, President of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, testified that, if he did not sit as a member of the New York
University Law School Placement Committee that reviews complaints, he "would
scarcely believe the questions that are still being asked" of women by "recruiters
from prestigious law firms and important corporations" which are "in direct
violation of instructions in the law schools [sic] placement handbook." New York
City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 218 (testimony of Robert McKay).
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number of women who have applied for judgeships and who have
been favorably reported on and the existence of any policies providing
for the active recruitment of women candidates for judgeships.
Regrettably, the Task Force received a limited response and insuf-
ficient information to undertake a meaningful analysis.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
1. In determining the level and quality of women attorneys' profes-
sional opportunities in the courts, inquiry was made into whether
women receive their proportionate share of fee-generating ap-
pointments and judgeships. Limitations of time and resources
precluded a full empirical analysis of these questions.
2. Leaders of the organized women's bar reported a widespread
perception among their membership that women are not treated
with the same favor as are men attorneys in judicial assignments
to lucrative and challenging guardianships, felony cases or other
desirable fee-generating positions.
3. Although women have been achieving judicial office in greater
numbers, they are underrepresented in New York's highest judicial
posts and are not well represented throughout the New York
State judiciary. Nearly half of all women judges, who constitute
9.7% of New York's judiciary, sit in New York City's family,
criminal, civil and housing courts. Forty-three of New York's
sixty-two counties are reported to have no women judges in their
courts of record.
RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
Maintain the records of appointments to fee-generating positions
by sex of appointee.
FOR BAR ASSOCIATIONS:
1. Review the assigned counsel mechanisms in local jurisdictions in
which members practice and develop means to ensure that ap-
pointments to fee-generating positions are not only fairly received
by qualified male and female attorneys but are perceived to be
fairly received.
2. Review mechanisms by which judges are nominated and elected
or appointed, identify impediments to achieving a fair represen-
tation and develop means that would assist qualified women in
gaining judicial office.
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VII. STATUS OF WOMEN COURT EMPLOYEES
The Task Force commissioned a study of the effects of personnel
practices on nonjudicial women employees of the New York Unified
Court System (UCS). The study was conducted by the Center for
Women in Government at the State University of New York, Albany.
Chief Administrative Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa (in a memoran-
dum to deputy chief administrative judges, administrative judges
and Office of Court Administration Unit heads requesting that they
offer the Center their "fullest assistance"), noted that the Center
"has conducted groundbreaking research in various public jurisdic-
tions on the structure of career ladders and the civil service promotion
process" and "has gained national recognition for innovation and
leadership in its work to achieve equal employment opportunity for
women and minority men in government. '458
The Center's work for the Task Force had three components: (1)
a statistical analysis of the UCS work force which included an
evaluation of the relative representation and status of women in the
full range of employment grades; (2) structured interviews with
administrators and 101 women employees in female-dominated job
titles459 intended to assess their perceptions of the impact of UCS
employment practices including hiring practices, job requirements,
transfer opportunities, promotion opportunities, training opportun-
ities, work-related stress, work hours, decision-making, communi-
cation, sexual harassment and women's support groups; and (3) a
textual analysis of UCS personnel rules with special attention to
their potential impact on women.
The Center Report included an extended discussion of the per-
ceptions of 101 women in female-dominated job titles, as related
during interviews, about the UCS work environment. The interviews
were conducted in a format of lengthy group discussions in Albany,
Buffalo, Manhattan and Syracuse. 460
The Center reported that the concerns raised by these 101 women
were virtually identical in all regions and principally related to
systemic problems such as a lack of communication within UCS,
lack of training and lack of input into decision-making.4 6' Although
458. CENTER REPORT, supra note 21, at 95.
459. "Female-dominated" or "male-dominated" job titles refer to those titles
filled 60% or more by that sex. See id. at 10 n.l.
460. See id. at 34-73.
461. The women interviewed raised several concerns: (1) lack of training beyond
that for specific tasks so that employees have little sense of how their work
contributes to the system; (2) being refused permission to attend training when it
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these are problems with negative consequences for both women and
men, they are of concern to the Task Force because they tend to
weigh most heavily on the lowest-level employees, and women, as
discussed below, are disproportionately the lowest level employees
in UCS. Similarly, the textual analysis of personnel rules revealed
ambiguities and indefiniteness that would permit constructions that
disadvantage employees irrespective of gender. The Task Force
transmitted the Center's complete report, including its discussion of
these systemic concerns, to the Chief Administrative Judge. This
section of the Task Force's Report focuses on those aspects of the
Center's report which relate specifically to gender bias: occupational
segregation, personal chores and errands as part of women's work
and sexual harassment.
The Center's study revealed acute occupational segrega-
tion. Women are disproportionately found in the lowest salary
grades of UCS employment. Minority women seem at an even greater
disadvantage than white women. Conversely, men are distributed far
more evenly through the UCS titles and dominate the higher-salary
grades of employment. Moreover, the question whether lower-grade
titles dominated by men pay more for jobs with lesser responsibilities
than lower-grade titles dominated by women requires examina-
tion. Finally, some women are expected to perform personal chores
and errands for supervisors as part of their job; some women are
subjected to sexual harassment and either cannot get their supervisors
to take action to halt it or are unaware that it is illegal.
The Task Force is deeply concerned by the unequal opportunity
for women in the court personnel system documented by the Center's
findings and by its implications for the way judges and court per-
sonnel carry out their judicial and administrative functions. Just as
laws are not self-executing but depend upon judicial discretion for
their interpretation and application, the personnel policies of the
UCS, which incorporate equal employment opportunity provisions
for all qualified persons, including women, are implemented-or
is offered; (3) lack of communication; (4) lack of input into decision-making; (5)
the fairness of the hiring process relating to competitive and noncompetitive
positions; (6) job requirements for skills that are not in fact used on the job; (7)
test content that is irrelevant to the job; provisional employees being fired because
they fail tests despite years of good job performance; and (8) lack of career mobility
and promotional opportunities. See CENTER REPORT, supra note 21, at 37-52. Some
of these concerns were discussed by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration.
See INITIAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMI TEE ON JUDIcIAL ADMINISTRATION 57-79 (Nov.
25, 1985).
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not-by administrative judges, individual judges and high-level non-
judicial court personnel.
Those with hiring authority in the UCS enjoy considerable dis-
cretion. To the extent that numbers may serve as a guide, hiring
decisions appear to be based upon "weight given to preconceived
notions of sexual roles rather than upon a fair and unswayed ap-
praisal of [the] merit as to each person. ' 462 Thus, the acute oc-
cupational segregation revealed by the Center's study may be seen
as a further manifestation of attitudes that disadvantage women in
areas of substantive law and in the courtroom environment.
A. Women's Representation in the Unified Court System
Although approximately one-half of all nonjudicial employees in
the UCS system are women, this distribution is not reflected through-
out all judicial grade levels or occupational categories. Men con-
sistently dominate the higher-grade, higher-paid positions. Women
are vastly overrepresented at the lower levels.
The statistics reveal considerable differences in the employment
status of women and men in the UCS. These inequities place women
in structurally disadvantageous positions within the employment hi-
erarchy which can further influence several aspects of their careers
including promotion, transfer and training opportunities, work-re-
lated stress and sexual harassment.
1. OCCUPATIONAL SEGREGATION
There is significant occupational segregation in the Unified Court
System. Using the Federal Occupational Categories, the Center found
that almost eighty percent of minority women and over eighty-four
percent of white women, compared to less than half of white and
minority men, are in office or clerical occupations. 463 Men are spread
much more broadly across the eight categories than are women and
hold the majority of positions in five of the eight occupational
groups:
462. Remarks of Cooke, supra note 2, Appendix A.
463. The Center estimated an error rate of 1-2 percent due to manual tabulation.
See, e.g., CENTER REPORT, supra note 21, at 18. In an independent tabulation by
the UCS Equal Employment Opportunity Office of some figures compiled by the
Center, in most cases the retabulated figures fell within this range. In all but one
category in which the UCS tabulation varied by more than 1-2 percent from the
Center's tabulation, even greater occupational segregation was demonstrated than
was found by the Center.
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Officials/Administrators
Professionals
Protective Service Workers
Skilled Craft Workers
Service Maintenance Workers
81.1%
68.7%
87.1%
63.1%
81.7%
male
male
male
male
male 464
Only one occupational group, technicians, is sex-integrated (ap-
proximately fifty-nine percent male and forty-one percent female).
Women dominate only two occupational categories:
Office/Clericals
Para-Professionals
66.0% female
80.6% female 465
Over fifty-three percent of all women in UCS work in large female-
dominated job titles. Reviewing just those titles in which there are
more than 100 incumbents and in which more than sixty percent
of those incumbents are female, produces the following list which
accounts for over 3,000 of the more than 5,500 women employed
in UCS.
Judicial Hiring
Grade (JG) Salary
Office Assistant 4 $11,311
Office Typist 4 $11,311
Data Entry Clerk 7 $13,266
Senior Office Assistant 8 $14,042
Senior Office Typist 8 $14,042
Senior Office Stenographer 9 $14,840
Principal Office Assistant 12 $17,638
Law Stenographer 14 $19,813
Court Assistant 16 $22,184
Court Interpreter 16 $22,184
Senior Secretary to Judge 17 $23,463
Assistant Court Clerk 18 $24,832
Court Clerk 18 $24,832
Chief Clerk 111466 21 $29,086
Clerk (part time) 60
Total Percent Total
Employees Female Females
204 85.8 175
511 88.2 451
146 89.0 130
299 88.3 264
336 97.6 328
106 100.0 106
373 87.4 326,
158 91.2 144
249 71.8 179
140 60.0 84
462 98.7 456
145 65.5 95
162 67.3 109
103 78.6 81
133 72.9 97467
464. CENTER REPORT, supra
465. Id.
note 21, at 14.
466. Although this figure may make it appear that a significant number of women
are Chief Clerks, it should be understood that the Chief Clerk series runs from
I to VII, with the level relating to the population of the community served and
the type of courts in that community. Chief Clerks III are largely found in small,
upstate communities. Of the forty-eight Chief Clerks, V, VI and VII, who have
starting salaries ranging from $42,240 to $61,124, only 12.5076 are women. See id.
at 26, 28-29.
467. See id. at 15.
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Occupational segregation is clearly a problem in the Unified Court
System. The Center calculated an occupational segregation index to
determine what proportion of current employees would have to
change jobs for women and men to be equally distributed across
all occupational groups. It found an occupational segregation index
of 62.8% for the UCS overall, meaning that 62.8% of all employees
would have to change jobs in order for both sexes to be equally
distributed throughout the UCS workforce.
2. DISTRIBUTION BY JUDICIAL GRADE
The UCS has a salary plan consisting of thirty grade levels similar
to that which operates in the executive branch of state government.
The dollar amounts associated with each grade are arrived at through
collective negotiations between the UCS and the various organizations
representing employees.
As of June 13, 1985, the date of all salary figures in this report,
starting salaries ranged from $11,311 for JG 4, the lowest grade to
which the UCS assigns a title, to $64,258 for JG 36, the highest
grade to which UCS assigns a title. Because UCS contracts provide
for a biannual fixed increment for each grade in addition to any
raise negotiated with new contracts, an employee at JG 18 could
be earning between $24,832 and $32,182, or more.
Over eighty-eight percent of men, compared to approximately forty-
nine percent of women nonjudicial employees are in JG 16 (starting
salary $22,184) or higher. In the highest grades, over forty percent
of men compared to approximately eighteen percent of women are
in positions at JG 23 (starting salary $32,347) or higher. No judicial
grades above nineteen are dominated by women. Of the seventeen
highest judicial grades (JG 20 and above), only four are sex inte-
grated. The remaining thirteen are male dominated.
Almost all lower-level grades, those JG 15 or below, are dominated
by women. The three lower-level grades dominated by men are JG
6, JG 10 and JG 11. All of these have few people in them and
are dominated by one or two traditionally male titles. In JG 6 the
title is custodial aide (sixty percent male), in JG 10 the titles are
court aide (fifty-one percent male) and confidential attendant (ninety-
seven percent male) and in JG 11 they are driver/messenger and
computer operator (one hunderd percent and seventy-five percent
male respectively).
The largest proportion of white women is employed in JG 8 (senior
office typist-starting salary $14,042), where over eleven percent of
all white women are employed. The largest proportion of minority
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women is in JG 4 (office assistant or office typist- starting salary
$11,311), the lowest judicial grade to which UCS assigns a title.
Almost eighteen percent of all minority women are employed in JG
4. In a marked contrast, the modal category for both white and
minority men is JG 18 (starting salary $24,832) where over seventeen
percent of white men and almost thirteen percent of minority men are
employed.
There is evidence of at least one case in which a lower-grade
male-dominated title with arguably lesser qualifications and lesser
responsibilities than an even lower-grade job dominated by women
pays more. A USC employment announcement posted on Decem-
ber 4, 1985 obtained by the Task Force sought applicants for the
positions of senior office typist (JG 8) and driver/messenger (JG
11). The senior office typist position, a title 97.6% occupied by
women, was competitive, required relevant experience and involved
supervising small clerical sub-units as well as clerical and typing
duties. It paid $14,042. The driver/messenger position, a title 100%
occupied by men, was noncompetitive, required an eighth-grade
education and involved transporting court employees and documents
and some clerical tasks. It paid $16,666.
B. Gender-Biased Conduct
Two concerns raised during the Center's interviews with women
court employees involve explicit examples of gender-biased conduct:
(1) requiring women court employees to perform personal chores
and errands; and (2) instances of sexual harassment. Although these
problems do not appear to be widespread, they do require attention.
1. PERSONAL ERRANDS AND CHORES AS PART OF
WOMEN'S WORK
Some women reported being required to make coffee, run personal
errands outside of the office and purchase personal items. All these
were performed for supervisors, including judges. One woman com-
mented: "You still have the old theory around here that women
are housewives (to the office). '46
Almost all women would have preferred not to do these tasks.
They felt, however, that if their "boss" required it of them, they
would be ill-advised to refuse. The women feared that a refusal
468. Id. at 57.
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would make their work lives more difficult or, in the extreme, that
they would be fired.
2. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Most respondents reported that sexual harassment 69 is not a serious
problem in UCS. Although in the course of interviews some women
told of incidents of sexual harassment, they generally categorized
them as "not serious" because the problem was resolved. In the
typical case, a supervisor was told about the incident(s) and put a
stop to the harassment by talking directly to the perpetrator.
perpetrator.
A few women described incidents of sexual harassment that they
considered serious and that were not resolved. In these cases su-
periors were notified but were unwilling to force the issue and make
the involved men stop.
Particularly disturbing is the Center's finding that some women
feel that putting up with sexual harassment is just "part of the
job. ' 470 These women described incidents such as offensive jokes,
unwanted physical contact and demeaning sexual comments. Often-
times these incidents were so regularly a part of the women's work-
lives that they did not understand that these are forms of sexual
harassment and that these behaviors are illegal. The Center reported
that until the discussion of sexual harassment during the Center's
interviews, many women simply believed that this is an unavoidable
experience for women in the workforce and that there was nothing
they could do.
469. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commision definition of sexual har-
assment provides:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a
term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or
rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work-
ing environment.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Guidelines on Discrimination Because
of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1986). Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation
of Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See id.
470. CENTER REPORT, supra note 21, at 71.
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RECOMMENDA TIONS
FOR COURT ADMINISTRATION:
1. Implement the broadest possible recruitment efforts for all po-
sitions on a continuing basis.
2. Include in the court system's affirmative action program specific
efforts designed to address those titles in which women are under-
represented.
3. Increase opportunities for training, transfers and promotions.
4. Monitor the hiring process as it affects women, especially with
respect to those positions that are filled on a noncompetitive
basis.
5. Review qualification requirements and salary grades of all non-
judicial titles.
6. Provide sexual harassment prevention training to all employees,
supervisors and managers.
7. Issue a directive stating that employees are not to be asked or
expected to perform personal services and errands for their su-
pervisors.
VIII. MECHANISMS FOR INSTITUTIONALIZING REFORM
AND MONITORING AND EVALUATING PROGRESS
The Task Force's recommendations are a first step towards rem-
edying the problems women litigants, attorneys and court personnel
face in New York's court system. Their promise is much more likely
to be fulfilled if means for institutionalizing reform and monitoring
progress are implemented. Accordingly, the Task Force proposes
several measures intended to ensure lasting equality for women and
men in the courts.
A. Appointing a Special Assistant and an Advisory Committee
It is the hope and expectation of the members of the Task Force
that this Report will lead to a better understanding of the deleterious
effects of gender bias as it is experienced by women attorneys,
litigants and court personnel. That understanding, coupled with the
implementation of recommendations made, will result in progress
toward achieving a system of justice in which gender bias plays no
part.
The focus of the best-intentioned leaders, however, cannot remain
long on one particular facet of progress. There are too many areas
in which improvements are needed; too many emergencies that may
take precedence.
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The executive branch has recognized the need to create a permanent
division for women in the executive chamber, with its director now
serving as a member of the Governor's cabinet. The Task Force
recommends that the Chief Judge recognize that same need within
the judicial branch and create a high-level staff position. The special
assistant could perform the following major functions: (1) signal
to members of the bench, bar and public the commitment of the
judicial branch to a system of justice that treats all litigants, attorneys
and personnel with equal dignity; (2) develop, design and implement
specific training programs for judges and for nonjudicial personnel
to help them better understand the effects of gender bias, and to
provide the tools to remedy situations that arise; (3) establish internal
procedures to collect and investigate complaints of gender bias and
make recommendations to the chief administrator as to appropriate
action; (4) review court rules, legislative and administrative rec-
ommendations and Office of Court Administration public statements
to insure that they are gender neutral; and (5) act as liaison to a
community advisory committee appointed by the Chief Judge, com-
posed of representatives of bar associations, judges, associations,
court employee groups, organizations with special expertise in re-
cognizing and combatting gender bias and others with special interest
in the issue.
The last function, that of liaison with a community advisory
committee, would provide a mechanism for the Office of Court
Administration to hear from a diverse group of concerned organi-
zations about the perceptions of the public and the bar as to problems
with gender bias in the court system. Perhaps as important, the
committee could help the Office of Court Administration to dis-
seminate accurate information concerning progress that has been
made and opportunities for change within the courts.
B. Judicial Education
Throughout this report, the Task Force has recommended judicial
education and training respecting a wide range of issues in which
gender bias is a factor. During the Task Force's public hearings,
the need for judicial education to help judges understand their own
biases about women in general and in specific areas of substantive
law was a repeated theme, with judicial witnesses among the strongest
proponents of this kind of training.
Judge Richard Huttner, Administrative Judge of the New York
City Family Court, spoke of the judicial education programs he has
arranged for his own court to counteract gender bias and urged
that the Office of Court Administration expand presentation of this
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kind of material at the judges' formal training sessions at the State
University of New York at Buffalo Law School. 7 ' Speaking of the
kinds of sex-biased attitudes that "corrupt the impartiality of justice
and lie hidden from all," Judge Huttner stated:
What I believe is vitally necessary to combat this situation, is
judicial training aimed at raising the consciousness and sensitivity
of our judges. Re-examination and judicial so[ul]searching, if you
will, of long accepted beliefs as to the role of women. 17
Supreme Court Justice Stanley Sklar testified:
[M]any if not most of us are sexist to one degree or another,
without even realizing it .... I submit that education will help
us, especially those of us charged with equal enforcement of the
law, to reduce and eliminate sexist shibboleths, attitudes and
rulings .473
New York City Civil Court Judge John Stackhouse, when asked
what he would recommend to eliminate the problems he had described
to the Task Force, replied, "I think education is the answer" and,
like Judge Huttner, urged the expansion and repetition of such
education at the judges' summer training sessions. 474 Supreme Court
Justice William Rigler, when asked whether he had any solution to
the problem areas he had identified, responded: "Education. ' 475
Judge Ira Raab, New York State Governor of the American Judges'
Association, spoke of the "sex stereotyped, prejudicial attitudes and
behavior" 47 6 in a variety of substantive law areas as well as courtroom
interaction and stated:
I believe that the root cause of these unacceptable occurrences is
the cultural conditioning of a male oriented judiciary .... Ju-
dicial education and training is the answer. Judges must [unlearn]
their male oriented cultural conditioning. 477
471. See New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 125 (testimony of Richard
D. Huttner).
472. Id. at 120.
473. New York City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 16 (testimony of Stanley
Sklar).
474. New York City Hearings II, supra note 50, at 297 (testimony of John E.H.
Stackhouse).
475. Id. at 108 (testimony of William Rigler). Justice Rigler also stated that at
a program urging mediation that he had recently attended he had asked: "[WIhere
is the education for the judges? You are talking about educating mediators. I think
it is more important that you educate judges. I don't feel . . . you can take a
judge and just sit him in a matrimonial part." Id. at 113.
476. Id. at 63 (testimony of Ira Raab).
477. Id. at 63, 67.
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Numerous nonjudicial witnesses concurred in these calls for ju-
dicial education about gender bias, 478 in particular with Judge Rigler's
assertion that training for judges responsible for matrimonial cases
is essential. Rockland County Legislator Harriet Cornell urged that
the Office of Court Administration establish a permanent commision:
[W]ith the mission of educating the judiciary on all matters regard-
ing domestic relations and family problems and of monitoring
judicial actions. Further, this commission shall see that current and
accurate information be given to judges about living costs, child
care costs and other statistical or social data that may be pertinent
in helping the judiciary reach unbiased decisions. 479
Judicial education about gender bias should be accomplished through
courses that are fully devoted to this issue and through the integration
of relevant materials into courses on specific areas of substantive
law. For example, gender bias in the application of the rape shield
law should be discussed in courses on criminal evidence. Courses
about the Equitable Distribution Law should include material about
the different economic consequences of divorce for women and men.
Judicial education about gender bias must be an ongoing effort,
not a one-time response to this Report.
C. Examination of Rules Governing Judges' and Attorneys'
Professional Conduct
Under current rules governing professional responsibilities and
ethics, attorneys are admonished in very general terms to "assist
in maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profes-
sion."4 8 0 Similarly, judges are required to "observe high standards
of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary
may be preserved" ' 481 and to conduct themselves "at all times in a
478. For example, Elizabeth Holtzman, Kings County District Attorney recom-
mended that comprehensive training programs be established for all judges and
other court personnel to increase their awareness of the impropriety of demeaning
women and their obligation to act swiftly to counter such acts. See New York
City Hearings I, supra note 27, at 39 (testimony of Elizabeth Holtzman); accord
New York City Hearings I, supra note 52, at 155 (testimony of Barbara Bartoletti);
id. at 72 (testimony of Elizabeth Schneider) (domestic violence cases); Albany
Hearings, supra note 57, at 40 (testimony of Judith Condo); Rochester Hearings,
supra note 49, at 197 (testimony of Lorraine Koury); id. at 62, 64 (testimony of
Beverly O'Connor) (sexual assault cases); New York City Hearings II, supra note
27, at 7 (testimony of Marcia Sikowitz).
479. Albany Hearings, supra note 57, at 54-55 (testimony of Harriet Cornell).
480. N.Y.S.B.A. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 1 (1978).
481. N.Y. CODE R. & REGS. tit. 22 § 100.1 (1982).
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manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary. 4 82 Although much of the gender-biased
conduct identified in this Report clearly falls within the ambit of
prohibited conduct under these rules, the Task Force believes that
express definition and recognition of this type of unethical conduct,
either in the rules themselves or in accompanying commentary, would
give notice to judges and lawyers of the seriousness of the impropriety
and the consequences to the impartial administration of justice. This
task may be most appropriately undertaken by bar associations.
D. Bar Association Response
The response of the legal profession to the issues identified and
discussed in this Report will be an important measure of the prospects
of reform. It is incumbent on lawyers, as officers of the court
ethically bound to promote justice and the public understanding of
the judicial process, to take a leading role in seeking to remedy the
perceptions of gender bias in the courts and the realities upon which
those perceptions are based.
The Task Force recommends that all bar associations in the state
place as a priority item on their agendas the issues of the status and
treatment of women litigants, women attorneys and women court
employees in the courts. Through frank and open discussions, state-
wide and local issues will be better understood. Creative solutions
can be developed and implemented. By publicizing specific responses
to these troublesome issues, public confidence in the profession's
commitment to equality in the courts will be enhanced.
IX. CONCLUSION
A number of attorneys questioned the need for and purpose of
the Task Force's undertaking. Some said:
I think the Task Force is placing too much emphasis on this
problem-it appears to me the area of concern is that of attitude
rather than actuality.
Forty-five-year-old rural male 483
To the extent that [gender bias] exists, it will disappear on its
own with the passage of time because of the increasing number
of women in the law schools and in the profession, and because
482. Id. § 100.2(a).
483. R.L. AssocIATEs, supra note 23, app. B, at 65 (Survey Respondent No.
1497M).
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of the attitude of young people about sexual bias. It seems to
me that a lot of time and money could be saved if the Task Force
were abolished and the problem, if there is one, be allowed to
disappear without exacerbating it by holding public hearings and
meetings and studying it to death.
Fifty-eight-year-old rural male" "
Accept certain things as they are. Society will change as people
grow with the times. Don't force people to accept attitudes spur[r]ed
by hostility .... Gender bias is not a crime-it is merely an
outgrowth of 3,000 years of culture. Old habits die hard. Be
patient-your time will come.
Thirty-two-year-old New York City male415
Calls for complacency in identifying gender bias in New York's
courts, and for sole reliance on the passage of time for its amel-
ioration, misapprehend the nature and consequences of gender bias
in our society. The courts have a special obligation to reject-not
reflect-society's irrational prejudices.
Attitudes invariably influence conduct. Conduct influenced by gen-
der bias in an institution with profound power over those who come
before it can wreak substantial injustice and can undermine the
courts' prestige and authority by eroding public confidence in the
justice system. It is fitting, therefore, that New York's court system
examine and seek to rid itself of any bias.
With leadership there will be a change. Ultimately, reform depends
on the willingness of bench and bar to engage in intense self-
examination and on the public's resolve to demand a justice system
more fully committed to fairness and equality.
484. Id., app. B, at 54 (Survey Respondent No. 1265M).
485. Id., app. B, at 27 (Survey Respondent No. 0696M).
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Appendix A
Hon. Lawrence H. Cooke, Remarks at the Press Conference An-
nouncing the Formation of the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York on May 31, 1984
The concept of justice is broad in reach and serious in nature;
it is antithetical to any discrimination triggered by prejudice.
None of us had any choice of the home in which we were born;
a higher power decided that circumstance. To deny anyone anything
because of race, creed, c6lor, national origin, gender, or any such
irrelevant consideration is the basest kind of misbehavior. It is a
surrender of the human to the animal instincts.
Distinctions grounded on improper concerns have no place what-
soever in the operation of our legal system and every reasonable
effort should be made to guarantee that the scales of justice are
balanced evenly for every person who comes before the courts. They
expect no less and, certainly, are entitled to no less. There must
be no corridors of special privilege, high hurdles for some, or bans
on any. There must be no institutional hypocrisy.
It was not much more than one hundred years ago that the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of an Illinois
statute prohibiting women from gaining admission to that state's
bar. The words that all are created equal and are endowed with
certain inalienable rights yielded no life, liberty or pursuit of hap-
piness to those before whom doors were closed in search of their
noblest aspirations or those who were told they could not enter the
legal profession because of sex.
There are those, particularly such substantial groups as the New
York State Association of Women Judges and the Women's Bar
Association of the State of New York, who have expressed concern
with the situation of women in our legal system. There is no question
but that in recent chapters of history tremendous strides have been
made by women in the legal structure and operation of our state
and nation. The issue remains whether, at this juncture, their al-
lotment of the jurisprudential scheme in the Empire State is fair
under all the circumstances.
To answer this question the New York Task Force on Women
in the Courts is being organized. The general aim of the Task Force
will be to assist in promoting equality for men and women in the
courts. The more specific goal will be to examine the courts and
identify gender bias and, if found, to make recommendations for
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its alleviation. Gender bias occurs when decisions are made or
actions taken because of weight given to preconceived notions of
sexual roles rather than upon a fair and unswayed appraisal of merit
as to each person or situation. In determining the fact or extent of
its existence, the focus of the Task Force should be upon all aspects
of the system, both substantive and procedural. An effort should
be made to ascertain if there are statutes, rules, practices, or conduct
that work unfairness or undue hardship on women in our courts.
Recently, a similar study was conducted on behalf of the court
system in New Jersey. Its leadership is to be commended and its
methodology provides an exemplar for the study to be conducted
here in New York.
The Task Force is made up of outstanding, representative and
independent citizens. The members are charged with fulfilling their
mission dispassionately and with reasonable dispatch.
The Task Force will be chaired by Edward J. McLaughlin, Ad-
ministrative Judge of the Family Court of Onondaga County, for-
merly a President of the Family Court Judges Association of New
York State and at one time employed by the Hughes Judiciary
Committee. The other members of the Task Force are:
Jay C. Carlisle, Esq., Professor of Law, Pace University School of
Law, White Plains;
Hon. Hazel Dukes, President of New York Conference of NAACP,
Roslyn Heights;
Haliburton Fales, II, Esq., President of New York State Bar As-
sociation, New York City;
Neva Flaherty, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Monroe County,
Rochester;
Hon. Josephine L. Gambino, Commissioner of New York State
Department of Civil Service, Bayside;
Marjorie E. Karowe, Esq., Past President of Women's Bar Asso-
ciation of the State of New York, Albany;
Hon. Sybil Hart Kooper, Justice of the Supreme Court and President
of New York State Women Judges' Association, Brooklyn;
Ms. Sarah Kovner, Chair, Board of Directors, First Women's Bank,
New York City;
Hon. David F. Lee, Jr., Justice of the Supreme Court, Norwich;
Ms. Joan McKinley, President of New York State League of Women
Voters, Saratoga Springs;
Hon. Olga A. Mendez, New York State Senator, Bronx;
Hon. S. Michael Nadel, Deputy Chief Administrator of the Unified
Court System, New York City;
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Edward M. Roth, Esq., Senior Law Assistant to Chief Judge, Mon-
ticello;
Oscar W. Ruebhausen, Esq., Former President of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, New York City;
Fern Schair, Esq., Executive Secretary, the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Scarsdale;
John Henry Schlegel, Esq., Associate Dean, State University of New
York at Buffalo Law School, Buffalo;
Richard E. Shandell, Esq., Past President of New York State Trial
Lawyers' Association, New York City;
Florence Perlow Shientag, Esq., Member of the Bar, New York
City;
Sharon Sayers, Esq., Member of the Family Law Section of the
Monroe County Bar Association, Rochester;
David Sive, Esq., Stimson Award Winner of New York State Bar
Association and Lecturer at Columbia Law School, Ardsley-on-
Hudson;
Hon. Ronald B. Stafford, Chairman of Codes Committee of New
York State Senate, Plattsburgh;
Hon. Stanley Steingut, Former Speaker of New York State Assembly,
Brooklyn.
Technical services for the Task Force will be supplied by the Equal
Employment Opportunity unit of the Office of Court Adminis-
tration under the leadership of Adrienne White, Director.
Patricia P. Satterfield, Assistant Deputy Counsel in the Counsel's
Office of the Office of Court Administration, will serve as the
Task Force's Counsel.
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Appendix B
Bibliography of Introductory Material on Issues Affecting Women
in the Courts
A. COURTROOM INTERACTION
Bernikow, We're Dancing As Fast As We Can, SAVVY, Apr. 1984,
at 41.
Johnson & Knapp, Sex Discrimination By Law: Study in Judicial
Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1971).
Kanter, Reflections on Women and the Legal Profession: A So-
ciological Perspective, I HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1978).
Sachs & Wilson, Sexism and the Legal Profession. A Study in Male
Beliefs and Legal Bias in Britain and the United States, 5 Women's
Rts. L. Rep. 53 (Rutgers Univ. 1978).
Schafran, Real Affirmative Action Is More than Just Numbers, Am.
Banker, Oct. 18, 1982, at 20.
Schafran, Women as Litigators: Abilities v. Assumptions, 19 TRIAL
36 (1983).
Schmidt, Sexist Schooling, WORKING WOMAN, Oct. 1982, at 101.
Serlin, Mutterings From the Men's Room, WORKING WOMAN, May
1983, at 112-15.
Taylor, Oyez, Qyze, NAT'L ASS'N OF WOMEN JUDGES, DIST. 2 NEWSL.,
Weil, A Separate Peace, SAVVY, July 1984, at 38.
Wikler, On the Judicial Agenda for the 80's: Equal Treatment for
Men and Women in the Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 202 (1980).
Woman & Frank, The Solor Woman in a Professional Peer Group,
45 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 164 (1975).
B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Storrs Lecture,
delivered at Yale University (1921).
Women Judges Tell of Sexism, Boston Globe, Mar. 6, 1983, at 22.
B. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: SECOND REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE
(1982).
C. Serum, Profile of Assailants, in MICHIGAN REGIONAL JUDICIAL
SEMINAR, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A JUDICIAL AND SOCIAL PER-
SPECTIVE (Nov. 1981).
Fields, The Battered Wife, FAM. ADVOC. 20 (Fall 1979).
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Fields, No Help for Battered Wives 'Til Attitudes Change, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE TODAY, Feb. 20, 1978, at 1. (Author is co-chair of
New York State Commission on Domestic Violence).
Jones, When Battered Women Fight Back, 9 BARRISTER 12 (1982).
Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23.
Arrest May Be Deterrent in Domestic Violence, Study Shows, N.Y.
Times, May 30, 1984.
A Study of Patterns in Family Violence, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1983.
McLaughlin & Whisenand, Beating a Spouse Is a Crime, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 10, 1981, at 23.
Letter from Marjory Fields to Lynn Schafran (Aug. 14, 1984) (in-
cluding minutes from hearing in domestic violence matter, pointing
out problems with judge's treatment of woman seeking protective
order).
C. CUSTODY
Armstrong, Daddy Dearest, CONNECTICUT MAG., Jan. 1984, at
54.
Bondenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation and the Right to Move,
FAM. ADVOC. 19-21 (Summer 1980).
Lawyer's Custody Battle Galvanizes Women's Bar, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
26, 1983, at 297.
National Center on Women and Family Law, Sex and Economic
Discrimination in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.,
Apr. 1983, at 1130.
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing?: A Brief Analysis of Criteria
Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep.
235 (Rutgers Univ. 1982).
A Mute Girl's Story: Child Abuse and the System, N.Y. Times,
May 12, 1984, at 45.
KARTEN, Weiss AND ITS AFTERMATH-THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF
NEW YORK STATE'S RESTRICTIVE MOVEMENT CASES (1983) (un-
published paper).
D. JUVENILE JUSTICE
A.B.A. STUDY, LITTLE SISTERS AND THE LAW: DIFFERENTIAL TREAT-
MENT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1977).
Exploring the Issue of Differential Treatment, in YOUTH POLICY AND
LAW, INC., WISCONSIN FEMALE JUVENILE OFFENDER STUDY PROJ-
ECT, SUMMARY REPORT (1982).
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Chesney-Lind, Young Women in the Arms of the Law, in WOMEN,
CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Bowker ed. 1978).
Courts Treat Girls More Harshly Than Boys, BEHAVIOR TODAY, Dec.
15, 1980, at 4.
The Violent Child: Some Patterns Emerge, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27,
1982, col. 1.
A.B.A. Says Criminal Justice System Discriminates Against Young
Women, A.B.A. Press Release, June 13, 1977.
E. ADULT SENTENCING
Chesney-Lind, Chivalry Reexamined: Women and the Criminal
Justice System, in WOMEN, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (Bowker ed. 1978).
F. RAPE
A Furor Over An Alternative Sentence, Nat'l L. J., Dec. 5, 1983,
at 8.
Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Court-
room, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE
202 (1974).
Dowd, Rape: The Sexual Weapon, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 27-29.
Ploscowe, Sex Offenses: The American Legal Context, 25 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215 (1960).
Rape Verdict: Blinded Justice?, NEW YORK MAG. (1982).
Was He Asking For It?, HARPER'S WEEKLY (undated).
Rape Plea an Injustice: Columbia NOW, Hudson Register-Star, Aug.
19, 1983, at A16.
Rape Victim Found Justice More Painful, Washington Post, Spring,
1982, at B3, col. 1.
Wisconsin Judge's Rape Ruling Angers Residents, Washington Post,
Jan. 21, 1982.
Judges Says Girl, 5, Invited Sex Assault, Capitol Times, Jan. 8,
1982, at 4, col. 3.
Ousted Judge in Rape Case Says Feminists Will "Stoop" to Any
Low, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1978.
G. SUPPORT AWARDS AND ENFORCEMENT
NATIONAL JUDICIAL EDUCATION PROGRAM TO PROMOTE EQUALITY
FOR WOMEN AND MEN IN THE COURTS, THE ECONOMIC CONSE-
QUENCES OF DIVORCE: NATIONAL AND NEW JERSEY DATA (1984)
(New York data appended).
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Bernstein, Shouldn't Low-Income Fathers Support Their Children,
66 PUB. INTEREST 55 (1982) (discusses attitudes of New York City
family court judges).
Hunter, Child Support Law and Policy: The Systematic Imposition
of Costs on Women, 6 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1983).
On the Trail of Those Dead Beat Dads, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP.,
Mar. 21, 1983, at 70.
Child Support: It's Unfair to Fathers, Washington Post, Oct. 4,
1983, at A14.
Why Fathers Don't Pay Child Support, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1983,
at Cl.
Mann, Newly Poor, Washington Post, July 15, 1983, at Bi, col.
1.
Child Support Frequently Not Paid, N.Y. Times, July 6, 1983, at
A10.
Divorce: Men Get Richer, Women Poorer, Washington Post, May
31, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
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Appendix C
Schedule of Public Hearing Witnesses
Public Hearing, November 19, 1984 at the Association of the
Bar, 42 West 44th Street, New York, New York, convened at
9:15 a.m.
Doris Jonas Freed, Esq., Dweck & Sladkus
Hon. Stanley L. Sklar, Acting Justice, New York State Supreme
Court
Julia Perles, Esq., Chair, Committee on Equitable Distribution,
Family Law Section, New York State Bar Association
Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, District Attorney, Kings County
Henry G. Miller, Esq., President, New York State Bar Association
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law
School
Harriet N. Cohen, Esq., Chair, Matrimonial and Family Law Com-
mittee, New York Women's Bar Association
Adria S. Hillman, Esq., Member, Matrimonial and Family Law
Committee, New York Women's Bar Association
Irene A. Sullivan, Esq., President, Women's Bar Association of the
State of New York
Marjory D. Fields, Esq., Co-Chair, Governor's Commission on Do-
mestic Violence
Frances Mattera, Founder/President, For Our Chidren and Us, Inc.
(FOCUS)
Lillian Kozak, Esq., Chair, Domestic Relations Law Task Force,
NOW/New York City
Barbara Bartoleti, Director of Women's Issues and Social Policy,
State League of Women Voters
Carolyn Kubitshek, Esq., MFY Legal Services; Member, Women's
Committee of the New York City Chapter of the National Lawyer's
Guild
Joel R. Brandes, Esq., Co-Chair, Continuing Legal Education Com-
mittee, Family Law Section, New York State Bar Association
Nancy D. Perlman, Executive Director, Center for Women in Gov-
ernment
Dean Robert B. McKay, President, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York
Carol Lefcourt, Esq., Counsel, New York State Women's Division
"Mary Jones," Litigant
Myrna Felder, Esq., Chair, Matrimonial Law Committee, Women's
Bar Association of the State of New York
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Barbara P. Billauer, Esq., President, Metropolitan Women's Bar
Association
Hon. Betty Weinberg Ellerin, Deputy Chief Administrative Judge
for Courts in New York City
Public Hearing, January 29, 1985 at Legislative Office Building,
Albany, New York, convened at 10:00 a.m.
Hon. Robert Abrams, New York State Attorney General
Hon. Gail S. Shaffer, New York State Secretary of State
Judith Condo, Executive Director, Albany County Rape Crisis Center
Hon. Harriet Cornell, Rockland County Legislature; Chair, Legis-
lative Commission of the Rockland County Commission on
Women's Issues
Hon. May Newburger, New York State Assembly; Chair, New York
State Assembly Task Force on Women's Issues
Eileen Millet, Esq., Board Member, Association of Black Women
Attorneys
Hon. Karen Burstein, President, New York State Department of
Civil Services; Co-Chair, Governor's Commission on Domestic
Violence
Marion Silber, Esq., Member of the firm, Gordon & Silber
Hon. Edward Spain, Police Court Judge, Troy, New York
Sidney Siller, Esq., Founder, National Organization for Men
Judith Avner, Assistant Director, New York State Women's Division
Jo-Ann Mullen, Community Service Coordinator, Families in Viol-
ence
Stanley Rosen, Esq., Attorney
Karen DeCrow, Former President, National Organization for Women
Linda Fairstein, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, New York County
Director, Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit
Joan Bukoskey, Victim Advocate, Unity House
Marsha Anderson, Chair, Columbia County National Organization
for Women
Thomas Kershner, Professor of Economics, Union College
Public Hearing, March 5, 1985 at Appellate Division Court
Room, Hall of Justice, 99 Exchange Street, Rochester, New
York, convened at 10:00 a.m.
Stephen Hassett, Esq., Staff Attorney, Neighborhood Legal Services
Deborah N. Sorbini, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Erie County
Lynn Vallone, Coalition for Child Support
Mary Lee Sulkowski, Haven House
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Beverly O'Connor, Executive Director, Rape Crisis Center of Syr-
acuse
Bonnie Gail Levy, Esq., Attorney
Wynn Gerhard, Esq., Acting Director, Neighborhood Legal Services
Phyllis Korn, Executive Director, Alternatives for Battered Women,
Inc.
Richard Sansone, Litigant
John Rossler, Vice President, Father's Rights Association
Marion Scipioni, Litigant
Richard Kirtland, Litigant
Herbert M. Siegel, Esq., Attorney
Prof. Virginia Burns, Professor of Criminal Justice, SUNY-Brockport
Lorraine M. Koury, Coordinator, Citizens Committee on Rape and
Sexual Assault
Samantha Moore, Litigant
Nancy Lowery, Social Worker, Vera House
Lois Davis, Ex-President, Judicial Process Committee of Rochester
Prof. Judy Long, Department Head, Department of Sociology, Syr-
acuse University
Mary Ann Hawco, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Monroe County
Joseph Heath, Esq., Attorney
Public Hearing, May 7, 1985 at 1 World Trade Center, New
York, New York, convened at 12:00 p.m.
Marcia Sikowitz, Esq., National Lawyer's Guild, New York Chapter
Susan Tucker, Co-Chair, Women's Rights Committee, New York
State National Organization for Women
Gail V. Conklin, Litigant
J. A. Rodriguez-Sierra, Litigant
Prof. John Hennings, Professor of Economics, Maxwell School,
Syracuse University
Karin Huneke, Litigant
Susan Leelike, Good Old Lower East Side
Judge Ira Raab, New York State Governor, American Judge's As-
sociation
Judith Reichler, Esq., Project Director, Governor's Commission on
Child Support
Hon. William Rigler, Justice of the Supreme Court, Kings County
Judge Richard D. Huttner, Administrative Judge, New York City
Family Court
Doris Jonas Freed, Esq., Dweck & Sladkus
Amy Ellman, Women Against Pornography
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Evelina Kane, Women Against Pornography
Linda Scavetti, Certified Public Librarian
June Nemet, Litigant
Dr. Lawrence Nannery, Litigant
Peter A. Pless, Litigant
Claire Hogenauer, Esq., Attorney
Hon. Amy H. Juviler, Judge of the New York City Criminal Court
Laura Blackburne, Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
Arthur Katz, Litigant
Hon. John Stackhouse, Judge of the New York City Civil Court
Ruth Laitman, Litigant
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Appendix D
Questionnaire and Transmittal Letter Sent to Surrogate's Courts
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
Questionnaire on Judicial Appointments
of Attorneys in Surrogate's Court
County:
Judge:
Phone Number:
1. What procedure does your court follow for selecting
attorneys for appointment as guardians ad litem in estate
cases (pursuant to SCPA §402[a] and §403[b])?
2. For the years 1982 through 1984, please complete the
following table regarding appointments at various stages
in estate proceedings (place in column A, the total
appointments for the year, and place in column B, the
total number of women appointed):
Probate of Will
under $100,000
$100,000 - $499,000
$500,000 - $999,000
$1 million or more
Judicial Settlement of Estates
under $100,000
$100,000 - $499,000
$500,000 - $999,000
$1 million or more
Judicial Settlement of Trusts
1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984
A B A B A B
1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984
1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984
under $100,000
$100,000 - $499,000
$500,000 - $999,000
$1 million or more
Estates
Estates
gstates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
Estates
TOTAL
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3. What procedure does your court follow for selecting
administrators of estates?
4. Please complete the following chart on public administrator
appointments (place in column A, the total appointments,
and place in column B, the total number of women appointed):
1982 1982 1983 1983 1984 1984
A B A B A B
Estates under $100,000
Estates of $100,000 - $499,000
Estates of $500,000 - $999,000
Estates of $1 million or more
5. a) What procedure does your court follow in appointing
guardians ad litem for infants in guardianship/custody
proceedings brought under Social Service Law §384-b?
Check one:
1) Contract with Legal Aid Society
(SPCA §403-a[3][a])
2) Appellate Division Agreement with attorneys
(SPCA §403-a(3][b])
3) Panel designates by Appellate Division
(SPCA §403-a[31[c])
4) Other procedure (please describe):
b) If your answer is Appellate Division Agreement,
how many attorneys have entered such agreement?
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(i) How were the attorneys selected?
(2) How many were women?
(3) If more then one attorney is available, by what
method does the court distribute assignments?
c) If your answer is "Panel Designated
Division", how is the panel selected?
by Appellate
(I) What qualifications must attorneys meet?
(2) How many are are on the panel?
(3) How many are women?
1986-87]
(5) If your court uses a procedure other than the
procedures specified in SCPA §403-a(3), please
complete the following table concerning
appointments:
1982 1983 1984
Number of Appointments made
Number of Appointments
to Women
6. Please complete the following table for guardian ad litem
appointments made under Social Services Law §384-b:
1982 1983 1984
Number of Appointments made
Number of Appointments
to Women
7. What procedure does the court use for appointing guardians
ad litem for indigent parties pursuant to SCPA §407
(respondent in proceedings under Social Services Law §384
and §384-b; parents opposing adoption of child)?
TASK FORCE REPORT 18
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(4) What procedure does the Court use in distributing
assignments (i.e., is a rotation system used)?
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8. Please complete the following table for guardian at litem
appointments made under Social Service Law §384-b:
1982 1983 1984
Number of Appoitments made
Number of Appointments
to Women
Please return this questionaire by November 15, 1985, to Neva
S. Flaherty, Esq., Chair of Subcommittee on Women in the Courts,
201 Hall of Justice, Rochester, New York 14614. Questions,
concerning this questionaire can be directed to Ms. Flaherty
at (716) 428-5680.
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TASK FORCE REPORT I
NEW YORK
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
270 BROAOWAY. AM 1012
NEW YORK NEW YORK 10007
(2121 $7 58-7
October , 1985
Dear
The Task Force on Women in the Courts,
appointed in May, 1984 by then Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals Lawrence H. Cooke, is
investigating a number of issues regarding
possible gender bias in the New York courts.
Among the topics assigned to the Subcommittee on
Women in the Courts is the process by which judges
select and assign counsel for litigants or parties
who need representation. The Task Force has
received some information on this topic through
public hearings. The Subcommittee is following up
with additional fact-gathering.
It would greatly assist the Subcommittee if
you could complete the attached questionnaire on
such judicial appointments and return it in the
enclosed envelope, to the address specified on the
questionnaire by November 15, 1985. Please
attach to the questionnaire any written material
requested.
Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,
Edward J. McLaughlin
Chairperson
cc: Neva S. Flahefty, Esq.
Chair, Subcommittee on
Women in the Courts
Adrienne White, Equal Employment
Opportunity, Office of Court
Administration
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Appendix E
Questionnaires and Transmittal Letters Sent to Judicial
Nominating Committees and Bar Association Judicial
Screening Committees
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
JUDICIAL NOMINATION COMMISSION QUESTIONNAIRE
(COURT OF APPEALS)
1. Number of members on the panel.
2. Number of male members who are attorneys.
Number of male members who are non-attorneys.
Number of female members who are attorneys.
Number of female members who are non-attorneys.
3. Number of vacancies, if any.
4. Describe the procedure followed by the panel in evaluating
candidates. Please also attach a copy of any written
rules or procedures used in evaluating candidates.
5. For the past three years, please provide the following
information:
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1982 1983 1984
Number of candidates evaluated
Number of women candidates
evaluated
Number of candidates
recommended to the Governor
Number of women candidates
recommended to the Governor
6. Judiciary Law Section 64(1) directs the commission to
establish procedures to encourage qualified attorneys
to agree to submit to considerations as judicial candidates,
in addition to those who request or are recommended for
consideration. Describe your committee's recruitment
procedures. In other words, how do you decide who shall
be encouraged to apply? Please send a copy of any written
rules or procedures regarding recruitment.
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7. Since the panel's inception, how many judicial nominees
has the panel recruited by these procedures?
8. How many of these recruits were women?
9. Do you believe the recruitment process is working
effectively? If not, why not?
10. Please recommend changes that you believe would improve
the recruitment process. . . .. .... ..... ...
Please note that the Task Force is not asking for names of
any nominees. Please send the requested information to Fern
Schair, Executive Secretary, The Bar Association of the City
of New York, 42 West 44th Street, New York, N.Y. 10036,
by November 15, 1985. If you have any questions, please call
Ms. Schair at 212-382-6600.
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TASK FORCE REPORT
NEW YORK
TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
270 AROAOWAY. AM 1012
NEW YOAX. NEW Y011t 10007
(2121 B7-5847
October , 1985
Dear
The Task Force on Women in the Courts,
appointed in May, 1984 by then Chief Judge of the
Court of Appeals Lawrence H. Cooke, is
investigating a number of issues regarding
possible gender bias in the New York courts.
Among the topics assigned to the Subcommittee on
Women in the Courts is the process by which judges
select and assign counsel for litigants or parties
who need representation. The Task Force has
received some information on this topic through
public hearings. The Subcommittee is following up
with additional fact-gathering.
It would greatly assist the Subcommittee if
you could complete the attached questionnaire on
such judicial appointments and return it in the
enclosed envelope, to the address specified on the
questionnaire by November 15, 1985. Please
attach to the questionnaire any written material
requested.
Thank you for your assistance.
Very truly yours,
Edward J. McLaughlin
Chairperson
cc: Neva S. Flaherty, Esq.
Chair, Subcommittee on
Women in the Courts
Adrienne White, Equal Employment
Opportunity, Office of Court
Administration
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Appendix F
6,1. . ATTORNEY SURVEY OF THE
NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS
TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN IN THE COURTS
,/' yG4,,
The possibility of gender bias in the justice system has been recognized as a matter serious enough to warrant
the establishment, in 1984, of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts. In order to determine the extent
to which this gender bias may exist, and the real or perceived effect it may have on courtroom interaction and the
decision making process, it is important that certain information be gathered.
Toward this end, the enclosed questionnaire has been prepared by the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, The information sought through this survey is essential to the work of the Task Force and I urge you to
complete and return the survey as quickly as possible.
Very truly yours,
Sol Wachtler
PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SURVEY EVEN IF YOU DO NOT HAVE STRONG FEELINGS
ABOUT GENDER BIAS WITHIN THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE
OBTAIN THE VIEWS OF AS MANY ATTORNEYS AS POSSIBLE. YOUR RESPONSES WILL
HELP US OBTAIN A MORE COMPLETE PICTURE OF GENDER BIAS IN THE NEW YORK
STATE COURTS.
This survey is based on the specific concerns raised at the Task Forces four public hearings and in meetings
with judges and lawyers throughout the State. Questions are divided into several areas relating to court
interaction and substantive law. Please answer questions only in those areas in which you have had ex-
perience in the post two years. Circle the response which best describes your experience, perception, or
opinion. Responses are: (1) Always, (2) Often, (3) Sometimes, (4) Rarely, or (5) Never.
Space for comments is provided at the end of the survey. Please use this space for more detailed responses
and other issues you would like to bring to the Task Force's attention. Attach additional sheets, if necessary.
The Task Force is especially interested in reviewing transcripts. Please send applicable transcript sections,
if you have them, along with your completed survey. The Task Force will consider purchasing transcripts
in appropriate cases when all information necessary to identify the case is provided.
Please do not put your name on the survey. Upon receipt, envelopes will be destroyed. You will not be
identified with your responses in any way. They will be summarized with those of other attorneys. Please
mail your completed survey no later than July 26 to R L Associates, 15 Chambers Street, Princeton, New
Jersey 08542. Thank you for your participation.
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1 = Always, 2 = Often. 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Rarely, 5 = Never
COURT INTERACTION: The Task force received testimony from judges and attorneys about the ways in which
seemingly trivial negative conduct toward women in courtrooms and in chambers interferes with the administration
of justice. These questions seek information about the perceived frequency of the behaviors most commonly cited.
Approximate number of appearances in court or chambers during the last two years -
A O S R N
1. Are women asked if they are attorneys when men are not asked? t 2 3 4 5
2. Are women attorneys addressed by first names or terms of endearment when
men attorneys are addressed by surnames or titles:
(a) by judges? t 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
3. Are women litigants or witnesses addressed by first names or terms of endear-
ment when men are addressed by surnames or titles:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? t 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
4. Are inappropriate comments made about the personal appearance of women
attorneys when no such comments are made about men:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
5. Are inappropriate comments made about the personal appearance of women
litigants or witnesses when no such comments are made about men:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
() by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
6. Are sexist remarks or jokes that demean women made in court or in chambers:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
7. Are women litigants or witnesses subjected to verbal or physical sexual
advances:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
8. Are women attorneys subjected to verbal or physical sexual advances:
(a) by judges? 1 2 3 4 5
(b) by counsel? 1 2 3 4 5
(c) by court personnel? 1 2 3 4 5
9. If you have experienced or observed any of the conduct described in questions 1 Yes
1-8. do you believe it affected the outcome of the case? IF YES. please describe 2 No
on the last page. Y Don't know
10. Have judges or counsel intervened to correct any of the situations described 1 Yes
in questions 1-8? IF YES, please use the last page to describe the situation 2 No
and the way it was handled.
CREDIBILITY- In the courtroom. 'credible in its fullest sense (believable capable. convincing, someone to be
taken seriously) is one of the most important things that a litigant, witness, expert, or attorney can be. Because
of testimony received at its public hearings, the Task Force seeks your perceptions of whether and how gender af-
fects credibility in the courts.
A 0 S R N
1. Do male judges appear to pay less attention to and/or give less credibility to
female attorneys' statements/arguments than to those of male attorneys? 1 2 3 4 5
2. Do female judges appear to pay less attention to and/or give less credibility to
female attorneys' statements/arguments than to those of male attorneys? 1 2 3 4 5
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I = Always, 2 = Often, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Rarely, 5 = Never
A O S R N
3. Do male judges appear to impose a greater burden of proof on female witnesses
than on male witnesses? 1 2 3 4 5
4. Do female judges appear to impose a greater burden of proof on female
witnesses than on male witnesses?
5. Do male judges appear to give less credibility to female expert witnesses than
to male experts based on gender rather than the substance of the experts'
testimony?
6. Do female judges appear to give less credibility to female expert witnesses than
to male experts based on gender rather than the substance of the experts'
testimony?
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
INTERRELATIONSHIP OF SEX/RACE AND SEX/ECONOMIC STATUS: Testimony received by
the Task Force suggests that women from minority groups and women who are economically disadvantaged sometimes
receive particularly unequal treatment in both courtroom interaction and substantive decisions. The Task Force seeks
further information from attorneys who have observed or experienced these compound forms of bias. Please use
the last page of the survey and attach sheets as necessary to provide your general analysis of this issue and concrete
incidents that illustrate how these factors interact to the disadvantage (or advantage) of adult and juvenile females
in the courts.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION
Approximate number of equitable distribution cases handled during the last two years
A O S R N
1. Are effective temporary restraining orders granted to maintain the status quo
for equitable distribution?
2. Do judges impose meaningful sanctions, including civil commitment, when in-
junctions are violated?
3. Do judges refuse to award 50% of property or more to wives even though 'pro.
bable future financial circumstances' indicate that even with such an award
husbands will not have to substantially reduce their standard of living but wives
will?
4. Do equitable distribution awards reflect a judicial attitude that property belongs
to the husband and a wife's share is based on how much the husband could
give her without diminishing his current lifestyle?
5. Do judges make remarks which indicate that awards of maintenance or pro-
perty distribution are based on the likelihood of the wife's remarriage?
6. Are women plaintiffs refused equitable distribution when husbands default, all
papers are in order and there is no question of notice?
7, Is there a rule of thumb in your county regarding division of marital property
under equitable distribution?
If Yes: ___ % to wife _ % to husband
2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 Yes
2 No
Y Don't know
MAINTENANCE
Approximate number of spousal maintenance cases handled during the last two years
A O S R N
1. Are older displaced homemakers, with little chance of obtaining employment
above minumum wage, awarded permanent maintenance after long-term
marriages? 1 2 3 4 5
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2. If permanent maintenance is not always granted after long-term marriages, what
is the trend in your county regarding the number of years for which maintenance
other than a jurisdictional award is granted for each of the following years of
marriage category:
(a) 10-20 years: years of maintenance (b) 21-30 years: -years of maintenance
(c) Over 30 years: years of maintenance
3. If there is a trend in your county with respect to the duration of rehabilitative __ years __ no trend
maintenance awarded after marriages of less than 10 years, what is the usual
duration of these awards:
A O S R N
4. Is temporary maintenance granted pending a hearing on the pendente lite
motion?
5. Is maintenance granted pendente lite?
6. Is maintenance granted retroactive to the initial motion date?
7. Do the courts effectively enforce maintenance awards?
8. Is enforcement of maintenance denied because of alleged visitation problems?
9. Are maintenance arrears reduced to judgment at the time arrears are established?
10. Is interest on arrears awarded as provided by statute?
11. Do courts reduce/forgive arrears accrued prior to the making of a motion for
downward modification of support?
12. Are income deduction orders granted when there are maintenance arrears?
13. Are downward modifications granted in response to support enforcement
motions?
14. Are decreases in maintenance awards granted in cases in which decreases are
warranted?
15. Are increases in maintenance awards granted in cases in which increases are
warranted?
16. Are sequestration and/or bonds ordered to secure future spousal support
payments? t
17. Are respondents who deliberately fail to abide by court orders for maintenance
jailed for civil contempt?
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
CHILD SUPPORT
Approximate number of child support cases handled during the last two years
A O S R N
1. Do child support awards reflect a realistic understanding of the local costs of
child raising, particular children's needs, and the earning capacity of the custodial
parent? 1 2 3 4 5
2. Is temporary child support granted pending a hearing on the pendente lite
motion? 1 2 3 4 5
3. Is child support granted pendente life? 1 2 3 4 5
4. Is child support granted retroactive to the initial motion date? 1 2 3 4 5
5. Do the courts effectively enforce child support awards? 1 2 3 4 5
6. Are repeated adjournments granted to non-custodial parents in child support
proceedings? t 2 3 4 5
7. Is enforcement of child support denied because of alleged visitation problems? 1 2 3 4 5
8. Are child support arrears reduced to judgment at the time arrears are established? t 2 3 4 5
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL [Vol. XV
I = Always. 2 = Often. 3 = Sometimes. 4 = Rarely. 5 = Never
9. Is interest on arrears awarded as provided by statute?
10. Do courts reduce/forgive arrears accrued prior to the making of a motion for
downward modification of support?
II. Are income deduction orders granted when there are child support arrears?
12 Are sequestration and/or bonds ordered to secure future child support payments?
13. Are downward modifications granted in response to support enforcement
motions'?
14. Are decreases in child support granted in cases in which decreases are
warranted?
15. Are increases in child support granted in cases in which increases are warranted?
16. Are respondents who deliberately fail to abide by court orders for child support
jailed for civil contempt?
CUSTODY
Approximate number of custody cases handled during the last two years
I. Are custody awards to mothers apparently based on an assumption that children
belong with their mothers rather than independent facts?
2. Do judges give fair and serious consideration to fathers who actively seek
custody'
3. Is temporary custody (pending final divorce) awarded to mothers despite fathers'
petitions for same9
4. Do you dissuade fathers from seeking custody because you think judges will
not give their petitions fair consideration?
5, Is custody awarded to the parent in a stronger financial position rather than
ordering child payments support to the primary caretaker?
6. Are mothers denied custody because of employment outside the home?
7. Are mothers granted custody on the condition they not work outside the home?
8, Are custody awards to mothers conditioned on limitations of social relation-
ships or activities?
9. Are fathers denied custody because of employment outside the home?
10 Are fathers granted custody on the condition they not work outside the home?
11. Are custody awards to fathers conditioned on limitations of social relationships
or activities?
12. Are visitation provisions sufficient for meaningful participation in children's lives
by non-custodial parents?
13. Is change of custody granted to fathers because of mothers working outside
the home and presence of 'stay at home" stepmothers?
14. Is joint custody imposed over the objections of one or both parents?
15. Do custody awards disregard father's violence against mother?
A 0 S R
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
t 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
t 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Approximate number of domestic violence cases handled during the last two years
A 0 S R N
1. Are Orders of Protection directing respondents to stay away from the home
granted when petitioners are seriously endangered? 1 2 3 4 5
TASK FORCE REPORT
1 = Always, 2 = Often, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Rarely, 5 = Never
A
2. When a woman is in a shelter or otherwise out of the marital home because
of violence, do judges issue Orders of Protection directing respondents to leave
the marital home to enable the woman and children to return?
3. Are Family Court petitioners granted ex porte temporary Orders of Protection? 1
4. Are Criminal Court complainants granted ex porte Orders of Protection? 1
5. Do District Attorneys decline to prosecute domestic violence complaints in
criminal courts? 1
6. Are mutual Orders of Protection issued even though respondents have not
filed petitions?
7. Are petitioners' requests for supervised visitation between respondent and
children refused or ignored?
8. Are Family Court petitioners asked why they have no visible injuries?
9. Are Criminal Court petitioners asked why they have no visible injuries?
10. Is adequate support awarded for domestic violence victims living apart from
respondents under Orders of Protection?
11. Are support awards to domestic violence victims and their children firmly
enforced?
12. Are potential petitioners discouraged by Family Court or Probation personnel
from seeking Orders of Protection?
13. Are victims discouraged from seeking Orders of Protection in Criminal Court?
14. Does Supreme Court grant Orders of Protection when there is a pending
matrimonial action?
15. Does Family Court grant Orders of Protection when there is a pending
matrimonial action?
RAPE
Approximate number of rape cases handled during the last two years.
1. Is bail in rape cases set lower than in other B felony offenses?
2. Are defendants in rape cases released on their own recognizance more often
than defendants charged with other B felony offenses?
3. Are sentences in rape cases shorter than in other B felony offenses?
4. Is bail in rape cases where parties knew one another set lower than in cases
where parties were strangers?
5. Are sentences in rape cases shorter when parties knew one another than in
cases where parties were strangers?
6. When there is improper questioning about complainant's prior sexual conduct,
do judges invoke the rape shield law sua sponte if the prosecutor does not?
7. Do you think there is less concern about rape cases where parties have a cur-
rent or past relationship/acquaintance, on the part of:
fa) judges?
(b) prosecutors?
(c) defense attorneys?
O S R N
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
4 5
4 5
2 3 4 5
2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
t 2 3 4 5
1 Yes 2 No Y Don't know
I Yes 2 No Y Don'i know
I Yes 2No YDon't know
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ADULT SENTENCING
Approximate number of criminal trials handled during the last two years
A O S R N
1. Do women receive lighter sentences than males with similar prior records con-
victed of similar crimes when comparable facilities are available?
2. Do women who are the primary income earners for their children receive lighter
sentences than women convicted of similar crimes who are not employed out.
side the home?
JUVENILE JUSTICE
Approximate number of juvenile hearings handled during the last two years
1 Are female juveniles dealt with more harshly than male juveniles charged with
similar status offenses?
2. Are male juveniles dealt with more harshly than female juveniles charged with
similar delinquency offenses?
3. All other factors being equal, do females and males
receive equal adjudications?
4. If no. who receives more lenient
adjudications?
5. All other factors being equal, do female and male juvenile delinquents receive
equal periods of secure placement?
6. If no. who receives shorter periods of
secure placements?
NEGLIGENCE
Approximate number of negligence trials handled during the last two years
ALL OTHER FACTORS BEING EQUAL:
1. Do men receive higher awards than women for pain and suffering?
2. Do husbands receive higher awards than wives for loss of consortium?
3. Do women receive higher awards than men for disfigurement?
4. Do women employed outside the home receive higher awards than homemakers
for pain and suffering?
COUNSEL FEES AND FEE GENERATING POSITIONS
1. Are women attorneys awarded lower counsel fees than men attorneys for similar
work?
2, Are women attorneys on assigned counsel panels assigned to represent women
and men attorneys assigned to represent men?
3, If you are eligible and have made your interest known, has a judge appointedyou to a fee generating position within the last two years?
4. If yes. please indicate the number of each: Guardian ad litem ___; Receiver
__ Conservator __ : Administrator __ : Other (please specify
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
A O S R
2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4
j Yes
2 No
Y Don't know
I Females
2 Males
Y Don't know
I Yes
2 No
Y Don't know
I Females
2 Males
Y Don't know
O S R
2 3 4
2 3 4
2 3 4
1 2 3 4 5
A 0 S R N
1 2 3 4 5
2 3 4
1 Yes
2 No
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5. Are you on an 18-B (assigned counsel) panel in your county? I Yes 2 No
6. Do women attorneys on assigned counsel panels receive their proportional share I Yes
of violent felony cases? 2 No
Y Don't know
7. Do women attorneys on assigned counsel panels receive their proportional share I Yes
of rape cases? 2 No
Y Don't know
DEMOGRAPHICS (To be used for statistical purposes only)
1. Age
2. Sex I Female 2 Male
3. Race/Ethnicity 4. Number of years practicing in New York
5. Primary county in which you practice
6. Areas of specialization
7. Type of Practice I Sole practitioner 5 Prosecutor
2 Law firm 6 Public agency counsel
3 Corporatelhouse counsel 0 Other:
4 Public Defender (p,.". -f0
Please use the space below for more detailed responses to any of the foregoing ques-
tions and other issues you would like to bring to the Task Force's attention. If necessary,
please attach additional sheets.
PLEASE RETURN YOUR COMPLETED SURVEY TO: R L Associates. 15 Chambers Street. Princeton. New Jersey
08542 by July 26. Thank you for your cooperation.
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Appendix G
Topics for Further Study
L JUVENILE JUSTICE
Many studies of the juvenile justice system have shown girls being
treated more harshly than boys, for lesser offenses.1 The Task Force
received a letter from the Executive Director of Statewide Youth
Advocacy, Inc. (SYA) stating:
The issue of sexism within the juvenile justice system is a serious
one. Anecdotal data received by SYA from social service workers,
law guardians, etc. indicate an over-response to misbehavior of
girls. In particular, all nonconforming actions which imply or are
incidences of precocious or promiscuous (in the eyes of the viewer)
sexuality bring forth the full effort of the state to "protect" the
girl from the presumed ill effects of her sexual action. 2
Survey respondents had rather a different perception. For example,
forty-six percent of women and eighty-eight percent of men reported
that female juveniles are "rarely" or "never" dealt with more harshly
than male juveniles charged with similar status offenses.3
Given the findings in regional and national studies on how gender
effects juvenile justice, and the overarching findings in this Report
concerning how gender affects application of substantive law, this
topic appears worthy of additional study.
II. LEGAL EDUCATION
The question of what kinds of attitudes toward women are being
1. See M. Chesney-Lind, From Benign Neglect to Malign Attention: A Critical
Review of Recent Research on Female Delinquency, in JUSTICE OF YOUNG WOMEN:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR YOUNG WOMEN 51-72 (Davison ed. 1982); Wells and Boisvert,
Toward a Rational Policy on Status Offenders, Soc. WORK, May, 1980, at 230;
see also FEMALE OFFENDER RESOURCE CENTER, LITTLE SISTERS AND THE LAW, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE (1977).
2. Letter from Eve Brooks, Executive Director, Statewide Youth Advocacy,
Inc. (July 3, 1985).
3. Female and male survey respondents (F%/M%) reported that female juveniles
are dealt with more harshly than male juveniles charged with similar status offenses:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
1/1 6/1 25/5 35/47 22/41 10/5
R.L. ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, app. A, at 73.
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fostered in our law schools today is a critical one. Laura Blackburn,
Esq., Director of the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution
and a faculty member at St. John's Law School testified that law
school is "the point of entry into that aspect of the court system
* . . [for lawyers and those] who .. .will later become judges and
administrative judges and chief judges . . . ." The increasing number
of women in law schools is not enough by itself to eliminate gender
bias in the courts. Law schools must be certain that there are women
on the faculty, because their presence there bears on what Ms. Black-
burn described as setting "the vision of who should be in [the legal]
system.'' Law Schools must also be certain that the course materials
used and the information and attitudes conveyed by faculty provide
students with current, accurate data about the spectrum of issues
discussed in this Report. 6
New York State's law schools need to review the casebooks and
materials used in all their courses to determine whether they are
gender biased, and, if so, what steps should be taken, such as the
inclusion of supplementary materials, to overcome this bias.
III. PROSTITUTION
Public hearing witnesses and survey respondents cited prostitution
as an area where there is extreme and obvious gender bias. Lois
Davis, past president of the Rochester Judicial Process Committee,
reported on her organization's experience court watching in Rochester
and Monroe County since 1969.
In a male-dominated system, women defendants have been dis-
criminated against most blatantly when there are sex roles involved
in the charge. Hundreds of women are arrested on charges of
prostitution, but only a handful of men are arrested on charges
of patronizing a prostitute. The charges are equally serious as
listed in the Penal Code. When a woman is arrested, she is held
in jail for a medical examination, which may not be completed
for several days. She is usually fined or given a jail sentence.
Many of the women resort to prostitution because it is the only
way they can support themselves and their children. The few men
who are arrested for patronizing are rarely held in jail, are not
4. New York City Hearings H, supra note 50, at 273 (testimony of Laura
Blackburn).
5. Id.
6. See Study, Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law, funded by Affirmative
Action Office of Ohio State University and Ohio State University College of Law
(June 1986) (reviewing seven most commonly used criminal law casebooks to see
how gender-related topics treated).
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required to have a medical examination, and are often given a
conditional discharge with a statement from the judge who says
that being arrested was punishment enough. Men patronize pros-
titutes purely for pleasure.7
The New York State Bar Association Committee on Revision of
Criminal Law recently issued a report advocating repeal of the current
prostitution law and stating that current enforcement efforts "merely
move the problem from one location to another while concentrating
more and more on women only on the poorest and on minorities." '
This area of the law, particularly the court's manner of enforcement
of prostitution laws, is worthy of future study.
7. Rochester Hearings, supra note 49, at 220 (testimony of Lois Davis).
8. Call for Repeal of Prostitution Law, STATE BAR NEWS, Feb. 1986, at 3.
